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Abstract	  
This	  study	  concerns	  the	  economics	  of	  innovation	  in	  the	  area	  of	  medical	  innovation	  –new	  diagnos-­‐
tics,	   medicines	   and	   vaccines-­‐,	   and	   in	   particular	   how	   innovation	   contributes	   to	   meeting	   public	  
health	  needs.	  Significant	  advances	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  medical	  science	  and	  technological	  innova-­‐
tions	  to	  prevent	  and	  treat	  diseases	  that	  are	  associated	  to	  the	  strong	  research	  and	  innovation	  sys-­‐
tem	   characteristic	   of	   the	   biomedical	   and	   pharmaceutical	   industry	   in	   developed	   countries.	   How-­‐
ever,	   firms	  are	  reluctant	   to	  mobilize	   this	  capacity	   towards	  disease	  areas	  where	  there	  are	  signifi-­‐
cant	  health	  needs	  but	   the	  market	   is	  not	  profitable.	  As	  a	   result,	   less	   socially	   valuable	   innovation	  
takes	  place	  than	  would	  otherwise	  be	  desirable.	  This	  problem	  is	  treated	  in	  this	  study	  through	  insti-­‐
tutional	  analysis,	  applied	  to	  the	  area	  of	  neglected	  diseases.	  The	  term	  neglected	  diseases	  is	  used	  to	  
refer	  to	  a	  group	  of	  diseases	  that	  affect	  over	  1	  billion	  people	  worldwide,	  persist	  under	  conditions	  of	  
poverty	  and	  are	  concentrated	  mainly	  in	  developing	  countries.	  	  
Previous	  studies	  of	   the	  problem	  of	   the	  gap	  of	   innovation	   in	  neglected	  diseases	  have	   focused	  on	  
identifying	  the	  market	  failures	  that	  cause	  for-­‐profit	   firms	  to	   invest	  very	   little	   in	  research	  and	  de-­‐
velopment	  (R&D)	  and	   innovation	   in	  neglected	  diseases,	  and	  advance	   ideas	  for	  new	  or	  additional	  
incentives	   that	   could	   encourage	   greater	   participation	   of	   firms	   in	   this	   area,	   such	   as	   guaranteed	  
payments	  for	  R&D	  efforts	  or	  new	  medical	  products	  developed.	  This	  study	  takes	  on	  a	  different	  ap-­‐
proach,	  centred	  on	  analysing	  the	  institutional	  framework	  in	  which	  R&D	  and	  innovation	  dynamics	  
take	  place.	  In	  particular,	  the	  study	  analyses	  a	  recent	  phenomenon:	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  new	  form	  
of	   institutional	  experiment	  –	  private	  non-­‐profit	  entities	  organized	  as	  product	  development	  part-­‐
nerships	   (PDPs)	   that	   act	   as	   “system	   integrators”	   to	   leverage	   the	   resources	   and	   capabilities	   of	   a	  
network	  of	  public,	  philanthropic	  and	  private	  sector	  partners	  towards	  R&D	  in	  neglected	  diseases.	  	  
The	   study	   also	   examines	   how	   this	   novel	   PDP	   institution	   responds	   to	   a	   well-­‐known	   incentive	  
mechanism	  in	  medical	  innovation	  –	  intellectual	  property	  rights.	  The	  study	  finds	  that	  PDPs	  respond	  
differently	  to	  IPRs	  than	  for-­‐profit	  firms,	  and	  this	  indicates	  there	  are	  variations	  in	  the	  value,	  use	  and	  
impact	  of	  IPRs	  under	  different	  institutional	  settings,	  beyond	  the	  firm.	  	  
	   iii	  
Finally,	  the	  study	  analyses	  the	  challenges	  in	  leveraging	  traditional	  medicinal	  knowledge	  to	  address	  
health	  needs,	  particularly	  in	  developing	  countries,	  and	  finds	  that	  as	  the	  traditional	  institutions	  that	  
have	  supported	  traditional	  medicine	  are	  under	  strain,	  new	  institutions	  are	  needed	  to	  support	  this	  
knowledge	  as	  it	  becomes	  fragile	  and	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  suffer	  from	  deterioration	  or	  even	  disappear-­‐
ance,	  as	  compared	  to	  scientific	  knowledge.	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Résumé	  
La	  présente	  étude	  porte	  sur	  l’économie	  de	  l’innovation	  dans	  le	  domaine	  de	  l’innovation	  médicale	  
(nouvelles	  méthodes	  diagnostiques,	  nouveaux	  médicaments	  et	  nouveaux	  vaccins)	  et	  explique,	  plus	  
particulièrement,	  comment	   l’innovation	  contribue	  à	   répondre	  aux	  besoins	  de	  santé	  publique.	  La	  
science	  médicale	  et	  l’innovation	  technologique	  ont	  fait	  d’immenses	  progrès	  dans	  la	  prévention	  et	  
le	  traitement	  des	  maladies	  notamment	  grâce	  au	  système	  solide	  de	  recherche	  et	  d'innovation	  qui	  
caractérise	  l’industrie	  biomédicale	  et	  pharmaceutique	  des	  pays	  développés.	  Pourtant,	  les	  entrepri-­‐
ses	  sont	  peu	  disposées	  à	  utiliser	  cette	  capacité	  dans	  des	  domaines	  pathologiques	  où	   les	  besoins	  
sanitaires	   sont	   importants,	  mais	   représentent	   un	  marché	   peu	   rentable;	   si	   bien	   que	   l'innovation	  
socialement	  utile	  est	  moins	  profuse	  que	  ce	  qu'il	  faudrait.	  Dans	  la	  présente	  étude,	  le	  problème	  est	  
analysé	   sous	   un	   angle	   institutionnel,	   appliqué	   au	   domaine	   des	  maladies	   négligées.	   L’expression	  
«	  maladies	  négligées	  »	  se	  rapporte	  à	  un	  groupe	  de	  maladies	  qui	  touchent	  plus	  de	  1	  milliard	  de	  per-­‐
sonnes	  dans	   le	  monde,	   se	  manifestent	  plus	   fortement	   là	  où	   sévit	   la	  pauvreté	  et	   se	   concentrent	  
principalement	  dans	  les	  pays	  en	  développement.	  	  
Les	  études	  qui	  se	  sont	  déjà	  penchées	  sur	  le	  problème	  du	  manque	  d’innovation	  en	  matière	  de	  ma-­‐
ladies	  négligées	  avaient	  principalement	  pour	  but	  d’identifier	  les	  défaillances	  du	  marché	  qui	  expli-­‐
quaient	  les	  faibles	  investissements	  des	  entreprises	  à	  but	  lucratif	  dans	  la	  recherche-­‐développement	  
(R-­‐D)	  et	   l’innovation	  des	  maladies	  négligées,	  et	  proposaient	  des	  mesures	   incitatives	  nouvelles	  et	  
additionnelles	  susceptibles	  d’encourager	  les	  entreprises	  à	  s'impliquer	  davantage	  dans	  ce	  domaine,	  
comme	  les	  paiements	  garantis	  pour	  récompenser	  les	  efforts	  en	  matière	  de	  R-­‐D	  et	  la	  mise	  au	  point	  
de	  nouveaux	  produits	  médicaux.	  La	  présente	  étude	  est,	  quant	  à	  elle,	  axée	  sur	   l’analyse	  du	  cadre	  
institutionnel	  dans	  lequel	  les	  dynamiques	  de	  la	  R-­‐D	  et	  de	  l’innovation	  ont	  lieu.	  Plus	  précisément,	  
l’analyse	  concerne	  un	  phénomène	  récent	  :	  l’émergence	  d’une	  nouvelle	  forme	  d’expérience	  institu-­‐
tionnelle	  où	  des	  entités	  privées	  à	  but	  non	  lucratif	  s’organisent	  en	  partenariats	  pour	  l’élaboration	  
de	  produits	  qui	  agissent	  comme	  des	  «	  intégrateurs	  de	  systèmes	  »	  afin	  de	  rassembler	  les	  ressour-­‐
ces	  et	  les	  capacités	  d’un	  réseau	  de	  partenaires	  publics,	  philanthropiques	  et	  privés	  dans	  la	  R-­‐D	  rela-­‐
tive	  aux	  maladies	  négligées.	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L’étude	   examine	   également	   comment	   ce	   nouveau	   dispositif	   institutionnel	   de	   partenariat	   pour	  
l'élaboration	  de	  produits	  s’accorde	  avec	  un	  mécanisme	  d'incitation	  connu	  dans	  le	  domaine	  de	  l'in-­‐
novation	  médicale,	  nommément	  les	  droits	  de	  propriété	  intellectuelle.	  L’étude	  fait	  apparaître	  que	  
les	  partenariats	  ne	  s’adaptent	  pas	  de	  la	  même	  manière	  aux	  droits	  de	  propriété	  intellectuelle	  que	  
les	  entreprises	  à	  but	  lucratif,	  ce	  qui	  montre	  que	  l’utilité,	  l’usage	  et	  les	  effets	  des	  droits	  de	  proprié-­‐
té	  intellectuelle	  varient	  en	  fonction	  des	  contextes	  institutionnels,	  qui	  sont	  extérieurs	  à	  l'entreprise.	  	  
Pour	  finir,	  l’étude	  analyse	  les	  problèmes	  qui	  se	  posent	  pour	  mobiliser	  les	  connaissances	  médicales	  
traditionnelles	  afin	  de	  répondre	  aux	  besoins	  sanitaires,	  notamment	  dans	   les	  pays	  en	  développe-­‐
ment,	  et	  conclut	  qu’étant	  donné	  que	  les	  institutions	  traditionnelles	  qui	  ont	  encouragé	  la	  médecine	  
traditionnelle	  sont	  en	  difficulté,	  de	  nouvelles	   institutions	  sont	  nécessaires	  pour	  assurer	  la	  subsis-­‐
tance	  de	  ces	  connaissances	  qui	  se	  fragilisent	  et	  risquent	  de	  se	  détériorer,	  voire	  de	  disparaître,	  par	  
rapport	  aux	  connaissances	  scientifiques.	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Chapter	  1 Introduction	  
	  
This	  study	  examines	  the	  role	  of	  medical	  product	   innovation	  and	  supportive	   institutional	  
environment	   –the	   rules	   of	   the	   game-­‐	   to	  meet	   health	   needs.	   In	   particular,	   it	   examines	   the	   chal-­‐
lenges	  of	  spurring	  medical	   innovation	  to	  tackle	  diseases	  that	  pose	  a	  disproportionately	  high	  bur-­‐
den	  to	  poor	  populations	  in	  developing	  and	  least	  developed	  countries,	  and	  focuses	  on	  the	  institu-­‐
tional	  framework	  that	  can	  be	  developed	  to	  effectively	  respond	  to	  the	  challenges.	  It	  also	  examines	  
the	   difficulties	   in	   leveraging	   the	   potential	   of	   traditional	  medicinal	   knowledge	   to	   address	   health	  
needs,	  particularly	  in	  developing	  and	  least	  developed	  countries.	  	  
Why	   are	   global	   research	   and	   development	   (R&D)	   priorities	   as	   defined	   by	   market-­‐oriented	   for-­‐
profit	   firms	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   disconnected	   from	  public	   health	   needs?	   Is	   institutional	   change	   or	  
experimentation	   taking	   place	   to	   effectively	   respond	   to	   this	   problem?	   Can	   the	   institutions	   that	  
work	  well	  to	  support	  the	  biomedical	  and	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  be	  extended	  to	  the	  area	  of	  ne-­‐
glected	  diseases?	  These	  are	  some	  of	  the	  questions	  that	  are	  addressed	  in	  this	  study.	  	  
Overall,	   the	  study	   finds	   that	   there	   is	  need	   for	   recognition	   that	   there	  can	  be	  multiple	  of	  ways	  of	  
organizing	  innovation	  and	  institutional	  arrangements	  and	  incentive	  mechanisms	  to	  support	  inno-­‐
vation.	  These	  need	   to	  be	  well	  matched	   to	   the	   specific	   socio-­‐economic	   context	   to	   solve	  pressing	  
social	  dilemmas.	  The	  study	  contributes	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  R&D	  in	  a	  non-­‐profit	  context	  and	  
the	  importance	  of	  collaboration	  and	  non-­‐market	  institutions	  to	  promote	  innovation	  where	  market	  
failures	  occur.	  The	  study	  also	  highlights	  that	  the	  value,	  use	  and	  impact	  of	  specific	  institutions	  asso-­‐
ciated	  to	  R&D	  and	  innovation	  can	  vary	  under	  different	  settings,	  informed	  by	  the	  example	  of	  how	  
intellectual	  property	  rights	  (IPRs)	  are	  managed	  by	  PDPs.	  Finally,	  the	  study	  contributes	  to	  the	  un-­‐
derstanding	  of	  the	  value	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  for	  public	  health	  and	  the	  role	  of	  tradi-­‐
tional	  institutions	  that	  support	  this	  form	  of	  experimental	  knowledge.	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  1.1 Theoretical	  Approach	  
	  
Health	   is	   essential	   to	   human	   well	   -­‐	   being1.	   Not	   all	   people	   have	   the	   same	   capabilities	   –
opportunities-­‐	   to	  achieve	  good	  health	   (Sen,	  2002).	  While	  many	   social,	   economic,	  environmental	  
factors	  and	  personal	  choices	  that	  influence	  health,	  some	  populations	  are	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  poor	  
health.	   These	   include	   those	   in	   the	   lowest	   socioeconomic	   position,	   across	   and	   within	   countries	  
(CSDH	  2008).	  Reducing	  health	  inequity,	  such	  as	  inequalities	  in	  health	  care	  –	  including	  inequalities	  
in	   availability	   or	   access	   to	   interventions	   to	   address	   health	   needs-­‐	   that	   are	   socially	   constructed,	  
unfair	  and	   therefore	  correctable-­‐,	   is	   an	  aspiration	  generally	   shared	  across	  health	  disciplines	  and	  
practitioners.	  It	  is	  also	  supported	  by	  human	  rights	  law	  for	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  right	  to	  health	  that	  
every	  human	  being	  is	  entitled	  to	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  the	  highest	  attainable	  standard	  of	  physical	  and	  
mental	  health.2	  These	  perspectives	  in	  turn	  strongly	  inform	  public	  health	  and	  global	  health	  policy,	  a	  
domain	  in	  which	  governments	  play	  a	  central	  role.3	  	  
Economics,	  particularly	  welfare	  economics	  and	  health	  economics,	   is	   likewise	  influential	   in	  under-­‐
standing	  the	  production	  and	  distribution	  of	  health	  care	  and	   informing	  public	  health	  policy.	  With	  
respect	  to	  the	  treatment	  of	  concerns	  of	  health	  equity,	  overall	  these	  are	  less	  present	  in	  economic	  
policy	  analysis	  as	  compared	  to	  public	  health	  and	  human	  rights	  (economics	  is	  generally	  more	  con-­‐
cerned	  with	  maximizing	  growth	  or	  aggregate	  social	  utility).	  The	  functioning	  of	  society	  is	  analyzed	  
mainly	   through	   the	   lens	  of	  market	  organization,	   as	  opposed	   to	  other	  alternative	   social	   arrange-­‐
ments.	  Orthodox	  economic	   theory	  holds	   that	   rational,	   self-­‐interested	   individuals	  participating	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  World	  Health	  Organization	  definition	  of	  health	  is	  “a	  state	  of	  complete	  physical,	  mental	  and	  social	  well-­‐being	  and	  
not	  merely	   the	  absence	  of	  disease	  or	   infirmity”.	   Preamble	   to	   the	  Constitution	  of	   the	  World	  Health	  Organization	  as	  
adopted	  by	  the	  International	  Health	  Conference,	  New	  York,	  19-­‐22	  June,	  1946;	  signed	  on	  22	  July	  1946	  by	  the	  represen-­‐
tatives	  of	  61	  States	  (Official	  Records	  of	  the	  World	  Health	  Organization,	  no.	  2,	  p.	  100)	  and	  entered	  into	  force	  on	  7	  April	  
1948.	  
2	  The	  right	  to	  health	   is	  recognized	  in	  the	  1948	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (UDHR)	  and	  the	  1966	  Interna-­‐
tional	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights,	  Article	  12.	   It	   is	  discussed	  in	  detail	   in	  the	  General	  Comment	  
No.	  14	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights,	  E/C.12/2000/4.	  	  Government	  obliga-­‐
tions	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  right	  to	  health	  include	  providing	  access	  to	  affordable	  and	  quality	  health	  care	  for	  all.	  	  	  
3	   The	   concept	   of	   “global	   health”	   is	   often	   used	   interchangeably	  with	   public	   health	   (at	   a	   global	   scale),	   international	  
health,	  or	  global	  public	  health.	  Some	  common	  elements	  emphasized	  are	  health	  as	  a	  public	  good	  -­‐benefit	  all	  members	  
of	  every	  society-­‐;	  priority	  on	  a	  population-­‐based	  and	  preventive	  focus;	  concentration	  on	  poorer,	  vulnerable,	  and	  un-­‐
derserved	   populations;	   multidisciplinary;	   importance	   of	   systems	   and	   structures;	   and	   the	   participation	   of	   several	  
stakeholders	  (Koplan	  et	  al	  2009).	  Global	  health	  also	  denotes	  a	  notion	  of	  health	   interdependence	  and	  risk	  across	  na-­‐
tional	  borders	  due	  to	  cross	  border	  flow	  of	  people	  and	  products.	  (Frenk	  and	  Moon	  2013).	  
	  	   3	  
open	  markets	  –competition	  and	  well-­‐functioning	  pricing	  system-­‐,	  should	  provide	  the	  optimal	  out-­‐
come	  that	  enhances	  overall	  economic	  growth	  and	  welfare	  for	  society.	  Thus,	  economic	  policy	  has	  
largely	  focused	  on	  analyzing	  how	  a	  given	  situation	  can	  be	  brought	  closer	  to	  this	  ideal.	  	  
A	  broad	  criticism	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  the	   largely	  abstract	  nature	  of	  the	  analysis,	  devoid	  from	  real	  
world	   experience;	   what	   R.	   Coase	   termed	   “blackboard	   economics”.	   Coase	   (1937)	   prominently	  
showed	  that	  there	  are	  costs	  to	  using	  the	  price	  mechanism	  for	  coordinating	  economic	  activity	  that	  
explained	  why	  alternative	   institutional	   arrangements,	   -­‐primarily	   the	   firm-­‐,	   surface	   to	   coordinate	  
economic	  activity	  at	  a	   lower	  cost.	  Coase	  also	  argued	  that	  when	  property	   rights	  are	  well	  defined	  
and	   transactions	   costs	   are	   low,	   private	   parties	   can	   organize	   among	   themselves	   to	   internalize	  
(solve)	  externalities–	  the	  costs	  or	  benefits	  of	  market	  transactions	  that	  affect	  an	  uninvolved	  third	  
party	  to	  the	  transaction	  (Coase	  1960).	  Likewise,	  K.	  Arrow	  in	  a	  seminal	  work	  focused	  on	  the	  health	  
care	  industry	  showed	  that	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  industry	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  satisfy	  the	  needs	  of	  so-­‐
ciety	  differs	  from	  the	  precepts	  of	  orthodox	  economics,	  and	  advanced	  that	  when	  the	  market	  fails,	  
social	   institutions	   are	   created	   to	   attempt	   to	   address	   the	   gaps	   (Arrow	  1963).	   Institutions	   can	  be	  
broadly	  understood	  as	  “the	  rules	  of	  the	  game”	  that	  structure	  interactions,	  reward	  and	  regulate	  a	  
variety	  of	  actors	  interacting	  in	  the	  economy.	  	  
The	  existence	  of	  various	   forms	  of	  markets	   failures	  and	  the	   importance	  of	   institutions	  to	  address	  
these	   is	   now	  well	   accepted	   and	   is	  widely	   applied	   as	   a	   framework	  of	   economic	   analysis.	  Market	  
failures	   find	  explanation	   in	  various	   factors,	   including	   transaction	  costs,	  externalities,	   information	  
asymmetries,	  mismatched	  incentives,	  and	  lack	  of	  supportive	  institutions.	  However,	  the	  approach	  
of	  understanding	  the	  dynamics	  in	  the	  economy	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  market	  failures	  is	  not	  without	  
critique,	  particularly	  from	  evolutionary	  and	  new	  institutional	  economics	  (Nelson	  and	  Winter	  1982,	  
Williamson	  2000)	  that	  aim	  to	  broaden	  the	  analysis	  to	  include	  market	  and	  non-­‐market	  institutions	  
that	  influence	  economic	  behavior.	  As	  noted	  by	  Nelson	  (1990),	  “active	  policy	  analyzed	  as	  response	  
to	  “market	  failures”	  is	  not	  adequate	  as	  it	  gives	  privilege	  standing	  to	  market	  organization,	  and	  sup-­‐
plements	  to	  market	  organization	  or	  different	  forms	  of	  organization	  or	  financing	  of	  an	  activity	  are	  
placed	   in	  a	  position	  of	   ‘second	  best’	  solution	   justified	  only	  because	  markets	   ‘fail’	   in	  some	  sense.	  
Better	  to	  see	  that	  different	  kinds	  of	   financing,	  and	  different	  kinds	  of	  organization,	  are	  better	  for	  
different	  kinds	  of	   things,	   instead	  of	  viewing	   the	  markets	  as	  preferred	  general	  purpose	  model	  of	  
operation,	  except	  when	  they	  fail.	  Analysis	  of	  different	  forms	  of	  different	  ways	  of	  organizing,	  gov-­‐
erning	  and	  funding	  an	  activity	  should	  proceed	  without	  bias.”	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This	  study	  also	  follows	  the	  approach	  that	  economic	  analysis	  of	  a	  socio-­‐economic	  problem	  requires	  
understanding	  to	  the	  specific	  context	  for	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  market	  and	  non-­‐market	  elements	  
of	  the	  economy	  and	  in	  particular,	  the	  underlying	  institutions.	  Furthermore,	  the	  study	  also	  consid-­‐
ers	  that	  market	  failures	  remain	  a	  valid	  and	  useful	  approach,	  though	  not	  sufficient,	  to	  think	  about	  
how	  alternative	   institutional	  arrangements	  and	  policy	   interventions	  can	  correct	   for	   less	   than	  so-­‐
cially	  optimal	  outcomes	  because	  of	  the	  extent	  of	  use	  or	  influence	  of	  markets	  in	  most	  economies	  
and	   societies.	   Combining	   the	   market	   failure	   approach	   with	   institutional	   analysis	   provides	   a	  
broader	  and	  more	  realistic	  framework	  of	  analysis	  to	  consider	  potential	  alternative	  arrangements	  
to	  markets	  to	  direct	  medical	  innovation	  towards	  meeting	  public	  health	  needs.	  	  
	  1.2 Chapters	  
	  
The	   study	   is	  organized	   in	   three	   chapters.	  Chapter	  1:	   	   “Can	  medical	  products	  be	  developed	  on	  a	  
nonprofit	   basis?	   Exploring	   product	   development	   partnerships	   in	   neglected	   diseases”,	   begins	   by	  
providing	  a	  context	  of	  the	  problem	  of	   lack	  of	  R&D	  and	  medical	   innovations	  to	  diagnose,	  prevent	  
and	  treat	  diseases	  that	  have	  a	  large	  burden	  in	  developing	  countries	  but	  no	  or	  small	  burden	  in	  the	  
developed	  world.	   In	   the	  past	   decades,	   significant	   advances	  have	   taken	  place	   in	  medical	   science	  
and	   technological	   innovations	   health,	   including	   developing	   new	   diagnostic	   tools,	   vaccines	   and	  
medicines	  to	  prevent	  and	  treat	  diseases.	  These	  are	  related	  to	  the	  strong	  research	  and	  innovation	  
system	   characteristic	   of	   the	   biomedical	   and	   pharmaceutical	   industry	   in	   developed	   countries	  
(Cockburn	  and	  Stern	  2010).	   The	   system,	  however,	  has	  not	  been	  unable	   to	  address	  a	  number	  of	  
problems.	  The	  specific	  problem	  addressed	   in	  this	  chapter	   is	   the	   lack	  of	  new	  medical	  products	   in	  
the	  area	  of	  neglected	  diseases.	  The	  chapter	  analyses	  a	  recent	  phenomenon:	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  
new	   form	  of	   institutional	  experiment	  –product	  development	  partnerships	   (PDPs).	  We	  define	   for	  
purposes	  of	  our	  study	  PDPs	  as	  self-­‐governing,	  private,	  non-­‐profit	  organizations	  that	  aim	  to	  develop	  
new	  medical	  products	  in	  the	  area	  of	  neglected	  diseases.	  The	  chapter	  examines	  closely	  PDP	  institu-­‐
tions,	  in	  particular	  how	  they	  address	  knowledge	  externalities	  and	  solve	  coordination	  problems	  in	  
the	  complex	  area	  of	  R&D	  for	  medical	  innovation	  for	  neglected	  diseases.	  A	  key	  finding	  is	  that	  PDPs	  
act	  as	  “system	  integrators”	  to	  leverage	  the	  resources	  and	  capabilities	  of	  a	  network	  of	  public,	  phil-­‐
anthropic	  and	  private	  sector	  partners	  towards	  R&D	  in	  neglected	  diseases.	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Chapter	  2	  explores	  in	  detail	  the	  institution	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  (IPRs).	  While	  it	  is	  consid-­‐
ered	  to	  provide	  important	  incentives	  for	  R&D	  and	  innovation	  in	  the	  biomedical	  and	  pharmaceuti-­‐
cal	  industry,	  so	  far	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  as	  to	  whether	  IPRs	  play	  a	  similar	  role	  in	  context	  of	  PDPs	  in	  
the	  area	  of	  neglected	  diseases.	  The	  study	  finds	  that	  IPRs	  does	  not	  act	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  the	  R&D	  
activities	  of	  PDPs,	  but	  PDPs	  do	  use	  IPRs	  for	  strategic	  purposes	  to	  advance	  their	  non-­‐profit	  and	  ac-­‐
cess	  mandate.	  A	  broad	  conclusion	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  that	  the	  research	  on	  economics	  of	  IPRs	  should	  
be	  informed	  by	  institutional	  analysis	  to	  deepen	  understanding	  of	  the	  variations	   in	  the	  value,	  use	  
and	  impact	  of	  IPRs	  under	  different	  institutional	  settings,	  beyond	  the	  firm.	  
Finally,	  Chapter	  3	  explores	  the	  value	  and	  role	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  in	  addressing	  pub-­‐
lic	  health	  needs.	  The	  weakening	  of	  traditional	  institutions	  to	  support	  the	  production	  and	  diffusion	  
of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  is	  associated	  to	  loss	  of	  knowledge,	  which	  to	  reduced	  capacity	  for	  
effective	   action	   in	   certain	   socioeconomic	   contexts	   and	   circumstances	   in	   which	   such	   knowledge	  
was	  previously	  useful	  or	  can	  be	  useful.	  As	  this	  system	  of	   institutions	  becomes	   less	  robust	  and	   is	  
collapsing,	  then	  the	  question	  of	  what	  socio-­‐economic	   institutions	  can	  be	  relied	  upon	  to	  produce	  
and	  distribute	  experiential	  knowledge	  in	  an	  efficient	  manner	  becomes	  central.	  The	  chapter	  exam-­‐
ines	   to	  what	  extent	   the	   institutions	   that	   support	   scientific	   knowledge	   could	  be	  extended	   to	   the	  
case	  of	  experiential	   knowledge,	   as	   a	   substitute	  of	   the	   traditional	   institutional	   framework	   that	   is	  
slowly	  disappearing.	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Chapter	  2 Can	   medical	   products	   be	   devel-­‐oped	   on	   a	   not-­‐for-­‐profit	   basis?	   Exploring	  product	   development	   partnerships	   for	   neg-­‐lected	  diseases4	  
	  
Reliance	   on	  market	   forces	   can	   lead	   to	   underinvestment	   in	   social	  welfare	   enhancing	   innovation.	  
The	  lack	  of	  new	  medical	  products	  in	  the	  area	  of	  neglected	  diseases	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  R&D	  for	  ne-­‐
glected	  diseases	  has	   increased	  with	  new	  funding	  and	  collaborations	  taking	  place	  mainly	   through	  
product	  development	  partnerships	  (PDPs).	  PDPs	  are	  self-­‐governing,	  private	  non-­‐profit	  R&D	  organi-­‐
zations.	  In	  contrast	  to	  push	  and	  pull	  instruments	  designed	  to	  address	  private-­‐sector	  R&D	  underin-­‐
vestment,	  PDPs	  have	  emerged	  voluntarily	  to	  address	  this	  public	  health	  challenge.	  In	  this	  study	  we	  
examine	  how	  non-­‐profit	  R&D	  collaboration	  for	  neglected	  diseases	  takes	  place	  through	  PDPs.	  We	  
find	  that	  PDPs	  act	  as	  ‘system	  integrators’	  that	  leverage	  the	  resources	  and	  capabilities	  of	  a	  network	  
of	  public,	  philanthropic	  and	  private-­‐sector	  partners.	  This	  study	  contributes	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  
R&D	  in	  a	  non-­‐profit	  context	  and	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  collaboration	  and	  nonmarket	  institu-­‐
tions	  for	  promoting	  innovation	  where	  market	  failures	  occur.	  	  
	  2.1 Introduction	  
	  
Over	  a	  billion	  people	  are	  affected	  by	  diseases	   that	  have	  a	   large	  burden	   in	  developing	  countries,	  
but	   no	   or	   small	   burden	   in	   the	   developed	  world	   (World	   Health	   Organization	   2010).	   Historically,	  
government	  public	  health	  programs	  and	   the	  pharmaceutical	   industry	  have	  neglected	   these	  pov-­‐
erty-­‐related	  diseases.	  Very	   few	  new	  medical	   products	   (drugs,	   vaccines	   and	  other	  biological	   pro-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  This	  Chapter	  is	  published	  as	  Muñoz-­‐Tellez,	  V.,	  Visentin,	  F.,	  Foray,	  D.,	  Gaule,	  P.	  (2014)	  ‘Can	  medical	  products	  be	  de-­‐
veloped	   on	   a	   not-­‐for-­‐profit	   basis?	   The	   case	   of	   Product	   Development	   Partnerships’,	   Science	   and	   Public	   Policy,	   doi:	  
10.1093/scipol/scu049.	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ducts,	  diagnostics	  and	  vector	  control	  products)	  are	  developed	  for	  their	  prevention	  and	  treatment.	  
Pharmaceutical	  firms,	  absent	  market	  incentives	  to	  spur	  their	  commercial	  interests,	  are	  reluctant	  to	  
independently	   engage	   in	   these	   endeavours.	   As	   a	   result,	   they	   pass	   up	   opportunities	   for	   socially	  
valuable	  innovation.	  	  
Economists	  have	  proposed	  a	  range	  of	  economic	  instruments	  to	  incentivize	  firm-­‐level	  R&D	  in	  neg-­‐
lected	  diseases.	  Push	  mechanisms	  that	  aim	  to	  bring	  down	  firms’	  costs	  of	  R&D,	  such	  as	  grants,	  tax	  
credits	  and	   loans	  are	  more	  broadly	  used	  by	  policy-­‐makers.	  Pull	  mechanisms,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
such	  as	  milestone	  or	  end	  prizes,	  aim	  to	  increase	  market	  attractiveness	  by	  lowering	  the	  risk	  of	  R&D	  
and	  assuring	  revenue	  for	  the	  outputs.	  	  
Meanwhile,	   a	   rising	   number	   of	   self-­‐governing	   private	   non-­‐profit	   organizations	   have	   emerged	   to	  
catalyse	   R&D	   for	   neglected	   diseases.	   Product	   Development	   Partnerships	   (PDPs)	   have	   produced	  
various	  new	  diagnostics	  and	  therapies	  in	  the	  form	  of	  reformulated	  or	  repurposed	  versions	  of	  exist-­‐
ing	  drugs,	  vaccines	  and	  biological	  products.	  They	  have	  also	  built	  significant	  R&D	  project	  portfolios	  
with	  several	  novel	  vaccines	  and	  drug	  candidates	   in	   the	  pipeline,	   including	  new	  chemical	  entities	  
(NCEs).	  Most	  PDPs	  do	  not	  undertake	  any	  in-­‐house	  R&D	  activities,	  but	  rather	  operate	  through	  ex-­‐
ternal	   collaboration.	   PDPs	   mobilize	   funding	   from	   philanthropic	   and	   public	   entities	   and	   partner	  
with	  a	  number	  of	  public	  and	  private	   institutions	  to	   implement	  R&D	  projects,	   including	  academia	  
and	  public	   research	   institutes,	   pharmaceutical,	   biotechnology	   and	  other	   private	   for-­‐profit	   firms,	  
such	  as	  contract	  research	  organizations.	  	  
This	   PDP	   openness	   to	   external	   R&D	   collaboration	   can	   appear	   to	   mirror	   a	   similar	   trend	   in	   the	  
pharmaceutical	  and	  biotechnology	   industry	   (Juliano	  2013).	  However,	   the	  motivation	   for	  PDPs	   to	  
pursue	  R&D	  collaboration	  is	  distinctly	  associated	  with	  their	  non-­‐profit	  mission.	  Large	  pharmaceu-­‐
tical	  firms	  are	  increasingly	  sourcing	  their	  R&D	  portfolios	  by	  in-­‐licensing	  external	  R&D	  projects	  and	  
through	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions	  (M&A)	  to	  raise	  growth	  and	  revenue	  prospects	  (Schuhmacher	  et	  
al	  2013).	  In	  contrast,	  the	  common	  goal	  of	  PDPs	  is	  to	  build	  R&D	  portfolios	  to	  develop	  products	  that	  
address	  unmet	  health	  needs.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  final	  product	  must	  be	  affordable	  and	  accessible	  
to	  patients.	  In	  this	  context,	  partners	  involved	  in	  PDP-­‐led	  R&D	  projects	  have	  to	  operate	  within	  the	  
confines	  of	   the	  PDP	  mission.	  The	   concept	  of	   “partnership”	   implies	  a	   commitment	   to	  a	   common	  
goal	  through	  the	  joint	  provision	  of	  complementary	  resources	  and	  expertise,	  and	  the	  joint	  sharing	  
of	  the	  risks	  involved	  (Ridley	  2001).	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This	   research	   is	   informed	  by	  a	   literature	   review	  and	   in-­‐	  depth	   interviews	  with	   the	  staff	  of	  PDPs.	  
Previous	   literature	   has	   described	   the	   role	   of	   PDPs	   in	   the	   neglected	   disease	   landscape	   (Moran	  
2005,	   Grace	   2006,	   Chataway	   et	   al	   2007,	   Grace	   2010,	  Moran	   et	   al	   2010,	   Chataway	   et	   al	   2010).	  
While	   building	   on	   this	   literature,	   we	   further	   explain	   the	   operation	   of	   PDPs,	   identify	   their	   core	  
capabilities,	  provide	  an	  update	  of	  PDP	  outputs,	  and	  analyse	  the	  variety	  among	  PDPs	  and	  the	  con-­‐
straints	  of	  the	  PDP	  approach.	  	  
The	  study	   is	  divided	   into	  seven	  sections.	  Following	   the	   introduction,	   the	  second	  section	  
presents	  the	  problem	  of	  insufficient	  innovation	  for	  neglected	  diseases.	  The	  third	  section	  then	  de-­‐
scribes	  the	  economic	  instruments	  that	  are	  designed	  to	  stimulate	  innovation	  in	  neglected	  diseases.	  
The	   fourth	   section	   explores	   how	   PDPs	   access	   and	   leverage	   external	   resources	   and	   capabilities	  
through	  R&D	  collaborations.	  The	  fifth	  section	  explains	  the	  variety	  within	  the	  PDP	  landscape.	  The	  
sixth	   section	  discusses	   the	   limitations	  of	   the	  PDP	  organizational	   form.	   The	   seventh	   section	   con-­‐
cludes.	  
	  2.2 The	  shortfall	  of	  innovation	  for	  neglected	  diseases	  
	  
The	  “neglected	  disease”	  expression	  points	  out	  the	  problem	  of	   insufficient	  new	  medical	  products	  
developed	  to	  address	  diseases	  that	  create	  a	  large	  burden	  in	  developing	  countries,	  but	  little	  or	  no	  
impact	  in	  the	  developed	  world.	  There	  is	  no	  single	  definition	  of	  “neglected	  disease”.	  The	  WHO	  de-­‐
fines	  “neglected	  diseases”	  as	  a	  group	  of	  17	  diseases	  affecting	  more	  than	  1	  billion	  people	  world-­‐
wide	  that	  persist	  under	  conditions	  of	  poverty	  and	  are	  concentrated	  almost	  exclusively	  in	  impover-­‐
ished	  populations	  in	  developing	  countries	  (World	  Health	  Organization	  2010).5	   Infectious	  diseases	  
in	  particular	  account	  for	  10	  million	  deaths	  each	  year,	  of	  which	  more	  than	  90	  percent	  occur	  in	  de-­‐
veloping	  countries	  (World	  Health	  Organization	  2010).	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  our	  study,	  we	  consider	  
the	  WHO-­‐	  listed	  diseases	  and	  also	  include	  three	  communicable	  diseases:	  tuberculosis,	  malaria	  and	  
HIV/AIDS.6	   These	   are	   diseases	   prevalent	   in	   developing	   countries	   that	   often	   they	   co-­‐exist	   with	  
other	  neglected	  diseases.	  However,	  they	  differ	  from	  other	  “neglected”	  diseases	  in	  that	  they	  may	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  diseases	  concerned	  are:	  Buruli	  ulcer;	  Chagas	  disease;	  cysticercosis;	  dengue;	  dracunculiasis;	  echinococcosis;	  en-­‐
demic	   treponematoses;	   foodborne	   trematode	   infections;	   human	   African	   trypanosomiasis;	   leishmaniasis;	   leprosy;	  
lymphatic	  filariasis;,	  onchocerciasis;	  rabies;	  schistosomiasis;	  soil-­‐transmitted	  helminthiases;	  and	  trachoma.	  	  
6	  The	  inclusion	  of	  these	  diseases	  is	  consistent	  with	  other	  studies,	  i.e.	  	  Trouiller	  et	  al.	  2002	  and	  the	  G-­‐FINDER	  Report	  on	  
Neglected	  Disease	  R&D,	  2012.	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also	  be	  found	  in	  developed	  countries	  (e.g.	  tuberculosis	  and	  HIV/AIDS)	  and	  generally	  receive	  more	  
financing	  for	  R&D	  and	  delivery.	  	  
New	  medical	  products	  are	  essential	  to	  the	  prevention,	  control	  and	  elimination	  of	  disease.	  The	  cur-­‐
rent	   level	  of	  R&D	  for	  new	  medical	  products	   targeting	  neglected	  diseases	   is	  negligible	   relative	   to	  
the	  health	  burden	  of	  these	  diseases.	  The	  imbalance	  is	  evident	  if	  we	  consider	  (i)	  the	  amount	  of	  R&D	  
investment	  for	  neglected	  diseases	  compared	  to	  the	  global	  R&D	  investment	  for	  all	  diseases	  and	  the	  
health	  burden	  of	  neglected	  diseases;	  and	  (ii)	  the	  number	  of	  new	  medical	  products	  developed	  for	  
neglected	  diseases	  compared	  to	  other	  diseases.	  	  	  
One	  study	  has	  found	  that	  global	  R&D	  investments	  by	  the	  public,	  philanthropic	  and	  private	  sectors	  
in	   neglected	   disease	   research	   in	   2010	   (approximately	   US$2.4	   billion)	   accounted	   for	   only	   1%	   of	  
overall	   health	   R&D	   investments	   (US$240	   billion)	   (Røttingen	   et	   al	   2013).	   	   Funding	   for	   neglected	  
diseases	  has	  slightly	  increased	  from	  an	  estimated	  US$	  2.8	  billion	  in	  2005	  (Global	  Forum	  for	  Health	  
Research	  2008)	  to	  US$3.045	  billion	  in	  2011	  (G-­‐Finder	  2012).	  The	  largest	  funders	  are	  public	  donors,	  
with	  a	  total	  of	  US$	  1.9	  billion	  in	  2011,	  followed	  by	  philanthropic	  donors,	  with	  a	  total	  of	  US$525.1	  
million	  in	  2011	  (G-­‐Finder	  2012).	  	  
The	  small	  number	  of	  new	  medical	  products	  for	  neglected	  diseases,	  as	  compared	  to	  other	  diseases,	  
is	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  persistent	  gap	  in	  innovation	  within	  this	  area.	  One	  landmark	  study	  found	  that	  
between	  1975	  and	  1999,	  1,393	  new	  drugs	  (excluding	  vaccines)	  were	  made	  available	  to	  the	  public;	  
however,	  only	  16	  of	  these	  were	  meant	  for	  neglected	  diseases	  (Troullier	  et	  al.	  2002).	  A	  recent	  study	  
finds	  that	  of	   the	  850	  new	  therapeutic	  products	   (NCEs,	  new	   indications,	  new	  formulations,	   fixed-­‐
dose	  combinations,	  and	  vaccines	  and	  biologicals)	   registered	   in	   the	  period	  2000	  to	  2011,	  only	  37	  
(4%)	  were	  indicated	  for	  neglected	  diseases,	  comprising	  25	  products	  with	  a	  new	  indication	  or	  for-­‐
mulation,	  and	  eight	  vaccines	  or	  biological	  products.	  Of	  those	  25	  products,	  only	  4	  were	  NCEs.	  Only	  
1%	  of	  all	  registered	  clinical	  trials	  were	  for	  neglected	  diseases	  (Pedrique	  et	  al.	  2013).	  	  
Generally	  firms	  invest	  in	  R&D	  with	  the	  expectation	  that	  the	  revenues	  generated	  from	  the	  sales	  of	  
new	  medical	  products	  will	  increase	  as	  a	  result.	  They	  finance	  R&D	  from	  their	  own	  resources	  (prof-­‐
its),	  as	  well	  as	  from	  public	  support	  instruments,	  such	  as	  tax	  breaks	  and	  grants.	  Nonetheless,	  firms	  
generally	  tend	  to	  invest	  less	  than	  the	  socially	  optimal	  levels	  of	  R&D.	  The	  reasons	  include	  high	  risks	  
and	  costs,	  problems	  of	  R&D	   financing	  and	   incomplete	  appropriability	  of	   returns	   to	  R&D	   (Nelson	  
1959,	  Hall	  2010).	  To	  address	  the	  appropriability	  problem,	  firms	  can	  seek	  legal	  protection	  for	  their	  
inventions	  through	  government-­‐granted	  patents	  that	  give	  the	  firms	  time-­‐limited	  monopoly	  control	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(e.g.	   manufacture,	   use,	   and	   sales)	   over	   the	   product.	   Patents	   support	   a	   firm’s	   pricing	   strategy,	  
aimed	  at	  setting	  a	  price	  as	  profitable	  as	  the	  buyer	  (there	  can	  be	  several	  possible	  buyers,	  such	  as	  
government	  health	  authorities,	  insurers,	  prescribers/pharmacists,	  patients	  out-­‐of-­‐pocket)	  is	  willing	  
to	  pay.	  Use	  of	  patent-­‐	  protected	  inventions	  normally	  requires	  authorization	  of	  the	  patent	  holder.	  
Only	  after	  the	  patent	  protection	  expires,	  generally	  a	  20-­‐	  year	  period,	  can	  any	  other	  firm	  produce	  
and	  market	  a	  generic	  version	  of	   the	  product.	  This	   competition	  helps	   to	  bring	  down	   the	  product	  
price.	  	  
The	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  has	  historically	  invested	  very	  little	  in	  R&D	  for	  new	  medical	  products	  
within	  the	  area	  of	  neglected	  diseases.	  This	  is	  to	  be	  expected,	  as	  the	  market	  for	  neglected	  diseases	  
does	  not	  offer	  firms	  many	  opportunities	  for	  profit,	  despite	  the	  gross	  unmet	  needs	  for	  treatment.	  
Accordingly,	  the	  economic	  barriers	  to	  R&D	  in	  neglected	  diseases	  by	  private	  firms	  can	  be	  described	  
as	  follows	  (Webber	  and	  Kremer	  2001):	  	  -­‐ Commercial	  markets	  are	  small.	  	  -­‐ Individual	  purchasing	  power	  is	  limited,	  even	  though	  the	  number	  of	  patients	  may	  be	  
very	  large.	  	  -­‐ High	  R&D	  costs	   (estimated	   to	  be	   the	  same	  as	   for	  new	  medical	  products	   for	  other	  
diseases)	   and	   the	   inherent	   risk	   in	   R&D	  will	   not	   be	   covered	   by	   returns	   on	   invest-­‐
ments.	  
Moreover,	  patents	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  the	  appropriability	  of	  R&D	  returns	  are	  not	  an	  effec-­‐
tive	  mechanism	  to	  stimulate	  R&D	  in	  neglected	  diseases,	  given	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  profitable	  market,	  
and	  rather	  may	  affect	  the	  availability	  of	  affordable	  medical	  products	  (World	  Health	  Organization	  
2006).	  
It	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  risks	  and	  costs	  of	  new	  product	  development	  for	  neglected	  disease	  R&D	  
may	   be	   the	   same	   as	   for	   other	   diseases.7	  Medical	   product	   development	   is	   generally	   very	   costly,	  
with	  a	  high	  risk	  of	  failure.	  However,	  precise	  data	  on	  R&D	  costs	  of	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  are	  gener-­‐
ally	  unavailable	  or	  undisclosed.	   This	   is	   a	   critical	   constraint	   for	   the	  adequate	  design	  of	  economic	  
instruments	  and	   their	  employment	   to	   incentivize	  R&D	   in	  neglected	  as	  well	   as	   in	  other	  diseases.	  
When	  firms	  do	  provide	  cost	  data,	  it	  is	  not	  specified	  how	  the	  R&D	  costs	  are	  calculated,	  or	  what	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  There	  can	  be	  ample	  variance,	  depending	  on	  the	  disease	  (e.g.	  the	  extent	  of	  research	  and	  development	  gaps,	  market	  
attractiveness)	  and	  type	  of	  product	  and	  means	  of	  undertaking	  clinical	  trials.	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included	  in	  the	  cost	  (Morgan	  et	  al	  2010).	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  a	  drug	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  NCE	  may	  take	  
between	  13	  –15	  years,	  from	  discovery	  to	  when	  it	  is	  available	  on	  the	  market.	  For	  vaccines,	  the	  full	  
R&D	  process	  may	  take	  12	  years.	  The	  levels	  of	  attrition	  (likelihood	  of	  project	  failure)	  can	  be	  close	  to	  
60%,	  higher	  in	  the	  discovery	  stage.	  Published	  estimates	  of	  the	  R&D	  costs	  diverge	  widely,	  with	  ex-­‐
isting	  studies	  varying	  in	  methodologies,	  data	  sources,	  samples	  and	  time	  periods.	  For	  example,	  one	  
recent	  study	  by	  health	  economists	  calculate	  that	  the	  net	  median	  R&D	  cost	  may	  be	  in	  the	  range	  of	  
US$13	  to	  204	  million,	  while	  existing	  estimates	  range	  from	  US$161	  million	  to	  1.8	  billion	  (Light	  and	  
Warburton	  2011).	  	  
There	  are	  also	  no	  concrete	  data	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  R&D	  investment	  overall	   in	  medical	  products	  by	  
pharmaceutical	  firms.	  While	  R&D	  costs	  have	  risen	  in	  the	  past	  two	  decades,	  revenues	  for	  pharma-­‐
ceutical	  firms	  have	  increased	  six	  times	  faster,	  with	  net	  profits	  after	  taxes	  substantially	  higher	  than	  
profits	  for	  all	  other	  Fortune	  500	  companies	  (Light	  and	  Lexchin	  2012).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  overall	  
rate	  of	  innovation	  in	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  has	  been	  in	  decline.	  The	  number	  of	  total	  innova-­‐
tive	  new	  medical	  products	  approved	  has	  fallen	  since	  the	  1990s,	  while	  many	  of	  those	  are	  “me	  too”	  
drugs,	  rather	  than	  new	  chemical	  (or	  molecular)	  entities,	  and	  without	  significant	  therapeutic	  value.	  	  	  
	  2.3 Economic	  instruments	  to	  stimulate	  innovation	  in	  neglected	  diseases	  	  
	  
In	  the	  last	  decades,	  various	  instruments	  have	  been	  designed,	  and	  some	  have	  been	  implemented	  to	  
address	  the	  underinvestment	  problem	  illustrated	  above.	  With	  the	  aim	  of	  filling	  the	  gap	  between	  
private	  and	  social	  returns	  to	  R&D	  in	  the	  field	  of	  neglected	  diseases,	  “push’’	  and	  “pull’’’	  instruments	  
have	  been	  explored	  by	  public	  and	  philanthropic	  sectors	  for	  financing	  and	  increasing	  R&D	  efforts.	  
“Push”	   instruments	   aim	   to	   stimulate	  R&D	  by	   reducing	   the	   costs	   of	   R&D	   for	   the	   industry.	   These	  
include	  instruments	  that	  pay	  for	  inputs	  to	  R&D,	  such	  as	  providing	  direct	  funding	  to	  research,	  par-­‐
ticularly	   basic	   research,	   but	   may	   also	   extend	   to	   applied	   research	   (grants	   to	   universities,	   gov-­‐
ernment	  public	   research	   laboratories,	  or	   for	   joint	  projects	  with	   industry),	  R&D	  tax	  breaks,	  direct	  
grants	  for	  small	  firms,	  funding	  for	  clinical	  trials	  in	  developing	  countries,	  open	  innovation	  platforms,	  
patent	  pools	  and	  related	   initiatives,	   fast	   track	   regulatory	   review	  (approvals),	  pre-­‐competitive	   re-­‐
search	  platforms	  for	  sharing	  R&D	  costs	  and	  regulatory	  harmonization.	  Some	  of	  the	  problems	  asso-­‐
ciated	  with	  pull	  instruments	  are	  that	  they	  may	  not	  provide	  sufficient	  incentive	  for	  R&D	  by	  them-­‐
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selves.	  Incentives	  between	  grantees	  and	  funders	  may	  be	  imperfectly	  aligned,	  and	  the	  instruments	  
are	  vulnerable	  to	  politization/lobbying	  (Sampath	  and	  Hedge	  2011).	  	  	  
“Pull”	  instruments	  pay	  for	  the	  outputs	  of	  R&D.	  The	  main	  barrier	  considered	  is	  insufficient	  market	  
attractiveness,	  rather	  than	  the	  high	  cost	  of	  R&D.	  Pull	  instruments	  aim	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  a	  
lack	   of	   commercial	  markets.	   They	   are	   designed	   to	   create	   demand	   for	   yet-­‐to-­‐be-­‐developed	   pro-­‐
ducts	  and	  effectively	  enlarge	   the	  market	   for	  medical	  products	   in	  neglected	  diseases.	  Pull	   instru-­‐
ments	   reward	   the	  output	   (new	  medical	  products	  developed)	   rather	   than	  pay	   for	   inputs	   to	  R&D.	  
There	  is	  limited	  practical	  experience	  with	  pull	  instruments	  for	  neglected	  diseases.8	  One	  attractive	  
feature	  of	  pull	  instruments	  is	  that	  they	  are	  less	  costly	  than	  other	  instruments,	  as	  they	  do	  not	  entail	  
up-­‐front	  payments.	  Money	  is	  spent	  only	  if	  milestones	  are	  reached	  or	  if	  new	  medical	  products	  are	  
developed	   in	   accordance	   to	   pre-­‐defined	   criteria.	   The	   specified	   criteria	  would	   be	   pre-­‐set	   by	   the	  
purchaser	  (e.g.	  government,	  philanthropic	  organization	  or	  international	  organization).	  The	  firm	  or	  
other	  entity	  could	  then	  decide	  on	  the	  R&D	  strategy	  to	  deploy	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  criteria.	  Once	  
the	  milestone	  is	  reached	  or	  the	  product	  is	  developed,	  the	  disbursement	  of	  the	  committed	  money	  
would	  be	  made,	  and	  the	  purchaser	  could	  make	  the	  product	  available	  to	  patients	  at	  low	  or	  no	  cost.	  
Examples	  of	  pull	   instruments	   include	  prizes,	   funds	   for	  end-­‐payments	   (such	  as	   the	  Health	   Impact	  
Fund),	   funds	   that	   would	   allocate	   resources	   to	   any	   research	   organization,9	   and	   advance	  market	  
commitments	  (AMC).	  	  
A	  critical	  condition	  of	  the	  pull	  instrument	  is	  that	  payment	  has	  to	  be	  attractive	  enough	  to	  provide	  
incentives	  to	  the	  participant	  in	  the	  scheme.	  In	  theory,	  an	  adequate	  size	  of	  the	  incentive	  may	  vary	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  An	  AMC	  program	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  tried	  for	  incentivizing	  new	  medical	  products.	  The	  first	  experience	  inof	  the	  design	  of	  a	  
large-­‐scale	  pull	  instrument	  was	  the	  AMC	  GAVI	  Alliance	  initiative,	  which	  has	  been	  in	  place	  since	  2009	  to	  make	  available	  
existing	  pneumococcal	  vaccines.	  It	  was	  designed	  by	  a	  group	  of	  economists	  (Levine,	  Kremer	  et	  al.	  2005).	  Governments	  
and	   the	  Gates	   Foundation	  made	   a	   binding	   commitment	   of	  US$1.5	   billion	   to	   fund	   the	   pilot	   AMC	   for	  which	   vaccine	  
manufacturers	  could	  bid.	  In	  2010,	  GlaxoSmithKline	  and	  Pfizer	  committed	  to	  supply	  30	  million	  doses	  of	  their	  pneumo-­‐
coccal	  vaccines	  for	  10	  years,	  which	  had	  recently	  been	  approved	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  US	  (Synflorix	  and	  Prevenar-­‐13)	  at	  a	  
maximum	  price	  of	  US$3.50	  a	  dose.	  The	  two	  vaccines	  were	  selling	  for	  an	  average	  of	  40	  Euros	  in	  Europe	  and	  US$90	  per	  
injection	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Each	  manufacturer’s	  share	  of	  the	  AMC	  funds	  is	  disbursed	  as	  a	  subsidy	  per	  dose,	  in	  addi-­‐
tion	  to	  the	  tail	  price	  of	  US$3.50	  US	  thus,	   the	  total	  price	  goes	  up	  to	  US$7	  for	  approximately	  the	  first	  20%	  of	  vaccine	  
doses	  procured	  from	  each	  manufacturer	  (Cernuschi	  et	  al.	  2011).	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  enable	  firms	  to	  quickly	  recover	   incre-­‐
mental	   investment	   costs	   incurred	   to	   allow	   the	   scaling	   up	   of	   supply	   capacity	   to	   serve	  GAVI-­‐eligible	   countries	   faster	  
through	  the	  WHO	  and	  UNICEF	  as	  procurement	  agents.	  The	  expectation	  is	  that	  the	  vaccines	  will	  be	  distributed	  to	  40	  
developing	  countries	  that	  will	  pay	  15	  cents	  of	  the	  US$3.50,	  with	  the	  remaining	  cost	  covered	  by	  the	  AMC.	  The	  estimate	  
cost	  per	  child	  receiving	  the	  vaccine	  is	  US$4,722	  (Scudellari	  2011).	  Some	  concerns	  that	  have	  been	  raised	  are	  the	  costs	  
of	  the	  system,	  transparency	  by	  firms	  on	  vaccine	  manufacturing	  costs	  and	  profit	  margins,	  geographical	  scope,	  eligible	  
purchasing	  agents,	  and	  entry	  of	  developing	  country	  producers	  that	  can	  lower	  the	  vaccine	  costs	  (MSF	  2013).	  
9	  Some	  of	  these	  proposals	  include	  the	  Product	  Development	  Partnership	  Financing	  Facility	  (PDP-­‐FF),	  the	  industry	  R&D	  
Facilitation	  Fund	  (IRFF),	  the	  Fund	  for	  Research	  in	  Neglected	  Diseases	  (FRIND),	  and	  a	  fund	  within	  a	  global	  framework	  on	  
health	  research	  and	  development.	  These	  proposals	  are	  reviewed	  in	  the	  2012	  report	  of	  the	  WHO	  CEWG,	  pp.	  	  176-­‐179.	  
See	  WHO	  2012b.	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among	  participants.	  For	  private	  firms,	  it	  requires	  increasing	  the	  likelihood	  of	  returns	  to	  their	  R&D	  
investments	  (at	  best,	  bring	  profits,	  at	  minimum,	  no	  loss).	  For	  other	  types	  of	  organizations,	  such	  as	  
non-­‐profit	   product	   development	   partnerships	   (PDPs),	   the	   size	   of	   the	   incentive	   required	  may	   be	  
smaller.	   	   In	  the	  design	  of	  pull	   instruments,	  a	  crucial	  element	   is	   the	  amount	  of	  the	  commitments	  
(including	   specifications,	   such	   as	   the	   doses	   to	   be	   purchased	   and	   purchase	   price)	   that	  would	   be	  
required	  to	  provide	  a	  strong	  enough	  incentive	  to	  create	  a	  market	  that	  would	  surpass	  the	  barrier	  to	  
R&D	   investment.	   	   Economist	   Michael	   Kremer	   foresaw	   that	   substantial	   industrial	   investment	   in	  
neglected	  disease	  R&D	  would	  occur	  only	   if	   expected	   rates	  of	   return	  were	  broadly	  equivalent	   to	  
those	  anticipated	  from	  R&D	   in	  conventional	  areas.	  However,	  without	  proper	   information	  on	  the	  
actual	  costs	  of	  R&D,	  public	   resources	  may	  be	  wasted.	  Robust	  data	  on	   the	  costs	  of	  R&D	  for	  new	  
medical	  product	  development	  should	  inform	  these	  decisions.	  However,	  as	  discussed	  earlier,	  exist-­‐
ing	  estimates	  for	  medical	  product	  innovation	  are	  unreliable.	  	  
A	  different	  means	  to	  spur	  medical	   innovation	   is	  via	  open	  models,	  based	  on	  collaboration.	   In	  the	  
discovery	  phase,	  open	  models	  of	   innovation	  rely	  on	  collaboration,	  sharing	  of	   information	  among	  
volunteers	  and	  open	  access	  to	  data.	  Two	  examples	  of	  these	  projects	  that	  have	  been	  studied	  are	  
CSIR	  Team	  India	  Consortium's	  Open	  Source	  Drug	  Discovery	  project	  (CSIR	  OSDD)	  and	  The	  Synaptic	  
Leap's	  Schistosomiasis	  project	  (TSLS)	  (Ardan	  and	  Rottingen	  2012).	  	  	  	  
Various	   pull	   and	   push	  mechanisms	   and	   alternative	  means	   for	  medical	   product	   innovation	   have	  
been	   recently	   reviewed	   by	   an	   expert	   working	   group	   of	   the	   WHO	   (World	   Health	   Organization	  
2012).	  	   	  2.4 Organizations	   to	  drive	   innovation	   in	  neglected	  diseases:	  Product	  Devel-­‐opment	  Partnerships	  
	  
Evidence	  suggests	  that	  collaboration	   in	  R&D	  for	  neglected	  diseases	   is	   increasing.	   	  One	  study	  has	  
found	   that	   there	   are	   approximately	   348	  organizations	   from	   the	  private	   and	  public	   sectors	   (aca-­‐
demic/research	  institutions,	  biotechnology	  companies	  and	  other	  medium	  and	  small	  firms,	  such	  as	  
contract	   research	   organizations,	   and	   large	   pharmaceutical	   companies)	   participating	   alone	   or	   in	  
partnership	  with	  each	  other	  in	  the	  development	  of	  a	  combined	  pipeline	  of	  374	  drugs	  and	  vaccines	  
for	  23	  neglected	  diseases	  (BVGH	  2012).	  The	  majority	  of	  collaborations	  are	  reported	  to	  be	  taking	  
place	   through	   PDPs,	   with	   a	   40%	   share	   of	   participation	   in	   the	   total	   number	   of	   projects	   (BVGH	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2012).	  Another	  study	  has	  found	  that	  for	  the	  123	  new	  medical	  products	  in	  development	  in	  the	  pe-­‐
riod	  of	  2000	  to	  2011,	  public	  organizations	  were	  involved	  in	  66	  products	  (54%),	  private	  industry	  in	  
28	   products	   (23%),	   and	   private	   non-­‐profit	   organizations	   (including	   PDPs,	   charities,	   foundations,	  
and	  philanthropic	  institutions)	  in	  19	  products	  (15%),	  with	  the	  remaining	  10	  products	  (8%)	  involving	  
a	  mix	   of	   sponsors.	   All	   three	  NCEs	   for	   neglected	  diseases	  were	  being	   sponsored	  by	  private	   non-­‐
profit	  organizations	  (Pedrique	  et	  al	  2013).	   It	  also	  appears	  that	   large	  pharmaceutical	   firms	  are	   in-­‐
creasingly	   interested	   in	   joining	  PDP	  projects	  more	  than	   in	  undertaking	  their	  own.	  The	  annual	  re-­‐
port	   by	   IFPMA	   for	   2012,	   lists	   132	   R&D	   projects	   for	   new	   medicines	   and	   vaccines	   (excluding	  
HIV/AIDS)	  involving	  IFPMA	  member	  companies,	  of	  which	  112	  are	  projects	  with	  PDPs,	  and	  only	  20	  
(15%)	  projects	  are	  firm-­‐only	  undertakings.	  	  
PDPs	  in	  the	  past	  15	  years	  have	  become	  part	  of	  the	  puzzle	  of	  how	  to	  close	  the	  innovation	  gap	  for	  
neglected	   diseases.	   One	   study	   found	   that	   the	   PDP	   pipeline	   included	   63	   neglected	   disease	   drug	  
projects	  (excluding	  vaccines,	  diagnostics	  and	  microbicides)	  under	  way	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2004,	  including	  
two	  new	  drugs	  at	   the	  registration	  stage	  and	  18	  new	  products	   in	  clinical	   trials,	  half	  of	  which	  had	  
already	  reached	  Phase	  III	  (Moran	  2005).	  However,	  new	  projects	  have	  been	  launched	  since	  the	  end	  
of	  2004,	  amplifying	  this	  trend	  (BVGH	  2012).	  A	  full	  list	  and	  description	  of	  new	  products	  developed	  
by	  PDPs	  is	  found	  in	  Table	  9	  in	  the	  Appendix	  to	  this	  study.	  	  
Since	  the	  1990s	  the	  number	  of	  PDPs	  has	  grown	  from	  one	  to	  23	  PDPs	  in	  2014,	  which	  we	  have	  iden-­‐
tified	   in	  our	  study.10	  We	  define	  for	  purposes	  of	  our	  study	  PDPs	  as	  self-­‐governing11,	  private,	  non-­‐
profit	  organizations	  that	  aim	  to	  develop	  new	  medical	  products	  in	  the	  area	  of	  neglected	  diseases.	  
PDPs	  are	  not	  push	  or	  pull	   instruments	   for	  R&D.	  As	  discussed	   in	   Section	  3,	  push	  and	  pull	   instru-­‐
ments	   are	   policy	   instruments	   designed	  mainly	   to	   promote	   private	   investment	   in	   R&D.12	   In	   con-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	   Our	   complete	   list	   of	   PDPs	   includes,	   in	   alphabetical	   order:	   AERAS;,	   Contraceptive	   Research	   and	   Development	  
(CONRAD);	   the,	   Consortium	   for	   Parasitic	   Drug	   Development	   (CPDD);	   the	   Dengue	   Vaccine	   Initiative	   (DVI);	   Drugs	   for	  
Neglected	   Diseases	   (DNDi);	   the	   European	   Vaccine	   Initiative	   (EVI);	   the	   Foundation	   for	   Innovative	   New	   Diagnostics	  
(FIND);	  the	  Global	  Alliance	  for	  TB	  Drug	  Development	  (TB	  Alliance);	  the	  HIV	  Vaccines	  Trials	  Network	  (HVTN);	  the	  Infec-­‐
tious	  Disease	  Research	  Institute	  (IDRI);	  the	  Innovative	  Vector	  Control	  Consortium	  (IVCC);	  the	  International	  AIDS	  Vac-­‐
cine	   Initiative	   (IAVI);	   the	   International	   Partnership	   for	  Microbiocides	   (IPM);	   the	   International	  Vaccine	   Institute	   (IVI);	  
the	   Medicine	   for	   Malaria	   Venture	   (MMV);	   the	  Microbiocides	   Development	   Programme	   (MDP);	   One	  World	   Health	  
(iOWH);	   the,	  Malaria	  Vaccine	   Initiative	   (MVI);	   the	  Meningitis	  Vaccine	  Project	   (MVP);	   the	  Pediatric	  Dengue	  Vaccines	  
Initiative	  (PDVI);	  the	  Sabin	  PDPl	  the,	  South	  African	  AIDS	  Vaccine	  Initiative	  (SAAVI);	  and	  the	  Turberculosis	  Vaccine	  Initia-­‐
tive	  (TVI).	  To	  date,	  we	  have	  interviewed	  several	  representatives	  from	  four	  PDPs,	  two	  of	  which	  produce	  drugs	  (DNDI,	  
MMV),	  one	  of	  which	  produces	  vaccines	  (MVP),)	  and	  one	  of	  which	  produces	  diagnostics	  (FIND).	  
11	  We	  include	  PDPs	  that	  are	  part	  of	  a	   larger	  PDP	  organization,	  (i.e.	  MVP	  and	  MVI	  are	  part	  of	  PATH;	  the	  Sabin	  PDP	  is	  
part	  of	  the	  Sabin	  Vaccine	  Institute).	  
12	  Instruments	  such	  as	  direct	  grants	  to	  small	  and	  medium	  firms	  and	  for	  clinical	  trials	  in	  developing	  countries,	  milestone	  
or	  end-­‐prizes,	  purchase	  or	  procurement	  agreements,	  among	  others,	  can	  be	  complementary	  to	  the	  role	  of	  PDPs,	  and	  
PDPs	  themselves	  can	  use	  them.	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trast,	  PDPs	  are	  R&D	  organizations	  that	  have	  emerged	  to	  bring	  about	  innovations	  in	  an	  area	  where	  
neither	   the	   private	   or	   public	   non-­‐market	   institutions	   can	   or	   are	   willing	   to	   do	   the	   task	   alone	  
(Chataway	  et	  al	  2010).	  	  
	  2.4.1 History	  of	  PDPs	  
	  
Members	  of	  the	  global	  public	  health	  community	  (such	  as	  the	  World	  Health	  Organization,	  civil	  soci-­‐
ety	  organizations	  and	  doctors)	   initiated	  PDPs	  as	  a	  practical	  means	  to	  increase	  R&D	  for	  neglected	  
diseases.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  evident	  why	  a	  new	  organizational	  innovation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  PDPs	  was	  
needed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  existing	  organizations	  in	  global	  public	  health	  governance.	  These	  include	  
public	  research	  institutions,	  firms	  (e.g.	  biotechnology,	  big	  pharmaceutical	  firms),	  government	  ag-­‐
encies,	  international	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  WHO,	  the	  World	  Bank,	  UNDP,	  UNESCO,	  UNICEF	  and	  
UNITAID,	  civil	  society	  organizations	  and	  existing	  networks	  of	  research	  collaborations.	  We	  trace	  the	  
origins	  of	  PDPs	  and	   identify	   the	  gaps	   in	  existing	  organizational	   structures	   to	  which	  PDPs	  are	   re-­‐
sponding	  to.	  	  
Some	  of	  the	  early	  PDPs	  were	  catalysed	  at	  the	  WHO	  through	  the	  Special	  Programme	  for	  Research	  
and	   Training	   in	   Tropical	   Diseases	   (TDR)	   and	   the	   experience	   with	   partnerships	   it	   progressively	  
forged	  in	  the	  1980s-­‐90s.13	  Before	  the	  TDR,	  there	  was	  no	  international	  framework	  focused	  on	  co-­‐
ordinating	   research	   to	   support	   infectious	   disease	   control,	   particularly	   in	   the	   developing	   world	  
(UNICEF	   et	   al	   2007).	   The	   role	   of	   TDR	   evolved	   in	   time,	   from	   a	   focus	   on	   strengthening	   research	  
capability	  building	  in	  endemic	  countries	  to	  promoting	  international	  collaboration	  to	  increase	  R&D	  
for	   neglected	   diseases.	   Scientists	   engaged	   in	   the	   private	   sector	   had	   been	   participating	   in	   TDR	  
committees,	  but	  the	  private	  sector	  was	  not	  formally	  engaged	  in	  the	  work	  of	  TDR.	  In	  time,	  oppor-­‐
tunities	   did	   arise	   for	   product	   development	   in	   collaboration	   with	   the	   industry.	   However,	   it	   ap-­‐
peared	  to	  be	  too	  costly	  and	  complex	  to	  manage	  and	   implement	  by	  TDR	  and	  outside	  of	   its	  man-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  The	  WHO	  is	  the	  leading	  directing	  and	  coordinating	  authority	  for	  health	  within	  the	  United	  Nations	  system.	  The	  WHO	  
TDR	  program,	  in	  existence	  since	  1975,	  is	  co-­‐sponsored	  by	  UNICEF,	  UNDP	  and	  the	  World	  Bank.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  program	  
was	  to	  intensify	  research	  on	  major	  tropical	  parasitic	  diseases	  (,	  taking	  into	  consideration	  that	  such	  activities	  should	  be	  
carried	  out	  mainly	  in	  endemic	  countries),,	  define	  the	  research	  priorities,	  extend	  cooperation	  with	  national	  institutions	  
and	  other	  governmental	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	   in	  regard	  to	  the	  coordination	  of	  research	   in	  this	   field,	  
and	  mobilize	  extra-­‐budgetary	  resources	  for	  scaling	  up	  these	  objectives	  (WHA	  27.52).	  	  The	  TDR	  was	  set	  up	  mainly	  as	  a	  
partnership	  between	  public	  donors,	   co-­‐sponsors	  and	  endemic	  country	  governments	   represented	   in	  an	   independent	  
board-­‐type	  structure.	  (UNICEF	  et	  al	  2007).	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date.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  the	  idea	  of	  creating	  independent,	  disease-­‐focused	  organizations	  appeared	  
as	  an	  avenue	  to	  speed	  up	  R&D	  and	  the	  delivery	  of	  new	  medical	  products	  to	  meet	  health	  needs.	  	  
TDR	  assisted	  in	  the	  creation	  various	  PDPs	  since	  1999,14	  while	  other	  PDPs	  were	  created	  in-­‐
dependently.15	   Non-­‐profit	   philanthropic	   foundations,	   such	   as	   the	   Rockefeller	   Foundation,	   have	  
played	  an	  active	   role	   in	  cultivating	  PDPs.	  The	  establishment	  of	   the	  Gates	  Foundation	  by	  Bill	  and	  
Melinda	  Gates	   in	  2000	  gave	  a	  big	  push	  to	  PDPs	  as	  a	  new	  source	  of	  available	  funding.	  PDPs	  have	  
also	   surged	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   process	   of	   “vertical	   dis-­‐integration”	   in	   the	   pharmaceutical	   in-­‐
dustry	  (Cockburn	  2004).	  	  
	  2.4.2 PDPs	  in	  medical	  product	  innovation	  ecosystems	  
	  
PDPs	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  functioning	  in	  the	  context	  of	  health	  innovation	  ecosystems	  (Papaioan-­‐
nou	  et	  al	  2009)	   that	   reach	  beyond	  national	  boundaries.	   The	   structure	  of	  PDPs	   is	   shaped,	  and	   in	  
turn,	   can	   shape	   the	   ecosystem	   in	  which	   they	   operate.	  Our	   context	   for	   analysis	   is	   therefore	   the	  
broader	  ecosystem	  (rather	  than	  the	  industry),	  which	  includes	  the	  community	  of	  organizations	  (e.g.	  
suppliers,	  sources	  of	  knowledge),	  institutions	  (i.e.	  regulatory	  authorities,	  government	  bodies),	  and	  
individuals	   (e.g.	  managers,	   policy-­‐makers	   in	   disease-­‐endemic	   countries,	   patients)	   that	   influence	  
PDPs.	  The	  ecosystem	  is	  composed	  of	  multiple	  players	   involved	   in	  the	  production	  and	  dissemina-­‐
tion	  of	  drugs,	  vaccines	  and	  diagnostics	  for	  neglected	  diseases,	  and	  is	  influenced	  by	  external	  factors	  
relating	   to	  public	  policy,	   financing,	   regulation,	   intellectual	   property,	   human	   resources	   and	   infra-­‐
structure,	  and	  markets.	  	  
The	  function	  of	  the	  ecosystem	  can	  be	  guided	  by	  principles	  for	  medical	  product	  innovation	  
that	  respond	  to	  health	  needs.	  An	  expert	  commission	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  World	  Health	  As-­‐
sembly	  advances	  the	  following	  principles	  (World	  Health	  Organization	  2006):	  	  
1) Availability:	  new	  product	  development	  and	  adequate	  supply	  (quantity)	  of	  product.	  
2) Acceptability:	  usability	  and	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  product	  tailored	  to	  specific	  needs.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	   In	  1999,	   the	  Malaria	   for	  Vaccines	  Venture	   (MMV)	  was	  created.	   In	  2000,	   the	  Global	  Alliance	   for	  TB	  Drug	  Develop-­‐
ment	  (TB	  Alliance)	  was	  established.	  In	  2003,	  the	  Drugs	  for	  Neglected	  Diseases	  initiative	  (DNDi)	  was	  created	  as	  a	  joint	  
initiative	  of	  Médecins	  Sans	  Frontiers,	  TDR	  and	  representatives	  of	  disease-­‐endemic	  countries.	  In	  2003,	  the	  Foundation	  
for	  Innovative	  New	  Diagnostics	  (FIND)	  was	  also	  established.	  	  
15	  In	  1993,	  the	  Infectious	  Disease	  Research	  Institute	  (IDRI)	  was	  created	  as	  a	  non-­‐profit	  research	  institute.	  	  
	  	   17	  
3) Quality:	  product	  effectiveness,	  standards	  for	  carrying	  out	  testing	  and	  clinical	  trials.	  	  
4) Affordability:	  ensuring	  the	  financing	  of	  product	  development	  and	  procurement,	  affordable	  
prices.	  	  	  	  
Figure	  1	  depicts	  the	  innovation	  ecosystem	  under	  which	  PDPs	  operate	  and	  the	  principles	  
that	  we	  consider	  should	  guide	  medical	  product	  development.	  	  
Figure	  1.	  PDPs	  in	  the	  Medical	  Product	  Innovation	  Ecosystem* 
 
Sources:	  Morel	  2005,	  WHO	  2006	  (our	  elaboration)	  	  2.4.3 PDPs	  as	  system	  integrators	  
	  
The	  characteristics	  of	  PDP	  organizational	  design	  that	  differentiate	  them	  from	  collaborative	  bilat-­‐
eral	  or	  multilateral	  networks	  on	  R&D	   for	  neglected	  diseases,	  public	   institutions	  and	  pharmaceu-­‐
tical	  firms	  with	  R&D	  capacity	  include	  the	  following:	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(i) They	  are	  established	  as	  non–profit	  entities	  that	  guarantee	  them	  independence	  and	  
no	  shareholder	  expectations	  of	  growth	  and	  revenue	  maximization	  motives.	  
(ii) Their	   objective	   is	   to	  develop	  new	  medical	   products	   that	   can	  have	  a	  public	   health	  
impact	  (specialized,	  access	  core	  to	  their	  mission).)	  	  
(iii) Their	  focus	  is	  on	  developing	  “system	  integration”	  capabilities	  to	  engage	  and	  lever-­‐
age	  diverse	  resources	  and	  capabilities	  of	  various	  actors	  in	  the	  R&D	  chain.	  	  
(iv) They	  have	  in-­‐house	  capabilities	  to	  manage	  a	  portfolio	  of	  R&D	  projects.	  	  
(v) External	  partners	  often	  undertake	   the	  R&D	  activities,	   though	  some	  have	   in-­‐house	  
R&D	  capacity.	  	  
PDPs	  are	  able	  to	  operate	  on	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  model,	  provided	  that	  they	  can	  receive	  sufficient	  fund-­‐
ing	   for	   their	  R&D	  projects	   and	  operations.	  A	   fundamental	   element	  of	   the	  PDP	   is	   thus	   to	  attract	  
funds	  for	  donors.	  For	  public	  and	  philanthropic	  donors,	  returns	  to	  investment	  are	  measured	  differ-­‐
ently	  than	  in	  the	  case	  of	  shareholders	  in	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  R&D	  model.	  As	  such,	  philan-­‐
thropic	  and	  public	  donors	  do	  not	  exert	  the	  same	  pressure	  as	  shareholders	  and	  venture	  capitalists	  
do	  on	  for-­‐profit	  firms	  in	  terms	  of	  maximizing	  profit.	  Donors	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  end	  result	  of	  PDPs	  
in	  terms	  of	  medical	  products	  developed	  to	  address	  unmet	  health	  needs.	  	  
Funding	   is	  also	  a	  central	  enabling	   factor	   for	  R&D	  collaboration	  that	   takes	  place	  through	  PDPs.	   It	  
allows	  PDPs	   to	  make	  propositions	  attractive	   to	  partners	  and	   reduces	   their	   risk	   (cost)	  of	  engage-­‐
ment.	  PDP	  financing	  is	  channelled	  to	  pay	  for	  services	  (e.g.	  academia,	  contract	  research	  organiza-­‐
tions	  in	  clinical	  trials),	  and	  reduces	  the	  costs	  of	  product	  development	  for	  the	  industry	  involved	  in	  
R&D,	   with	   clinical	   trials,	   manufacturing	   and	   registration	   being	   the	   largest	   cost	   factors.	   	   As	   de-­‐
scribed	  by	  Chataway	  et	  al	  2007,	  PDPs	  can	  play	  both	  the	  role	  of	  integrator	  and	  broker	  among	  vari-­‐
ous	  private	  and	  public	  sector	  actors.	   In	  the	   innovation	  ecosystem,	  PDPs	  play	  the	  role	  of	  “system	  
integrator,”	  which	  can	  involve	  actors	  at	  any	  stage	  of	  the	  R&D	  chain,	  from	  discovery	  all	  the	  way	  to	  
implementation	  and	  delivery.	  	  
For	  most	  PDPs,	   the	  capabilities/assets	   for	  R&D	  (such	  as	   financial	   resources,	  vaccine/drug	  discov-­‐
ery,	  development,	  manufacturing,	  distribution)	  do	  not	  reside	  with	  the	  PDP	  itself.	  Accordingly,	  the	  
main	  avenue	  by	  which	  PDPs	  create	  an	  R&D	  resource	  base	  is	  via	  collaboration.	  PDPs	  search,	  select	  
and	  draw	   in	   these	  capabilities/assets	   from	  external	   sources,	   including	  academia,	  pharmaceutical	  
firms,	   biotech	   firms,	   contract	   research	   organizations,	   public	   and	   philanthropic	   organizations.	   As	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example	  of	  product	  development	   through	  PDPs,	   in	   Figure	  2	  we	   report	   the	   case	  of	   the	  develop-­‐
ment	  of	  a	  new	  anti-­‐malaria	  drug.	  The	  project	  was	  led	  by	  DNDi	  with	  the	  collaboration	  of	  TDR.	  
	  
Figure	  2.	  An	  example	  of	  how	  PDPs	  work:	  The	  case	  of	  the	  development	  of	  a	  fixed	  –dose	  
combination	  of	  existing	  anti-­malaria	  drugs,	  artesunate	  (AS)	  and	  mefloquine	  (MQ),	  for	  
Latin	  America	  and	  Southeast	  Asia	  
	  
Source:	  http://dndi.org/treatments/asmq/partnership.html	  and	  Wells	  et	  al	  2013	  (our	  elaboration).	  
	  
Traditionally	   large	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  are	  rarely	   inclined	  to	  share	  knowledge	  outside	  the	  
firm,	   although	   outsourcing	   research	   activities,	   mergers	   and	   acquisitions	   and	   in-­‐licensing	   com-­‐
pounds	  from	  biotechnology	  firms	  are	  increasing	  trends	  (Schuhmacher	  et	  al	  2013).	  It	  appears	  para-­‐
doxical	   that	   pharmaceutical	   firms	   are	  willing	   to	   engage	   in	   PDP-­‐led	  R&D	  projects	  when	   they	   are	  
usually	  locked	  into	  searching	  for	  the	  next	  blockbuster	  product	  (Cockburn,	  2006).	  According	  to	  eco-­‐





coordination	  	  	  WHO	  recommended	  ASMQ	  since	  2001,	  need	  for	  product	  development.	  WHO	  TDR	  and	  DNDi	  (PDP)	  partnership	  	  
2002	  
STAGE	  2:	  
Fundraising	  	  	  
Public	  funds	  from	  European	  Union,	  France,	  Netherlands,	  UK,	  Spain;	  Médecins	  Sans	  Frontières;	  and	  in-­‐kind	  contributions	  of	  partners.	  
2002	  
STAGE	  3:	  
Product	  Development	  Collaborative	  consortium	  composed	  by	  various	  parties,	  including	  a	  public	  pharmaceutical	  company	  from	  Brazil;	  Universities	  in	  France,	  Malaysia,	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Thailand;	  research	  institutes	  in	  Thailand	  and	  Burkina	  Faso;	  various	  trial	  sites.	  
2002	  –	  2007	  	  
STAGE	  4:	  
Manufacturing	  and	  
registration	  First	  manufacturer	  of	  ASMQ:	  Public	  pharmaceutical	  company	  from	  Brazil,	  Farmanguinhos/Fiocruz,	  for	  supply	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
2007	  	  
Technology	  transfer	  to	  a	  second	  manufacturer:	  Private	  pharmaceutical	  company	  from	  India,	  CIPLA	  Ltd,	  to	  supply	  in	  Asia.	  	  




endemic	  countries	  	  Pre-­‐agreed	  terms	  to	  ensure	  affordable	  prices	  for	  treatment.	  Adopted	  as	  birst-­‐line	  treatment	  of	  uncomplicated	  malaria	  in	  several	  countries	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  and	  South	  America.	  
2014	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source	   sharing	   for	   neglected	   diseases	   by	   for-­‐profit	   companies,	   constrained	   by	   shareholders’	  
values,	   should	  not	   take	  place.	  However,	   through	  PDPs,	   such	  partnerships	  do,	   in	   fact,	   result.	  The	  
private	  sector	  lacks	  interest	  in	  solely	  undertaking	  the	  range	  of	  R&D	  activities	  for	  medical	  product	  
development	  on	  neglected	  diseases.	  Yet,	  within	  in	  the	  PDP	  framework,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  private	  
sector	  can	  be	  induced	  into	  collaboration	  if	  costs	  and	  risks	  are	  reduced	  and	  there	  are	  other	  drivers,	  
such	  as	  a	  boost	   to	  public	   relations.	  By	  working	  with	  PDPs,	  pharmaceutical	   firms	  can	  still	  protect	  
shareholder	  value	  while	  sharing	  access	  to	  research	  tools	  and	  technology,	  and	  undertaking	  manu-­‐
facturing	  and	  distributing	  final	  products	  with	  reduced	  risks	  and	  most	  costs	  covered.	  
For	  projects	   in	  the	  discovery	  phase,	  PDPs	  tap	  into	  the	  skills	   in	  academia,	  biotech	  and	  large	  phar-­‐
maceutical	   firms	   as	   knowledge	   sources,	   negotiating	   access	   for	   compound	   libraries16,	   know-­‐how	  
and	  compound	  screening	  capabilities.	  PDPs	  often	  engage	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  for	  manufacturing,	  
where	  the	   latter	  provide	   in-­‐kind	  contributions,	  such	  as	   infrastructure	  and	  personnel	   time,	  which	  
aid	  in	  low-­‐cost	  production.	  	  
Academia	  and	  other	  public	  research	  institutions	  generally	  do	  not	  have	  the	  full	  range	  of	  necessary	  
resources,	  capabilities	  or	  assets	  to	  undertake	  medical	  product	  R&D,	  even	  though	  there	  is	  a	  resolve	  
to	  address	  unmet	  health	  needs.	  Public	  sector	  institutions	  involved	  in	  R&D	  are	  usually	  focused	  on	  
discovery	   and	   creating	   knowledge	   (upstream)	   and	   translational	   research,	   while	   the	   industry	   is	  
more	   focused	  on	  product	  development	   (downstream)	  and	  submissions	   for	   regulatory	  approvals,	  
manufacturing	  and	  scaling,	  distribution	  and	  sales.	  For	  a	  PDP,	   the	  measure	  of	  success	   is	  not	  only	  
product	  development.	  As	  noted	   in	   the	  previous	  section,	   the	  aim	   is	   to	  develop	  new	  medical	  pro-­‐
ducts	  that	  are	  effective,	  high	  quality,	  acceptable	  to	  the	  target	  group,	  and	  available	  at	  an	  affordable	  
price.	  Accordingly,	  a	  number	  of	  PDPs	  have	  agreed	  to	  a	  common	  definition	  of	  “access”	  as	  referring	  
to	   a	   coordinated	   set	   of	   activities	   needed	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   products	   developed	  will	   ultimately	  
have	  an	  equitable	  public	  health	   impact	   (Brooks	  et	  al	  2010).	  Moreover,	  many	  PDPs	  establish	  “ac-­‐
cess”	  policies.	  A	  PDP	  access	  policy	  may	  include	  defining	  upfront	  the	  contours	  of	  a	  technology	  that	  
is	   appropriate	   and	  has	   affordable	   resource-­‐limited	   settings.	  Generally	   the	   target	  product	  profile	  
for	  each	  R&D	  project	   is	  developed	  taking	   into	  account	   the	  unmet	  need,	   the	  disease	  profile,	  and	  
the	   local	  environment	  (including	  the	  regulatory	  framework,	  purchasing	  power)	   in	  which	  the	  pro-­‐
duct	  would	  be	  delivered.	  They	  may	  also	  define	  a	  product	  design	  and	  set	  benchmarks	  for	  product	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Access	  to	  the	  chemical	  compound	  collections	  of	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  is	  very	  important.	  However,	  the	  firms	  them-­‐
selves	  caution	  that	  the	  existing	  chemical	  diversity	  in	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  in	  search	  of	  new	  drugs	  is	  limited	  (Payne	  et	  
al.	  Nature	  Reviews	  Drug	  Discovery,	  2007).	  The	  portfolio	  of	  several	  PDPs	  includes	  projects	  for	  radical	  innovations	  (i.e.,.	  
the	  discovery	  of	  new	  chemical	  entities).	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manufacturing	  cost	  and	  the	  final	  price.	  The	  PDP	  product	  profiling	  helps	  clarify	  expectations	  for	  all	  
partners	  and	  subcontractors	  in	  R&D	  projects.	  	  
Most	   PDPs	   pick	   up	   opportunities	   for	   projects	   based	   on	   dormant	   or	   discontinued	   research	   else-­‐
where	  that	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  neglected	  diseases.	  PDPs	  producing	  drugs	  have	  generally	  focused	  on	  
developing	  repurposed	  products	  rather	  than	  NCEs	  (Pedrique	  2013).	  In	  the	  area	  of	  vaccines,	  this	  is	  
also	  the	  case.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  most	  clinically	  advanced	  malaria	  vaccine	  candidate	  to	  date	  RTSS	  is	  
being	  developed	  by	  the	  pharmaceutical	  firm	  GlaxoSmithKline	  (GZK),	  the	  PDP	  Malaria	  Vaccines	  In-­‐
itiative	  (MVI)	  and	  PATH.17	  RTSS	  is	  not	  a	  new	  vaccine	  candidate.	  Scientists	  at	  GSK,	  in	  collaboration	  
with	   a	  US	  Department	   of	  Defence	  biomedical	   research	   laboratory,	   created	   the	   vaccine	   in	   1987.	  
The	  pricing	  arrangement	  announced	   for	   the	  RTSS	  vaccine	   for	  young	   infants	  and	  children	   in	  Sub-­‐
Saharan	  Africa	   is	   that	  GSK	  will	  be	  paid	   to	  cover	   the	  costs	  of	   the	  vaccine	  manufacturing	  and	  will	  
receive	  a	  5%	  return	  (MVI	  2013).	  	  	  	  
PDPs	  generally	  also	  aim	  to	  keep	  down	  the	  costs	  of	  R&D.	  While	  PDPs	  have	  to	  cover	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  
product	  development	  and	   take	   into	  account	   the	  costs	  of	  product	  delivery	   (including	   registration	  
costs),	  PDPs	  are	  aware	  that	  they	  need	  to	  stay	  as	  close	  as	  possible	  to	  the	  marginal	  costs	  of	  produc-­‐
tion	  to	  meet	  their	  access	  goals.	  PDPs	  are	  able	  to	  channel	  most	  of	  their	  resources	  to	  pure	  R&D	  ac-­‐
tivities	   (in	   addition	   to	   R&D	   portfolio	  management	   and	   advocacy	   for	   funding),)	   as	   compared	   to	  
marketing	  (to	  promote	  sales),)	  which	  may	  command	  a	  larger	  budget	  for	  research	  in	  large	  pharma-­‐
ceutical	  firms.	  
In	  negotiating	   the	   terms	  of	   engagement	  with	  partners	   at	   the	  development	   stage,	   PDPs	  need	   to	  
carefully	  evaluate	  the	  access	  considerations	  in	  negotiating	  the	  price	  of	  manufacturing	  and	  distribu-­‐
tion	  by	  a	  partner,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  acceptability	  for	  a	  partner	  to	  manufacture	  and	  distribute	  drugs	  in	  
disease-­‐endemic	   countries	   with	   long-­‐term	   sustainability,	   at	   an	   “at-­‐cost”	   or	   “no	   profit,	   no	   loss”	  
basis.	  PDPs	  need	  project	  managers	  with	  good	  market	  knowledge	  and	  negotiation	  skills.	  PDPs	  can	  
leverage	   the	   fact	   that	   commercial	   incentives	   do	   exist	   for	   certain	   neglected	   diseases,	   such	   as	  
HIV/AIDS,	  malaria	   and	   tuberculosis	   (TB),	  which	  are	  prevalent	   in	  both	  developed	  and	  developing	  
countries.	  PDPs	  can	  also	  identify	  target	  products	  that	  may	  have	  potential	  commercial	  markets	  in	  
the	  private	  sector	  in	  disease-­‐endemic	  countries,	  where	  manufacturers	  can	  make	  a	  margin	  on	  sales,	  
and	  may	   leverage	   this	   incentive	   in	  order	   to	  obtain	  better	   terms	   (e.g.	   lower	  production	  cost	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  The	  results	  of	  phase	  III	  trials	  of	  the	  vaccine’s	  capacity	  have	  shown	  approximately	  a	  50%	  percent	  success	  rate.	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final	  sale	  price)	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  within	  disease-­‐endemic	  countries.18	  	  PDPs	  can	  assist	  in	  bringing	  
overall	  costs	  down	  by	  leading	  and	  financing	  the	  registration	  processes	  or	  by	  finding	  other	  partners	  
for	  this	  purpose.	  	  
	  2.4.4 Governance	  of	  PDPs	  
	  
PDPs	  maintain	  governance	  independence	  as	  self-­‐established	  entities,	  though	  they	  depend	  on	  ex-­‐
ternal	   financing.	   The	  management	   of	   R&D	   projects	   involves	   partners	   that	   are	   vertically	   disinte-­‐
grated,	  and	  this	  internal	  management	  structure	  brings	  flexibility	  to	  PDPs	  in	  their	  decision-­‐making.	  
There	  is	  little	  pressure	  for	  PDPs	  to	  expand,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  that	  often	  face	  
pressure	  to	  undertake	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  the	  growth	  expectations	  
of	  shareholders.	  Pressure	  to	  contract	  in	  size	  is	  more	  likely,	  in	  case	  of	  reduced	  funds.	  	  
In	  the	  PDP	  analysis,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  give	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  R&D	  managers	  and	  managerial	  
processes	   (Technical	  Advisory	  Body-­‐Board-­‐Managers),	   as	  PDPs’	  main	   job	   is	   to	  build	  and	  manage	  
R&D	  project	  portfolios.	  Managers	  play	   the	   critical	   role	  of	   coordinating	   and	  overseeing	  partners’	  
separate	  tasks	  and	  building	  synergies,	  as	  most	  PDPs’	  R&D	  activities	  are	  carried	  out	  outside	  of	  the	  
PDP.	   The	   leadership	   in	   terms	   of	   decision-­‐making	   remains	  within	   PDPs,	  while	   in	  most	   PDPs,	   the	  
R&D	  activities	  are	  outsourced	  to	  partners,	  which	  have	  been	  described	  as	  “virtual”	  R&D	  organiza-­‐
tions	  (Grace	  2006,	  2010).	   	  PDPs	  build	  specialized	  capabilities	  in	  project	  portfolio	  management	  by	  
focusing	  on	  a	  single	  type	  of	  medical	  product	  and	  a	  single	  disease	  or	  a	  core	  set	  of	  diseases.	  Such	  a	  
framework	  endows	  PDPs	  with	  disease-­‐type	  experience	  that	  biotechnology	  or	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  
rarely	  have.	  	  
The	   entrepreneurial	   aspect	   of	   PDPs	   deserves	   to	   be	   highlighted.	   PDPs	   are	   built	   by	   individuals	   or	  
groups	  of	   individuals	  with	  an	   idea	   (purpose	   to	  drive	  R&D	   into	  neglected	  diseases),	  who	   identify	  
opportunities	  within	  the	  ecosystem	  (new	  sources	  of	  philanthropic	  financing,	  growing	  openness	  to	  
R&D	  collaboration	  in	  the	  pharmaceutical	  sector)	  and	  design	  an	  organizational	  form	  under	  which	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  A	  case	  example	  is	  the	  combination	  drug	  ASAQ	  developed	  by	  DNDi	  in	  partnership	  with	  Sanofi.	  It	  is	  now	  registered	  in	  
over	   30	   sub-­‐Saharan	   countries	   and	   India,	   and	   is	   prequalified	   by	  WHO.	  DNDi	   developed	  ASAQ	   in	   collaboration	  with	  
Sanofi	  and	  other	  partners;	  it	  claimed	  a	  patent	  and	  then	  licensed	  it	  out	  to	  Sanofi	  for	  African	  and	  other	  developing	  coun-­‐
tries.	  Under	  the	  DNDi/Sanofi	  agreement,	  Sanofi	  has	  committed	  to	  supply	  the	  public	  sector	  in	  endemic	  countries	  at	  a	  
no-­‐profit-­‐no-­‐loss	  maximum	  price	  of	  US$	  1.	  In	  the	  private	  sector,	  Sanofi	  is	  free	  to	  sell	  at	  market	  price	  and	  pays	  a	  royalty	  
back	  to	  DNDi,	  which	  is	  reinvested	  in	  additional	  studies.	  DNDi	  and	  Sanofi	  agreed	  not	  to	  file	  any	  new	  patents;	  as	  a	  result,	  
the	  drug	  can	  be	  freely	  produced	  and	  distributed	  by	  any	  other	  pharmaceutical	  company	  in	  the	  world.	  DNDi	  is	  currently	  
facilitating	  technology	  transfer	  to	  ensure	  the	  production	  of	  ASAQ	  by	  an	  African	  manufacturer.	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may	  be	  possible	  to	  assemble	  the	  resources/capabilities	  needed	  to	  carry	  out	  R&D,	  taking	   into	  ac-­‐
count	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  market	  for	  new	  products	  for	  neglected	  diseases.	  The	  organizational	  
and	  managerial	  processes	  in	  PDPs	  include	  selecting	  targets	  for	  R&D	  projects	  and	  management	  of	  
the	  project	  portfolio,	  including	  the	  various	  alliances/contractors.	  Managers,	  advised	  by	  boards	  and	  
technical	  bodies	  have	  a	  central	  role	  in	  making	  operational	  and	  strategic	  decisions	  to	  identify	  com-­‐
plementarities	   and	   select	   and	   align	   internal	   and	   external	   assets	   for	   developing	   target	   products,	  
and	  then	  in	  engaging	  external	  partners	  where	  necessary	  to	  access	  the	  necessary	  assets	  and	  capa-­‐
bilities.	   This	   “asset	  orchestration”	   (Teece	  2012)	   is	   a	   core	   capability	   that	  PDPs	  need	   to	  build	  and	  
continuously	  strengthen.	  	  
Experienced	  project	  managers	  are	  core	  assets	  of	  PDPs.	  Once	  disease	  and	  target	  product	  profiles	  
are	   set	   by	   the	   PDP	   (taking	   into	   account	   scientific,	   financing	   and	   access	   considerations),	   project	  
managers	  source,	  negotiate,	  and	  manage	  partnerships	  with	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  participants.	  
They	  drive	  discovery	  projects;	  select	  which	  promising	  candidates	  to	  advance	  to	  trials	  or	  products	  
to	  advance	  through	  the	  pipeline	  or	  projects	  to	  terminate.	  In	  managing	  risk,	  the	  considerations	  for	  
PDPs	  are	  similar	  as	  in	  pharmaceutical	  firms.	  The	  overall	  measure	  of	  success	  in	  advancing	  the	  R&D	  
portfolio	  is	  the	  number	  of	  product	  approvals	  that	  meet	  the	  target	  product	  profile,	  with	  few	  project	  
terminations.	  PDPs	  work	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  attrition	  rates	  and	  pre-­‐established	  milestones	  and	  time-­‐
lines.	   Evaluation	  of	  PDP	  effectiveness	   is	  made	   through	  project	  portfolio	  management,	   based	  on	  
the	  initial	  plan.	  This	  is	  the	  same	  overall	  process	  as	  in	  a	  pharmaceutical	  or	  biotech	  company.	  PDPs	  
have	   generally	   adopted	   “private	   sector”	   managerial	   methods	   for	   their	   work.	   They	   are	   not-­‐for	  
profit,	  but	  nevertheless	  aim	  to	  operate	  efficiently.	  Donors/funders	  also	  monitor	  PDP	  performance	  
and	   may	   require	   measures	   of	   cost-­‐effectiveness	   and	   public	   health	   impact,	   although	   donor	   re-­‐
quirements	  are	  not	  harmonized,	  nor	  are	  the	  processes	  or	  measures	  harmonized	  among	  PDPs.	  	  
PDPs	  generally	  have	  a	  small,	  core	  team	  of	  staff	  with	  public	  health	  and	  industry	  experience,	  whose	  
work	  is	  overseen	  by	  a	  Board.	  PDPs	  try	  to	  compensate	  for	  their	  limited	  internal	  capacity	  in	  terms	  of	  
their	  own	  staff	  (limited	  experience	  in	  project	  management	  from	  discovery	  up	  to	  development,	  and	  
delivery)	  by	  engaging	  outside	  expertise	   in	  an	  advisory	  manner	   (similar	   to	   the	  WHO	  TDR	  model).	  	  
External	  expert	  advisory	  bodies	  provide	  additional	   technical	  and	  scientific	  expertise.	   	  Boards	  are	  
influential	   in	  the	  PDP	  overall	  strategy	  and	  portfolio	  design,	  but	  project	  management	  tends	  to	  be	  
an	  activity	  left	  to	  the	  project	  managers	  that	  are	  the	  core	  PDP	  staff.	  The	  technical	  staff	  members	  in	  
PDPs	   also	   receive	   advice	   from	   technical	   advisory	   committees	   that	   are	   composed	   of	   experts	   in	  
medical	  product	  development	  and	   related	  areas.	   The	  Board	  membership	  mixes	   skill	   and	  experi-­‐
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ence	  from	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sector.	  The	   incentives	  for	  members	  of	  the	  Board	  are	  not	  mon-­‐
etary.	  	  
	  2.4.5 PDP	  capabilities	  
	  
We	  now	  identify	  several	  types	  of	  capabilities	  that	  PDPs	  in	  their	  “systems	  integrator”	  role	  need	  to	  
build	  and	  maintain.	  PDPs	  need	  strong	  organizational	  capabilities	  to	  detect	  and	  obtain	  the	  neces-­‐
sary	  resources	  and	  capabilities,	  which	  may	  reside	   in	  multiple	  sources.	  Once	  these	  resources	  and	  
capabilities	  are	  obtained,	  PDPs	  t	  bring	  them	  together	  into	  a	  single	  R&D	  project	  designed	  to	  meet	  
its	  health	  needs,	  as	  well	  as	  make	  key	  decisions	  throughout	  the	  project	  lifetime,	  such	  as	  whether	  to	  
terminate	  a	  project	  and	  product	  pricing.	  PDPs	  also	  require	  strategic	  planning	  capacity,	  particularly	  
at	   the	   initial	  stage	   in	  building	  the	  target	  product	  profile	  and	   in	  making	  strategic	  decisions	  there-­‐
after,	  for	  instance,	  on	  the	  choice	  of	  technology	  and	  partners.	  Staff	  and	  governance	  structure	  is	  a	  
key	  source	  for	  building	  the	  necessary	  organizational	  capabilities.	  Knowledge	  capabilities	  required	  
include	  knowledge	  of	  the	  diseases,	  context	  and	  demand,	  knowledge	  of	  medical	  product	  R&D	  at	  all	  
stages	  and	  requirements	  for	  product	  approval.	   	  PDPs	  also	  require	  negotiation,	  strategy	  and	  mar-­‐
keting	  capabilities	  in	  relation	  to	  contracting	  services,	  building	  R&D	  collaborations,	  and	  mobilizing	  
funding	  and	  broader	  public	  support	  for	  their	  activities.	  The	  financial	  capability	  of	  PDPs	  is	  directly	  
related	  to	  their	  ability	  to	  detect	  and	  mobilize	  external	  funding	  sources.	  Communication	  and	  rela-­‐
tional	  capabilities	  are	  also	  central	   in	  the	  PDP	  structure,	  which	  requires	  frequent	   interaction	  with	  
donors,	  endemic-­‐country	  governments,	  and	  partners,	  among	  others.	  Finally,	  PDPs	  require	  the	  ca-­‐
pacity	  to	  adapt	  to	  changes	  in	  their	  environment,	  such	  as	  flux	  in	  the	  burden	  of	  diseases,	  financial	  
resources,	  government	  priorities	  and	  the	  entrance	  or	  exit	  of	  other	  initiatives	  on	  medical	  product	  
innovation	  for	  neglected	  diseases.	  	  
	  2.5 PDPs	  :	  Variety	  within	  the	  landscape	  
	  
While	  PDPs	  share	  common	  characteristics,	  there	  are	  important	  differences	  among	  PDPs.	  PDPs	  vary	  
in	   their	   legal	   form,	   scope,	   internal	   structure	   and	   how	   they	  make	   strategic	   choices.	   Table	   1	   de-­‐
scribes	  common	  PDP	  characteristics	  and	  differences.	  	  
	  















PDP	  Common	  Characteristics	   PDP	  Differences	  
Non-­‐profit	  institutions	   Legal	   form:	   stand-­‐alone	   versus	   part	  
of	   another	   organization,	   permanent	  
versus	  temporary	  	  
The	   objective	   is	   product	   development	   of	  
medicines,	  diagnostics,	  vaccines	  and	  biologi-­‐
cals	  for	  neglected	  diseases.	  
Scope:	   disease	   and	   geographical	  
coverage,	   type	   of	   medical	   products	  
developed,	   involvement	   in	   imple-­‐
mentation	  phase	  
Priority-­‐setting	   is	   driven	   by	   medical	   needs:	  
products	   developed	   need	   to	   be	   affordable	  
and	   adequate	   to	   the	   local	   context	   to	   facili-­‐
tate	   uptake.	   Define	   the	   target	   product	   pro-­‐
file.	   Requires	   low	   cost	   of	   product	  manufac-­‐
turing	  and	  selling	  price.	  
Internal	   structure:	   size	   of	   staff	   and	  
roles,	   outsourced	   versus	   in-­‐house	  
R&D	   capacity,	   governance	   model,	  
external	  advisory	  support	  
The	  public	  health	  goal	  and	  R&D	  objective	  of	  
PDPs	   drive	   their	   strategic	   choices	   (e.g.	   pri-­‐
ority	   setting,	   governance	   and	   sources	   of	  
financing).	  	  
Strategic	   choices:	   IP	   policy,	   partner	  
selection	   and	   type	   of	   relationship,	  
transfer	  of	  technology	  to	  developing	  
countries,	   capacity	   building	   for	   de-­‐
veloping	  countries	  	  
Collaborative	   R&D	   model:	   most	   PDPs	   have	  
little	  or	  no	  in-­‐house	  R&D	  activities,	  work	  with	  
a	   diversity	   of	   partners	   from	   the	   public	   and	  
private	  sectors.	  	  Managing	  the	  collaborations	  
is	  the	  key	  task	  of	  a	  small	  core	  number	  of	   in-­‐
house	  staff	  in	  PDPs.	  
Internal	  structure:	  core	  staff,	  Board,	  advisory	  
committee	  	  
Funding	   from	  philanthropic	  and	  public	   sour-­‐
ces	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2.5.1 Legal	  form	  
While	   PDPs	   are	   all	   non-­‐profit	   institutions,	   they	   vary	   in	   their	   specific	   legal	   form.	  Most	   PDPs	   are	  
stand-­‐alone	   entities,	   yet	   a	   few	   are	   part	   of	   a	   larger	   organization	   (e.g.	  MVP	   and	  MVI	   are	   part	   of	  
PATH,	  the	  Sabin	  PDP	  is	  part	  of	  the	  Sabin	  Vaccine	  Institute).	  Likewise,	  most	  PDPs	  are	  registered	  as	  
non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  (i.e.,	  IAVI,	  the	  TB	  Alliance),	  while	  some	  are	  recognized	  as	  interna-­‐
tional	  organizations	  (i.e.,	  DNDi,	  FIND,	  MMV	  in	  Switzerland).	  PDPs	  are	  generally	  created	  as	  a	  per-­‐
manent	  institution,	  but	  some	  PDPs,	  particularly	  those	  that	  are	  a	  project	  of	  a	  larger	  institution,	  can	  
be	  of	  a	  temporary	  nature,	  to	  complete	  a	  particular	  goal	  (e.g.	  develop	  a	  medical	  product	  for	  a	  spe-­‐
cific	  disease	  target)	  and	  are	  discontinued	  thereafter	  (i.e.,	  MDP	  has	  terminated	   its	  activities	  since	  
2009,	  although	  the	  founding	  organizations	  continue	  to	  carry	  out	  similar	  work).	  	  
	  2.5.2 Scope	  
PDPs	  vary	  in	  scope,	  including	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  disease	  coverage,	  geographical	  area	  for	  which	  they	  
target	   their	  medical	   products,	   the	   type	   of	  medical	   product	   to	   develop	   (medicine,	  microbiocide,	  
vaccine	  or	  diagnostic),	  and	  the	  level	  of	  involvement	  of	  the	  PDP	  in	  activities	  during	  the	  implementa-­‐
tion	  phase.	  	  
The	  variance	  in	  the	  disease	  coverage	  of	  PDPs	  is	  presented	  in	  Table	  10	  in	  the	  Appendix.	  Most	  PDPs	  
focus	  on	  a	  single	  disease,	  although	  some	  PDPs	  cover	  up	  to	  6	  diseases.	  Malaria	  is	  the	  disease	  most	  
covered.	  The	  profile	  of	  each	  disease	  presents	  specific	  challenges	  for	  medical	  product	  development	  
through	  the	  PDP	  model.	  For	  example,	  while	  most	  neglected	  diseases	  affect	  particular	  geographical	  
regions	  or	  countries,	  some	  diseases	  such	  as	  HIV/AIDS,	  malaria	  and	  TB	  have	  a	  broader	  geographical	  
reach	  in	  terms	  of	  disease	  burden.	  This,	   in	  turn,	  creates	  to	  some	  extent	  market	  incentives	  for	  pri-­‐
vate	  partners	   (i.e.,	  populations	   in	  developed	  countries	   travelling	   to	  endemic-­‐ridden	  areas	   in	  de-­‐
veloping	  countries	  for	  tourism	  or	  military	  missions).	  	  
In	  Table	  2,	  PDPs	  are	  classified	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  type	  of	  medical	  product	  they	  aim	  to	  develop.	  
We	   identified	  15	  PDPs	   for	   vaccines,	  4	  PDPs	   for	  new	  medicines,	  4	  PDPs	   for	  microbiocides,	   and	  2	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Table	  2.	  Type	  of	  Medical	  Product	  by	  PDP	  





agnostic	  AERAS	   	   X	   	   	   	  
MMV	   X	   	   	   	   	  
DVI	   	   X	   	   	   	  
EVI	   	   X	   	   	   	  
IVCC	   	   	   X	   	   	  
IAVI	   	   X	   	   	   	  
OWH	   X	   X	   	   	   X	  
IVI	   	   X	   	   	   	  
MVI	   	   X	   	   	   	  
MVP	   	   X	   	   	   	  
PDVI	   	   X	   	   	   	  
Sabin	  PDP	   	   X	   	   	   	  
SAAVI	   	   X	   	   	   	  
TBVI	   	   X	   	   	   	  
DNDi	   X	   	   	   	   	  
CPDD	   X	   	   	   	   	  
TB	  Alliance	   X	   	   	   	   	  
IDRI	   X	   X	   	   	   X	  
CONRAD	   	   	   	   X	   	  
HVTN	   	   X	   	   	   	  
IPM	   	   	   	   X	   	  
MDP	   	   	   	   X	   	  
FIND	   	   	   	   	   X	  
Total	   6	   14	   1	   3	   3	  
	  
Disease	  profiles	  also	  vary	  in	  their	  mortality	  rates	  and	  incidence.	  Moreover,	  the	  scientific	  and	  know-­‐
ledge	  challenges	  vary	  among	  diseases	  (i.e.,	  whether	  any	  products	  are	  currently	  available	  for	  pre-­‐
vention/treatment	  or	  cure).	  	  
PDPs	  also	  vary	  in	  their	  level	  of	  involvement	  in	  the	  late	  stage	  development	  process.	  While	  all	  PDPs	  
work	  from	  the	  point	  of	  discovery	  to	  product	  development,	  some	  PDPs	  stop	  at	  the	  point	  where	  the	  
product	   is	  developed,	  while	  others	  continue	  to	  follow	  up	  implementation	  activities,	   including	  as-­‐
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sisting	   in	  product	  pre-­‐qualification	  by	  WHO,	  national	   registration	  and	  uptake	  and	  delivery	   in	  en-­‐
demic	  countries.	  
	  2.5.3 Internal	  structure	  
	  
The	  size	  of	  core	  staff	  of	  PDPs	  varies	  largely	  in	  respect	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  PDPs’	  R&D	  portfolio	  and	  
disease	  coverage.	  Some	  PDPs	  that	  have	  a	  large	  portfolio	  have	  operations	  in	  more	  than	  one	  coun-­‐
try	  or	   location.	  We	  also	   find	  some	  variance	   in	   the	  specific	   roles	  of	   the	  staff,	  Board	  and	  advisory	  
committees	  and	  their	  relationships	  with	  each	  other	  and	  partners	  involved	  in	  R&D	  projects.	  	  2.5.4 Strategic	  choices	  
	  
There	  is	  a	  significant	  variance	  in	  the	  strategic	  choices	  of	  PDPs	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  way	  R&D	  is	  under-­‐
taken,	  how	  the	  portfolio	  is	  managed,	  and	  in	  particular,	  the	  selection	  of	  and	  agreements	  with	  part-­‐
ners.	  While	  most	  PDPs	  do	  not	   carry	  out	  R&D	  activities	   in-­‐house,	   some	  PDPs	  do	  undertake	   their	  
own	  research,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  IDRI	  and	  AERAS.	  PDPs	  also	  vary	  significantly	  in	  the	  way	  they	  man-­‐
age	  their	  R&D	  project	  portfolios.	  	  
As	  noted	   in	   the	  previous	  section,	   some	  PDPs	  define	  upfront	   target	  product	  profiles	   for	   the	  R&D	  
project.	  However,	  some	  PDPs	  adopt	  a	  more	  flexible	  approach	  to	  determine	  product	  profiles,	   for	  
example,	  opting	   to	  define	  a	  pricing	   strategy	   for	   the	  new	  medical	  product	   at	   a	   later	   stage.	  PDPs	  
may	  also	  vary	  as	  to	  whether	  they	  have	  a	  defined	  “access”	  policy	  (guidelines	  as	  to	  how	  to	  ensure	  
that	  the	  new	  medical	  product	  will	  be	  available	  to	  those	  in	  need).	  Most	  PDPs	  have	  some	  basic	  prin-­‐
ciples	  on	  ensuring	  access	  that	  guide	  negotiations	  for	  access	  to	  knowledge	  (compounds	  for	  screen-­‐
ing),	  low	  cost	  of	  production	  from	  industry	  partners	  and	  royalty-­‐free	  licenses,	  at	  least	  for	  endemic	  
countries.	  	  
In	  some	  PDPs,	  negotiations	  and	  relationships	  with	  partners	  are	  guided	  by	  broader	  policies,	  in	  areas	  
such	  as	  intellectual	  property	  (IP).	  An	  IP	  policy	  serves	  in	  some	  PDPs	  to	  inform	  their	  strategy	  for	  the	  
management	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  (IPRs),	   in	  particular	  to	  ensure	  that	  IPRs	  do	  not	  create	  
obstacles	  for	  the	  PDP	  to	  access	  know-­‐how	  and	  assets,	  affordability	  of	  new	  products,	  and	  follow-­‐on	  
R&D.	   However,	   in	   some	   PDPs,	   decisions	   on	   IP	  management	   are	   taken	   on	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis,	  
which	  is	  viewed	  as	  providing	  the	  PDP	  with	  greater	  flexibility.	  Overall,	  there	  is	  significant	  variance	  in	  
PDP	  practices	  on	  IP.	  Some	  PDPs	  define	  at	  the	  outset	  that	  IP	  should	  generally	  not	  be	  sought	  for	  any	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product	  developed,	  while	  others	  define	   that	   the	  partner	  can	  claim	  or	  share	  with	   the	  PDP	  the	   IP	  
from	   a	   potential	   product	   along	   with	   licensing	   terms	   (e.g.	   non-­‐exclusive	   or	   exclusive	   terms	   of	  
licenses	   for	   pre-­‐existing	   IP	   or	   new	   products	   developed).	   PDPs	  may	   also	   have	   particular	   policies	  
concerning	   the	   level	  of	   control	   that	   the	  PDP,	  partner	  or	   funder	  may	  have	  over	   the	  R&D	  project	  
(decision-­‐making).	  PDPs	  generally	  face	  greater	  pressure	  from	  partners	  to	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  decision-­‐
making	  when	  the	  financial	  input	  of	  the	  partner	  is	  substantial.	  PDPs	  may	  also	  have	  particular	  poli-­‐
cies	  concerning	  funding	  sources	  (such	  as	  specifying	  a	  minimum	  percentage	  of	  the	  PDP	  budget	  that	  
should	  be	  covered	  by	  public	  funding	  as	  opposed	  to	  private)PDPs	  also	  vary	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
they	  consider	  capacity	  building	  and	   the	   transfer	  of	   technology	   to	  developing	  countries	  a	  part	  of	  
their	  mission.	  For	  example,	  DNDi	  includes	  these	  activities	  as	  a	  part	  of	  its	  mandate.	  In	  South	  Africa,	  
SAAVI	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  national	  Medical	  Research	  Council,	  and	  its	  work	  includes	  programs	  to	  sup-­‐
port	  community	  involvement	  and	  education	  interventions	  in	  relation	  to	  HIV	  issues.	  	  	  
	  There	  are	  numerous	  projects	  that	  include	  the	  transfer	  of	  technology	  to	  developing	  countries,	  such	  
as	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  firm	  Zenufa,	  based	  in	  Tanzania,	  as	  a	  second	  manufacturer	  of	  ASAQ	  -­‐-­‐	  a	  
DNDi	  product.	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  meningitis	  vaccine	  MenAfriVac,	  manufactured	  by	  the	  Serum	  
Institute	  of	  India	  (SILL)	  Ltd,	  Pune,	  India	  –a	  product	  of	  MVP.	  	  The	  decision	  on	  whether	  to	  go	  with	  a	  
manufacturer	  in	  a	  developed	  country,	  or	  a	  clinical	  research	  organization	  from	  a	  developing	  coun-­‐
try	  is	  also	  a	  strategic	  one.	  Considerations	  include	  the	  cost	  of	  production	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  dis-­‐
ease	   and	   local	   context	   to	   promote	   affordability	   and	   uptake	   of	   the	  medical	   product	   in	   endemic	  
countries.	  	  
	  2.6 Discussion	  
	  
We	  have	  shown	  so	  far	  that	  PDPs	  contribute	  to	  increasing	  R&D	  in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  lack	  of	  new	  
medical	  products	   for	  neglected	  diseases.	  We	  have	  also	  explained	  how	  PDPs	   function	  within	   the	  
broader	  context	  of	  medical	  product	  innovation	  ecosystems,	  and	  how	  PDPs	  are	  able	  to	  bring	  about	  
R&D	   collaboration.	   We	   have	   also	   identified	   the	   core	   capabilities	   that	   PDPs	   need	   to	   build	   and	  
strengthen	  in	  playing	  the	  role	  of	  “system	  integrator”	  to	  stimulate	  R&D	  in	  neglected	  diseases.	  Fur-­‐
thermore,	  we	  analysed	  the	  variety	  among	  the	  PDP	  landscape.	   In	  this	  section,	  we	  discuss	  the	  po-­‐
tential	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  PDP	  organizational	  form	  and	  current	  operation.	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  2.6.1 Constraints	  on	  the	  determinants	  of	  R&D	  productivity	  
	  
PDPs	  appear	   to	   still	  have	   limited	  R&D	  capabilities.	   In	   the	  case	  of	  pharmaceuticals,	   to	  date	  PDPs	  
have	   focused	   to	   a	   substantial	   extent	   on	   “low-­‐hanging	   fruit”:	   existing	   drugs	   being	   evaluated	   for	  
new	  indications,	  new	  formulations	  of	  existing	  drugs,	  novel	  fixed-­‐dose	  combinations,	  but	  not	  NCEs.	  
PDPs	  have	  yet	  to	  prove	  whether	  they	  can	  develop	  NCEs,	  though	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  NCE	  pro-­‐
jects	  in	  late-­‐stage	  clinical	  trials.	  NCEs	  are	  riskier	  to	  invent	  than	  finding	  new	  uses	  for	  existing	  drugs	  
or	  new	  formulations.	  The	  latter	  can	  be	  developed	  in	  a	  shorter	  timeframe,	  and	  thus	  can	  be	  deliv-­‐
ered	   to	   those	   in	   need	   in	   shorter	   timeframe.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   discovery	   of	   new	   NCEs	   will	   be	  
needed	  to	  achieve	  substantial	  improvements	  in	  terms	  of	  therapeutic	  benefits	  over	  existing	  drugs.	  
Transaction	  costs	  and	  coordination	  costs	  are	  higher	  and	  more	  complex.	  Mobilizing	  sufficient	  finan-­‐
cing	  for	  projects	  on	  NCEs	  is	  a	  major	  challenge.	  	  
Project	  managers	   in	  PDPs	  need	  to	  be	  highly	  skilled	   in	  order	  to	  accomplish	  the	  range	  of	  activities	  
they	  may	  be	  entrusted	  to	  do,	  or	  if	  these	  activities	  are	  separated	  among	  project	  managers	  (by	  R&D	  
phase	  or	  activity),	  they	  will	  need	  to	  be	  highly	  coordinated	  among	  them,	  (i.e.,	  scientific	  expertise,	  
evaluating	  licensing	  opportunities,	  designing	  appropriate	  clinical	  trials).	  	  
The	  size	  of	  PDPs	  may	  vary,	  though	  generally	  they	  are	  small	  organizations.	  The	  empirical	  evidence	  
on	  the	  relationship	  between	  firm	  size	  and	  innovation	  is	  inconsistent	  (Cohen	  2010).	  Some	  empirical	  
literature	   finds	   that	   in	   the	   pharmaceutical	   industry,	   size	   confers	   an	   advantage.	   Henderson	   and	  
Cockburn	  found	  that	  discoveries	  in	  larger	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  are	  more	  productive,	  deriving	  from	  
economies	   of	   scope	   and	   scale	   (Henderson	   and	  Cockburn	   1996).	   Yet	   in	   drug	  development,	   large	  
firms	  have	  the	  advantage	  of	  scope,	  rather	  than	  returns	  to	  scale	  (Cockburn	  and	  Henderson	  2001).	  
However,	   small	   firms,	   such	   as	  biotechnology	   firms,	   can	  be	  highly	   innovative.	   The	   share	  of	  NCEs	  
attributable	   to	   small	  biotechnology	  and	  pharmaceutical	   firms	  has	   increased	   to	  nearly	  70%	  since	  
1980	  (Munos	  2009).	  Moreover,	  the	  large	  scale	  of	  R&D	  portfolios	  in	  large	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  and	  
trends	   in	  growth	  via	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions	  have	  not	   lead	  to	  their	   increased	   innovativeness	   in	  
terms	  of	  newly	  approved	  NCEs.	  	  	  	  
PDPs	  with	  small	  project	  portfolios	  may	  have	  a	  perverse	  incentive	  to	  cling	  onto	  projects	  that	  should	  
otherwise	  be	  terminated.	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  single-­‐product	  early	  stage	  firms	  are	  more	  reluc-­‐
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tant	   to	  abandon	  the	  development	  of	   their	  only	  viable	  drug	  candidates,	   in	  contrast	   to	   firms	  with	  
multiple	  products	  in	  development	  (Guedj	  and	  Scharfstein	  2004).	  	  	  2.6.2 Constraints	  on	  financing	  and	  priority	  setting	  
	  
Governments	   of	   disease-­‐endemic	   countries,	   global	   health	   organizations	   (particularly	  WHO)	   and,	  
public	  and	  philanthropic	  donors	  lack	  coordinated	  R&D	  priority	  agendas	  and	  funding	  efforts,	  based	  
on	  the	  global	  burden	  of	  diseases.	  Currently	  activities	  are	  highly	  disjoined.19	  This	  lack	  of	  coordina-­‐
tion	  is	  also	  reflected	  among	  PDPs.	  
PDPs,	  as	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	  with	  respect	  to	  other	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  institutions	  in	  global	  health,	  
derive	   their	   legitimacy	   from	   their	   effectiveness	   in	   improving	   specifically	   defined	   health	   outputs	  
and	  outcomes,	  in	  contrast	  to	  traditional	  multilateral	  agencies,	  which	  derive	  legitimacy	  from	  multi-­‐
government	   representation	  and	  deliberation	   (Sridhar,	   2012).	   In	  PDPs,	  donors	  decide	  on	   the	  pri-­‐
ority	  areas	   for	   funding,	   the	   conditions	  attached	   to	   fund	  disbursements,	   instruments	   for	   control,	  
transparency	   requirements,	   and	   so	   forth.	  These	   requirements	  are	  not	  harmonized	  among	  PDPs,	  
nor	  are	  they	  made	  public.	  The	  risk	  is	  that	  the	  priorities	  of	  governments,	  particularly	  from	  endemic-­‐
disease	  countries,	  do	  not	  match	  those	  of	  the	  donor;	  therefore,	  the	  PDPs’	  R&D	  efforts	  may	  deliver	  
products	  that	  will	  not	  find	  entry	  in	  disease-­‐endemic	  countries.	  Currently	  there	  is	  no	  assurance	  that	  
the	  current	  portfolio	  of	  PDPs’	  R&D	  projects	  will	  match	  the	  expectations	  of	  disease-­‐endemic	  count-­‐
ries.	  	  	  
PDPs	  maintain	  close	  relationships	  with	  partners	   in	  collaborative	  R&D	  schemes.	  The	  interests	  and	  
priorities	  of	  various	  partners,	  public	  and	  private,	  can	  be	  at	  odds.	  The	  PDP	  has	  the	  role	  of	  neutrally	  
managing	  these	  tensions,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  exempt	  from	  influence.	  Hence,	  PDP	  access	  and	  other	  related	  
policies	  are	  critically	  important.	  Not	  all	  PDPs	  openly	  disclose	  their	  policies	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  
partnerships.	  None	  disclose	   the	  details	  of	   the	  deals	  made.	  While	   this	   is	   standard	  practice	   in	   the	  
pharmaceutical	  industry,	  in	  pursuing	  the	  public	  health	  objectives	  of	  PDPs	  in	  the	  non-­‐profit	  frame-­‐
work,	  greater	  transparency	  should	  be	  expected.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	   	  A	  WHO	  expert	  working	  group	  (CEWG)	  proposed	  a	  binding	  R&D	  treaty	  to	  improve	  priority-­‐setting	  based	  on	  public	  
health	  needs,	  and	   to	  promote	   increased	  government	   financing	   for	  R&D	  and	  coordination	  among	  public	  and	  private	  
R&D	  (CEWG	  2012).	   	   	  There	  are	  proposals	  by	  governments,	  civil	  societies,	  and	  PDPs	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  global	  
R&D	  framework	  that	  monitors,	  coordinates,	  and	  finances	  medical	  innovations	  for	  neglected	  populations,	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  a	  new	  R&D	  treaty	  (DNDi	  and	  MSF	  2012)	  to	  establish	  a	  Global	  Health	  R&D	  Observatory	  within	  WHO.	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PDPs,	   as	   independent	   entities,	   could	   use	   added	   oversight	   from	   the	   global	   public	   health	   com-­‐
munity.	  Currently	  some	  level	  of	  oversight	  is	  exerted	  only	  privately	  by	  funders.	  WHO	  could	  provide	  
additional	  leadership	  in	  establishing	  priority	  areas	  for	  R&D	  in	  neglected	  diseases	  and	  could	  coordi-­‐
nate	  with	  other	  new	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  institutions	  that	  assist	  in	  the	  purchasing	  and	  disbursement	  
of	  new	  medical	  products	  such	  as	  the	  Global	  Fund	  to	  Fight	  AIDS,	  Tuberculosis	  and	  Malaria	  and	  the	  
GAVI	   Alliance.	   However,	   the	   ability	   of	   countries	   to	   align	   their	   priorities	   for	   programs	   with	   the	  
budget	  at	  WHO	  is	  currently	  restricted.	  Member	  States	  approve	  and	  decide	  on	  the	  use	  of	  only	  the	  
portion	  of	   the	  budget	  that	   is	   financed	  by	  Member	  State	  contributions	   (about	  25%	  of	   total	   fund-­‐
ing),	   while	   donors	   decide	   on	   the	   use	   of	   extra-­‐budgetary	   (voluntary)	   funding	   (over	   80%	   of	   total	  
funding)	  from	  State	  and	  non-­‐State	  actors.20	  	  
Donors,	  especially	  philanthropic	  foundations,	  are	  also	  not	  responsive	  to	  any	  broader	  global	  health	  
community.	  Their	   legitimacy,	  as	   in	   the	  case	  of	  PDPs,	   rests	   in	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   their	   interven-­‐
tions,	   but	   is	   delinked	   from	  any	   accountability	   to	   governments.	  With	   their	   amount	   of	   resources,	  
they	  are	  able	  to	  exert	  enormous	  influence	  on	  global	  health	  policies.	  The	  interviews	  we	  conducted	  
point	   out	   that	   PDPs	   are	   not	   always	   clear	   in	   terms	   of	   who	   is	   setting	   the	   priorities	   for	   the	   PDP.	  
Moreover,	  various	   interests	  are	  aligned,	  whether	   it	   is	   the	  funder,	   (i.e.,	  with	  the	  Bill	  and	  Melinda	  
Gates	  Foundation	  being	  the	  largest	  philanthropic	  donor),	  the	  Board,	  the	  pharmaceutical	   industry	  
partner,	   or	   the	  government	  of	   endemic-­‐disease	   countries.	  When	  a	   representative	  of	   a	  PDP	  was	  
interviewed,	  we	  were	   told,	   “When	  Gates	   says	   that	  we	   should	   increase	   efforts	   for	   vaccines,	  we	  
know	  that	  the	  risk	  for	  PDPs	  not	   in	  the	  vaccine	  field	   is	  real”.	  There	  could	  be	  potential	  conflicts	  of	  
interests	   in	   the	   Board,	   for	   example,	  when	   an	   active	   pharmaceutical	   company	   representative	   or	  
funder	  (i.e.	  Gates	  Foundation,	  Médecins	  Sans	  Frontiers)	  is	  on	  the	  Board.	  PDPs	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  
a	  clear	  strategy	  on	  how	  to	  tackle	  the	  issues.	  Some	  PDPs	  want	  to	  maintain	  independence	  and	  give	  
assurance	  of	  being	  a	  neutral	  catalyser	  for	  R&D,	  while	  others	  consider	  it	  to	  be	  of	  great	  importance	  
to	  have	  key	  partners	  represented	  on	  the	  Board.	  	  
PDP	  financing	  is	  also	  not	  assured	  on	  a	  long-­‐time	  horizon.	  PDPs	  are	  highly	  vulnerable	  to	  fluctuations	  
in	  financing,	  especially	  at	  times	  of	  financial	  downturns	  affecting	  governments	  and	  donors.	  Public	  
and	  donor	  financing	  to	  PDPs	  are	  reported	  to	  have	  decreased	  in	  light	  of	  the	  recent	  economic	  down-­‐
turn	   since	   2008,	   down	   US$128.7	  million	   (G-­‐Finder	   2012).	   	   Furthermore,	   PDPs	  must	   invest	   con-­‐
siderable	  resources	  to	  be	  used	  in	  fundraising	  and	  public	  relations.	  They	  have	  to	  undertake	  market-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  See	  the	  WHO	  document	  A66/48,	  WHO	  Reform,	  Financing	  of	  WHO,	  Sixty-­‐Sixth	  World	  Health	  Assembly,	  Provisional	  
Agenda	  Item	  11,	  13	  May	  2013.	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ing	  and	  advocacy	  activities	   to	  attract	  new	   funding.	  PDPs’	  R&D	  portfolios	  are	  mostly	   in	   the	  early	  
stages	  (development,	  early	  clinical	  stages),	  with	  important	  exceptions.	  As	  projects	  progress	  to	  lar-­‐
ger	   clinical	   trials,	   the	   costs	   will	   likely	   increase	   significantly,	   together	   with	   total	   funding	   needs.	  
There	  may	  not	  be	  adequate	   cost	  estimations	  of	   the	   total	   funds	  needed	   for	   completion.	  Already	  
some	  PDPs	  are	  struggling	  to	  ensure	  the	  estimated	  funding	  required	  for	  their	  phase	  III	  projects	  (i.e.,	  
as	  is	  the.	  case	  with	  DNDi	  projections).	  	  
Some	  PDPs	  have	  been	  experimenting	  with	  alternative	  means	  to	  raise	  financing,	  in	  addition	  to	  ad-­‐
vocating	  for	   increased	  resource	  allocations	  from	  the	  global	  health	  community.	  For	  example,	   IDRI	  
created	  three	  for-­‐profit	  start-­‐ups	  (biotechnology	  companies)	  as	  a	  means	  to	  continue	  financing	  for	  
its	   non-­‐profit	   arm,	   including	   licensing	   vaccine	   adjuvants	   to	   pharmaceutical	   firms	   for	   developed	  
country	   markets	   that	   were	   originally	   developed	   for	   neglected	   diseases	   (Nature	   Biotechnology	  
2009).	  One	  problem	  identified	  is	  that	  PDPs	  cannot	  attract	  venture	  capital	  or	  some	  types	  of	  grants	  
(e.g.	  small	  business	  grants	  in	  the	  US)	  that	  are	  available	  to	  small	  innovative	  firms,	  but	  not	  to	  non-­‐
profits.	  However,	   the	  relationship	  between	  non-­‐profit	  and	   for-­‐profit	  arms	  of	  PDPs	   is	   likely	   to	   in-­‐
crease	  tensions	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  public	  interest	  mission	  of	  PDPs.	  	  	  
	  2.6.3 Constraints	  of	  access	  and	  delivery	  
	  
The	  PDP	  setup	  creates	  tensions	  between	  incentives	  to	  R&D	  and	  access	  goals.	  In	  practice,	  managing	  
an	  agenda	  of	  R&D	  plus	  access	   is	   complex.	  A	  case	  example	   is	  defining	   the	  product	  price	  and	   IPR	  
policy.	  In	  cases	  where	  the	  market	  is	  too	  small	  to	  stimulate	  competition,	  products	  will	  need	  to	  be	  
supplied	  at	   cost,	  or	  at	  a	  price	   corresponding	   to	  a	   small	  margin	  above	   the	   lowest	  manufacturing	  
costs	  to	  ensure	  sustainability	  of	  production.	  Yet,	  due	  to	  asymmetric	  information,	  PDPs	  can	  be	  pay-­‐
ing	  higher	  than	  “at	  cost”	  to	  partners,	  who	  may	  also	  seek	  IPR	  protection	  for	  the	  new	  medical	  pro-­‐
ducts,	  in	  particular,	  for	  diseases	  that	  have	  some	  commercial	  market	  (i.e.	  HIV/AIDS,	  malaria,	  tuber-­‐
culosis,	  meningitis).	  
PDPs	  also	  face	  challenges	  of	  ensuring	  that	  end	  users	  can	  access	  products	  once	  they	  are	  developed.	  
Introducing	   new	   tools	   for	   various	   indications	   has	   often	   been	   associated	  with	   a	   significant	   delay	  
between	  global	  availability	  and	  local	  adoption.	  Donors	  are	  funding	  product	  development,	  but	  not	  
product	  delivery.	  The	  capacity	  to	  conduct	  research	  to	  support	  and	  sustain	  public	  health	  initiatives	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in	  developing	  countries	   remains	  weak,	  which	   is	  a	  barrier	   to	   the	   long-­‐term	  availability	  of	  existing	  
products.	  
	  2.6.4 Constraints	  of	  contracting	  and	  coordination	  problems	  	  
	  
The	  disintegrated	  R&D	  structure	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  PDPs	  raises	  contracting	  problems	  and	  transac-­‐
tion	   costs,	   as	   compared	   to	   centralized	   vertically	   integrated	   R&D	   within	   a	   single	   organization	  
(Cockburn	  2005).	  	  
Problems	  of	  asymmetric	  information	  exist	  in	  contracting	  with	  partners.	  Academic	  researchers	  may	  
be	   better	   aware	   of	   the	   true	   value	   of	   their	   research,	   and	   may	   contract	   research	   organizations	  
(CROs)	  about	  the	  costs	  of	  clinical	  trials,	  and	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  about	  the	  cost	  of	  manufacturing	  
and	  distribution.	  Moral	  hazard	  may	  occur,	   in	  particular	   in	  manufacturing,	   given	   that	  PDPs	   cover	  
most	  of	  the	  costs;	  therefore,	  the	  firm	  involved	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  take	  risks.	  The	  contractual	  terms	  of	  
PDP	  collaborations	  are	  not	  disclosed.	  Non-­‐disclosure	  of	  contractual	  terms	  makes	  it	  more	  difficult	  
for	  PDPs	  to	  share	  information,	  learn	  from	  each	  other’s	  experience	  and	  share	  it	  with	  outside	  R&D	  
projects.	   	   In	  particular,	   IPR	   terms	  can	   limit	   the	   freedom	  of	  PDPs	   to	  coordinate	  R&D,	  grant	  subli-­‐
censes	  for	  manufacturing	  and	  other	  activities	  with	  third	  parties.	  	  	  
We	  observe	  that	  PDPs	  tend	  to	  select	   those	  with	  whom	  they	  have	  previously	  worked.	  A	  possible	  
explanation	   is	   incomplete	   information	   on	   potential	   partners.	   In	   doing	   so,	   opportunities	   for	   col-­‐
laboration	  may	  be	  missed,	  for	  example,	  with	  partners	  from	  disease-­‐endemic	  countries.	  	  
PDPs	  operate	   independently,	  with	  no	  overall	   coordinating	  entity	  or	  priority-­‐setting	  public	  policy	  
guidance,	  other	   than	  their	  own	  PDP	  governance	  structure	  and	  pursuit	  of	   their	  mission.	  The	  only	  
coordinating	   entity,	   to	   some	   extent,	   is	   the	   Gates	   Foundation.	   As	   a	   funder	   of	   several	   PDPs,	   the	  
Foundation	  sees	  the	  broader	  picture	  of	  PDPs’	  R&D	  projects;	  yet,	  an	  analysis	  of	  PDP	  portfolios	  or	  
other	  initiatives	  to	  coordinate	  at	  a	  broader	  level	  are	  not	  disclosed	  to	  the	  public.	  PDPs	  may	  be	  sub-­‐
ject	  to	  the	  problems	  that	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  face	  in	  pursuing	  the	  same	  leads	  to	  dead	  ends,	  mak-­‐
ing	  unnecessary	  efforts	  to	  replicate	  screening,	  and	  studies	  that	  others	  have	  already	  undertaken.	  	  	  
There	  can	  also	  be	  a	   lack	  of	   coordination	  and	  collaboration	  among	  PDPs,	   leading	   to	  unnecessary	  
duplication	  of	  efforts,	  though	  we	  do	  not	  have	  sufficient	  evidence	  to	  explore	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
this	  may	  be	   affecting	  R&D	  outcomes.	   Competition	   in	   a	   non-­‐profit	   economy	   is	   a	   topic	   not	   often	  
	  	   35	  
explored.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  PDPs,	  it	   is	  evident	  that	  PDPs	  can	  be	  competing	  with	  one	  another	  for	  the	  
same	  select	  sources	  of	  funding	  to	  capture	  resources.	  The	  overlapping	  of	  R&D	  portfolios	  in	  terms	  of	  
diseases	  or	  leads	  may	  not	  constitute	  a	  problem	  in	  itself,	  given	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  failure	  that	  can	  be	  
expected	   in	   medical	   product	   development,	   particularly	   vaccines	   and	   new	   drugs.	   However,	   re-­‐
sources	  may	  be	  wasted,	  and	  spill-­‐overs	  may	  be	   foregone	  by	  a	  potential	   lack	  of	  cooperation	  and	  
sharing	  of	  information	  and	  resources	  among	  PDPs.	  If	  the	  sources	  of	  financing	  for	  PDPs	  are	  not	  as-­‐
sured,	  or	  if	  policies	  are	  not	  implemented	  by	  governments	  and	  funders	  to	  regulate	  PDP	  behaviour	  
in	  another	  direction,	  this	  competitive	  environment	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  continue.	  However,	  there	  
are	   indications	  that	  PDPs	  are	  working	  to	   increase	  coordination	  and	  collaboration	  amongst	  them-­‐
selves.	  For	  example,	  the	  TB	  Alliance	  granted	  DNDi	  a	  royalty-­‐free	   license	  to	  develop	  anti-­‐TB	  com-­‐
pounds	  for	  use	  against	  other	  neglected	  diseases	  in	  the	  R&D	  portfolio	  of	  DNDi.	  	  
Sharing	   information	   among	  PDPs	   can	   also	   serve	   to	   build	   collective	  bargaining	  power	   to	   achieve	  
better	  deals	  and	  to	  strengthen	  their	   future	  negotiating	  positions	  with	  partners,	  particularly	  with	  
pharmaceutical	   firms.	   PDPs	   could	   share	  with	   one	   another	   their	   experiences	   in	   negotiating	  with	  
partners,	  the	  terms	  of	  deals,	   including	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  firms	  define	  terms	  such	  as	  
what	  “at	  cost”,	  “no	  loss”,	  “fully	  burdened	  manufacturing	  cost”	  and	  “cost	  plus”,	  which	  may	  signifi-­‐
cantly	   vary	   the	  cost	  of	  a	  PDP	  R&D	  project,	   and	   strategies	   for	   IPR	  management.	  PDPs	   could	  also	  
work	  more	  closely	  in	  their	  common	  operations,	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  advocacy	  to	  donors	  and	  technol-­‐
ogy	  platforms	  to	  bring	  down	  costs	  and	  increase	  effectiveness.	  
	  	  2.6.5 Constraints	  of	  insufficient	  transparency	  
	  
As	   independent	   non-­‐profit	   organizations,	   PDPs	   face	   demands	   for	   accountability	   from	  
various	  sources,	   including	  donors,	  endemic	  country	  governments,	  partners	  and	  end-­‐users	  of	   the	  
medical	  products	  that	  they	  aim	  to	  treat.	  They	  are	  legally	  accountable	  in	  terms	  of	  compliance	  with	  
the	   health	   regulatory	   standards	   for	   new	  medical	   products	   in	   general.	   However,	   PDPs	   could	   im-­‐
prove	  their	   transparency	  and	  disclosure,	  as	  well	  as	  performance	  assessment	  mechanisms.	   	  PDPs	  
and	  partners	  do	  not	  systemically	  nor	  publicly	  disclose	  all	  relevant	  scientific	  and	  clinical	  data	  that	  
could	  be	  useful,	  for	  example,	  cases	  when	  clinical	  trials	  fail	  to	  avoid	  making	  the	  same	  mistakes	  or	  
following	  the	  same	  leads.	  PDPs	  need	  to	  make	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  deals	  with	  partners,	  financial	  allo-­‐
cations	  and	  costs	  of	  their	  R&D	  projects	  more	  transparent	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  proper	  evaluation.	  PDPs	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could	  increase	  their	  credibility	  and	  legitimacy	  by	  establishing	  governance	  instruments	  and	  institu-­‐
tional	  policies	   to	   reduce	   the	   risk	  of	   capture	  or	  undue	   influence	  by	  donors	  and	  other	  actors	  and	  
could	  avoid	  conflicts	  of	   interests	   in	  managing	   their	  R&D	  portfolios.	  Some	  PDPs	  have	  established	  
policies,	   for	  example,	  with	  respect	  to	  ensuring	  multiple	  sources	  of	   financing	  to	  avoid	  donor	  cap-­‐
ture,	  and	  policies	  on	  access	  and	  management	  of	  IPR,	  but	  these	  are	  isolated	  initiatives.	  There	  is	  also	  
a	  lack	  of	  systemic	  assessment	  of	  PDPs,	  based	  on	  a	  commonly	  agreed-­‐upon	  methodology	  or	  met-­‐
rics.	   Despite	   the	   growing	   amount	   of	   resources	   being	   challenged	   for	   neglected	   disease	   R&D	   to	  
PDPs,	  there	  are	  no	  reliable	  methods	  or	  regular	  assessment	  reviews	  of	  PDP	  performance,	  as	  com-­‐
pared	  to	  other	  alternatives	  (Ridley	  2004).	  	  
	  2.6.6 Constraints	  on	  insufficient	  use	  of	  capabilities	  in	  disease-­‐endemic	  countries	  
	  
Not	  all	  PDPs	  see	  their	  mission	  as	  seeking	  to	  build	  up	  the	  capacity	  of	  developing	  countries	  them-­‐
selves	  and	  technology	  transfer	   to	  undertake	  R&D	  on	  treatments	   for	   those	  diseases	   that	  particu-­‐
larly	   affect	   disease-­‐endemic	   countries.	   Greater	   R&D	   capacity	   in	   developing	   countries	   has	  many	  
benefits,	  such	  as	  lower	  R&D	  costs,	  price	  of	  manufacturing	  and	  distribution,	  and	  increasing	  market	  
competition	   to	   drive	   down	   long-­‐term	  prices	   for	  medical	   products.	   In	   the	   case	  of	   the	  meningitis	  
vaccine	  developed	  by	   the	  PATH	  Meningitis	  Vaccine	  Project	   (MVI),	   the	   India	  Serum	  Vaccine	   Insti-­‐
tute	  was	  able	  to	  offer	  to	  manufacture	  the	  vaccine	  at	  the	  target	  price	  set	  by	  MVI,	  which	  would	  al-­‐
low	  endemic-­‐country	  governments	  to	  procure	  the	  vaccine	  at	  US$0.50	  a	  dose.	  No	  other	  big	  vaccine	  
manufacturer	  was	  willing	   to	   produce	   at	   this	   price.	   PDPs	   should	   seek	   greater	   collaboration	  with	  
emerging	  economies	  that	  are	  increasing	  their	  role	  in	  the	  neglected	  disease	  landscape	  (So	  and	  Ruiz-­‐
Esparza	  2013).	  
	  2.7 Conclusions	  
	  
We	  have	  described	  an	  interesting	  phenomenon	  under	  the	  lens	  of	  economics	  of	  innovation.	  PDPs	  
are	  a	  new	  form	  of	  pharmaceutical	  R&D	  in	  the	  area	  of	  neglected	  diseases.	  We	  have	  found	  evidence	  
that	  PDPs	  are	  able	  to	  bring	  about	  new	  medical	  products.	  We	  did	  not	  consider	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  
PDP	  organizational	  form,	  as	  compared	  to	  others.	  Reasons	  for	  having	  not	  carried	  out	  any	  efficiency	  
analysis	   are	   various.	   In	   particular,	   the	   needed	   data	   for	   undertaking	   such	   an	   analysis	   were	   not	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available,	  and	  even	  if	  the	  data	  had	  been	  obtained,	  the	  absence	  of	  counterfactual	  cases	  would	  have	  
strongly	  limited	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  analysis.	  Moreover,	  the	  various	  PDPs	  investigated	  in	  the	  study	  are	  
not	  readily	  comparable	  because	  they	  deal	  with	  different	  diseases	  and	  medical	  products;	  thus,	  the	  
scientific	  and	  technological	  problems	  they	  try	  to	  solve	  are	  of	  different	  levels	  of	  complexity.	  
In	   this	   study,	   we	   exclusively	   analyse	   the	   experience	   of	   PDPs	   in	   the	   area	   of	   neglected	   diseases.	  
Nonetheless,	  there	  is	  increasing	  academic	  and	  policy	  interest	  in	  exploring	  the	  potential	  of	  PDPs	  in	  
other	  areas,	  such	  as	  antibiotics.21	  There	  is	  also	  growing	  interest	  in	  promoting	  greater	  collaboration	  
and	  information	  sharing	  to	  advance	  drug	  development,	  particularly	  in	  the	  pre-­‐competitive	  stage	  of	  
discovery.22	  	  	  
We	   find	   that	   PDPs	   act	   as	   “system	   integrators”	   that	   leverage	   the	   resources	   and	   capabilities	   of	   a	  
diverse	  network	  of	  public,	  philanthropic	  and	  private	  sector	  partnerships.	  PDPs	  are	  able	  to	  mobilize	  
private	  firms	  to	  join	  R&D	  projects	  and	  provide	  in-­‐kind	  contributions.	  By	  binding	  together	  and	  co-­‐
ordinating	  the	  activities	  of	  various	  firms	  and	  other	  organizations,	  the	  PDP	  integrator	  role	  is	  benefi-­‐
cial	  to	  all	  involved.	  PDPs	  facilitate	  access	  to	  the	  financing	  and	  exchange	  of	  knowledge;	  additionally,	  
they	  diffuse	  knowledge	  among	  the	  groups	  that	  in	  turn,	  may	  also	  be	  internalized	  by	  individual	  par-­‐
ticipants.	  Public	  policy	  should	  encourage	  PDP	  types	  of	  activities	  and	  R&D	  collaborations.	  	  	  
Some	  of	   the	   constraints	  we	   found	   associated	  with	   PDPs	   are	   coordination	   problems,	   insufficient	  
transparency	  in	  contractual	  terms	  with	  partners	  and	  the	  mismatch	  between	  the	  financing	  horizons	  
of	  donors	  and	  the	  timeframe	  of	  medical	  product	  development.	  	  
The	  future	  of	  the	  PDP	  landscape	  remains	  uncertain.	  Some	  PDPs	  that	  have	  completed	  their	  activi-­‐
ties	   (or	  whose	  funding	  has	  ceased)	  have	  disappeared,	  while	  others	  have	  merged	   into	   larger	  PDP	  
organizations.	  This	  may	  be	  an	  indication	  that	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  scale	  and	  scope	  in	  PDP	  operations,	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  uncertain	  financing.	  It	  would	  be	  useful	  for	  PDPs	  to	  increase	  their	  transparency	  in	  
their	  internal	  operations,	  their	  policies	  on	  critical	  issues	  such	  as	  access	  and	  IPRs,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  their	  
dealings	  with	  funders	  and	  partners.	  Such	  transparency	  may	  be	  forthcoming	  if	  greater	  oversight	  is	  
done	   by	   international	   health	   organizations,	   for	   instance,	   the	  WHO,	   neglected	   disease-­‐endemic	  
countries	  and	  public	   funders.	  An	  agreement	   for	   increased	  global	   coordination	  of	  priority-­‐setting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  World	  Health	  Organization	  2012a.	  
22	   See	   Ekins	   et	   al.	   2013.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   neglected	   diseases,	   openness	   is	   facilitated	   by	   the	   particularity	   that	   funding	  
comes	   from	  public	   sources,	   and	  potential	   profits	   are	  nil	   or	   low.	   For	  other	  diseases,	   intellectual	   property	   and	  profit	  
margins	  are	  central	  components	  of	  the	  business	  strategy	  of	  firms,	  and	  may	  be	  the	  case	  for	  academia,	  as	  well.	  In	  this	  
context,	  the	  incentive	  for	  openness	  and	  knowledge	  sharing	  in	  product	  development	  is	  weaker,	  although	  on	  the	  whole,	  
it	  would	  be	  beneficial	  to	  speed	  up	  medical	  product	  development.	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for	  R&D	  and	   resource	  allocation	  directed	  at	  neglected	  diseases,	   for	   instance,	   through	   the	  WHO,	  
would	  serve	  to	  direct	  the	  work	  of	  PDPs	  in	  a	  more	  coherent	  and	  transparent	  manner.	  According	  to	  
Weder	  and	  Grubel	  (1993),	  private	  agents	  have	  found	  many	  ways	  to	  internalize	  R&D	  externalities	  
and	   solve	   coordination	   problems	   that	   arise	   from	   the	   public	   good	   nature	   of	   knowledge	   and	   re-­‐
search.	  They	  call	  these	  solutions	  “Coasean	  institutions”,”	  according	  to	  the	  principle	  developed	  by	  
Ronald	  Coase	   that	  knowledge	  externalities	   induce	   the	  creation	  of	  private	   institutions	  capable	  of	  
internalizing	  them.	  The	  institution	  analysed	  and	  documented	  in	  this	  study–the	  PDPs	  –clearly	  rep-­‐
resent	  a	  new	  Coasean	  solution	  to	  this	  broad	  class	  of	  problems,	  including	  R&D	  and	  knowledge	  ex-­‐
ternalities,	  as	  well	  as	  coordination	  failures	   in	  decentralized	  markets	  for	  knowledge	  and	  new	  pro-­‐
ducts.23	  	  
A	  limitation	  of	  this	  study	  is	  the	  lack	  of	   information	  available	  concerning	  the	  contractual	  terms	  of	  
PDP	  collaborations	  with	  partners	  and	  processes	  for	  determining	  how	  funds	  are	  allocated	  to	  part-­‐
ners.	  This	  information	  is	  not	  publicly	  available,	  and	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  collect	  comparable	  data.	  
If	   such	   information	  were	  available,	   future	   research	  could	  evaluate	   the	  performance	  of	  PDPs,	   in-­‐
cluding	   resource	  allocation,	   selection	  and	   termination	  of	  R&D	  projects	  and	   the	  appropriateness,	  
affordability	  and	  health	  impact	  of	  new	  medical	  products	  produced	  by	  PDPs,	  as	  compared	  to	  other	  






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  However,	  as	  Weder	  and	  Grubel	  cautioned,	  policy	  has	  to	  limit	  the	  natural	  rent-­‐seeking	  activities	  of	  private	  agents	  by	  
establishing	  constraints	  on	  the	  cooperative	  agreements	  that	  take	  place	  with	  firms	  within	  the	  collaborative	  R&D	  struc-­‐
ture	  (Weder	  and	  Gruber	  1993).	  In	  the	  case	  where	  public	  moneys	  are	  being	  channelled	  to	  PDPs,	  policy	  can	  play	  a	  role	  in	  
defining	   the	   conditions	   for	   disbursement,	   such	   that	   all	   partners	  work	   to	   fulfil	   the	   PDP	  mission	   and	   avoid	   potential	  
rent-­‐seeking,	  and	  promote	  greater	  transparency.	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Chapter	  3 Does	   Intellectual	   Property	  matter	  for	   not-­‐for-­‐profit	   innovation?	   The	   case	   of	  product	   development	   partnerships	   for	   neg-­‐lected	  diseases	  
	  
This	  study	  examines	  how	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  medical	  product	  ventures	  respond	  to	  intellectual	  property	  
(IP)	  as	   incentives	   for	   innovation.	  The	  specific	  case	  of	  an	   institutional	  experiment	  -­‐Product	  Devel-­‐
opment	  Partnerships	  (PDPs)	  in	  the	  area	  of	  neglected	  diseases	  -­‐	  is	  considered.	  PDPs	  are	  independ-­‐
ent	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  organizations	  that	  aim	  to	  develop	  new	  vaccines,	  drugs	  and	  diagnostics	   for	  dis-­‐
eases	   for	  which	  there	   is	  under-­‐investment	   in	  R&D	  as	  compared	  to	   the	  socially	  optimum	  level.	  A	  
survey	  and	  patent	  data	  search	  was	  conducted	  for	  the	  whole	  population	  of	  PDPs.	  The	  study	  finds	  
that	  IP	  protection	  does	  not	  encourage	  the	  R&D	  activities	  of	  PDPs,	  though	  PDPs	  are	  “users”	  of	  third	  
party	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  (IPRs)	  and	  “producers”	  of	  their	  own	  IPRs.	  PDPs	  use	  IP	  for	  strategic	  
purposes	  to	  advance	  their	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  and	  access	  mandate.	  This	  finding	  is	  consistent	  with	  previ-­‐
ous	  literature	  pointing	  that	  IP	  does	  not	  act	  an	  incentive	  for	  innovation	  in	  areas	  where	  commercial	  
markets	  are	   low	  or	  non-­‐existent.	  A	  broader	  conclusion	  of	  this	  study	   is	   that	  the	  research	  on	  eco-­‐
nomics	  of	   IPRs	  should	  be	  informed	  by	  institutional	  analysis	  to	  deepen	  understanding	  of	  the	  vari-­‐
ations	  in	  the	  value,	  use	  and	  impact	  of	  IPRs	  under	  different	  institutional	  settings,	  beyond	  the	  firm.	  
It	  may	  also	  serve	  to	  better	  understand	  how	  the	  behaviours	  of	  actors	   in	  R&D	  (i.e.	   firms,	  universi-­‐
ties)	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  legal	  protections	  afforded	  by	  IPRs	  can	  be	  influenced	  by	  dif-­‐
ferent	  institutional	  settings	  (PDPs).	  	  
	  3.1 Introduction	  
	  
It	   is	  well	   known	   that	   the	  pharmaceutical	   industry	  actively	   seeks	  out	  patents	  and	  other	   forms	  of	  
intellectual	  property	  rights	  (IPRs)	  and	  is	  opposed	  to	  weakening	  of	  intellectual	  property	  (IP)	  protec-­‐
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tion.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  IP	  practices	  and	  policies	  of	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  R&D	  institutions	  involved	  in	  medical	  
product	  development	  are	  not	  well	  understood.	  In	  general,	  the	  role	  of	  IP	  in	  the	  context	  of	  not-­‐for-­‐
profit	  innovation	  is	  an	  underexplored	  subject.	  	  
This	  study	  explores	  this	  question	  by	  examining	  a	  specific	  form	  of	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  R&D	  organization:	  
product	  development	  partnerships	  (PDPs),	  specifically	  those	  involved	  in	  advancing	  innovation	  for	  
tackling	  neglected	  diseases.24	   PDPs	  are	   independent	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	   organizations	   that	   aim	   to	  de-­‐
velop	   new	   diagnostics,	   vaccines	   and	   drugs	   for	   diseases	   that	   concentrate	   in	   poor	   countries	   and	  
populations	  and	  for	  which	  there	  is	  under-­‐investment	  in	  R&D	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  socially	  optimum	  
level.	  In	  contrast	  with	  for-­‐profit	  firms,	  PDPs	  are	  not	  motivated	  by	  economic	  interest	  but	  rather	  by	  
the	  objective	   to	  bring	  about	  new	  medical	  products	   that	  are	  accessible	   to	  poor	  populations.	  The	  
PDP	   non-­‐profit	   operational	  model	   allows	   for	   the	   cost	   of	   R&D	   to	   be	   delinked	   from	   returns	   over	  
product	  sales	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  firms	  achieved	  via	  high	  prices)	  because	  public	  and	  philanthropic	  do-­‐
nors	  directly	  finance	  R&D.	  	  
The	  aim	  this	  study	  to	  understand	  to	  what	  extent	  are	  IPRs	  are	  relevant	  for	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  innovation	  
by	  examining	  the	  case	  of	  PDPs	  that	  undertake	  non-­‐profit	  R&D	  through	  R&D	  collaborations	  with	  a	  
diversity	  of	  public	  and	  private	  actors.	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  that	  IPRs	  would	  be	  of	  minor	  rele-­‐
vance	  in	  the	  context	  of	  non-­‐profit	  innovation	  in	  PDPs	  given	  their	  mission	  and	  operating	  model.	  	  
The	   study	   analyzes	   the	   role	   of	   IPRs	   in	   the	   context	   of	   PDPs,	   from	   two	  perspectives.	  On	   the	   one	  
hand,	  it	  considers	  PDPs	  as	  potential	  users	  of	  IPRs	  to	  obtaining	  access	  a	  technology	  or	  knowledge	  
asset	  of	  a	  partner	  or	  a	  third	  party	  that	  is	  protected	  by	  IPRs.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  PDPs	  are	  consid-­‐
ered	  as	  potential	  producers	  of	  IPRs,	  in	  deciding	  whether	  to	  obtain	  IPRs	  for	  outputs	  developed	  as	  
part	  of	  an	  R&D	  project.	  A	  survey	  on	  was	  undertaken	  covering	  the	  whole	  populations	  of	  PDPs	  to	  
understand	  the	  IP	  management	  policies	  and	  practices	  of	  PDPs.	  A	  search	  was	  also	  conducted	  for	  all	  
patents	  held	  by	  PDPs.	  Overall	   the	  study	  contributes	  to	  the	  understanding	  the	  role	  of	   IPRs	  under	  
different	  institutional	  settings	  that	  support	  R&D	  and	  innovation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  The	  term	  “neglected	  disease”	  is	  a	  used	  to	  denote	  diseases	  that	  have	  a	  large	  burden	  in	  poor	  populations	  in	  develop-­‐
ing	  countries,	  but	  no	  or	  little	  burden	  in	  the	  developed	  world,	  and	  that	  lack	  effective,	  affordable,	  or	  easy	  to	  use	  diag-­‐
nostics	  and	  treatments.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  and	  following	  Munoz	  et	  al	  2014,	  in	  this	  study	  we	  consider	  neg-­‐
lected	   diseases	   to	   include	  Malaria,	   HIV/AIDS,	   Tuberculosis,	   and	   the	   group	   of	   17	   diseases	   classified	   as	   such	   by	   the	  
World	  Health	  Organization,	  namely	  buruli	  ulcer,	  chagas	  disease,	  cysticercosis,	  dengue,	  dracunculiasis,	  echinococcosis,	  
endemic	   treponematoses,	   foodborne	   trematode	   infections,	   human	   african	   trypanosomiasis,	   leishmaniasis,	   leprosy,	  
lymphatic	  filariasis,	  onchocerciasis,	  rabies,	  schistosomiasis,	  soil-­‐transmitted	  helminthiases	  (hookworm),	  and	  trachoma	  
(WHO	  2010).	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The	  remainder	  of	  the	  study	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  Section	  2-­‐3	  reviews	  the	  literature	  on	  intellec-­‐
tual	  property	  as	  an	  incentive	  to	  innovation	  and	  other	  uses	  of	  IPRs	  by	  firms	  and	  universities	  alone	  
and	  in	  R&D	  collaborations.	  Section	  4	  discusses	  the	  IP	  approaches	  of	  PDPs.	  Section	  5	  presents	  the	  
method	  and	  survey	  data.	  Section	  6	  discusses	  the	  results.	  Section	  y	  concludes.	  3.2 Intellectual	  property	  and	  incentives	  for	  innovation 
	  3.2.1 IPRs	  and	  innovation	  
	  
The	  understanding	  of	  incentives	  for	  R&D	  and	  innovation	  is	  a	  long-­‐standing	  subject	  in	  economics	  of	  
innovation.	   Economists	   have	   mainly	   given	   attention	   to	   intellectual	   property	   as	   an	   incentive	  
mechanism	  and	  policy	  response	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  imperfect	  appropriability.	  Intellectual	  property	  
is	  one	  among	  several	  incentive	  mechanisms	  used	  to	  promote	  R&D	  and	  innovation.	  The	  problem	  of	  
appropriability	  refers	  to	  the	  situation	  where	  innovators	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  fully	  capture	  the	  profits	  
associated	  with	   their	   innovation,	   given	   the	   potential	   for	   unintended	   spillover	   (i.e.	   transmission,	  
imitation)	   of	   the	   information	   and	   knowledge	   created	   through	   their	   private	   investment	   in	   R&D	  
(Arrow	   1962,	   Levin	   et	   al.	   1987,	  Winter	   2006).	   By	   limiting	   R&D	   spillovers,	   in	   theory	   intellectual	  
property	  helps	  innovators	  to	  protect	  returns	  to	  innovation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  R&D	  spillovers	  are	  
an	  important	  source	  of	  technical	  progress	  (Levin	  1988,	  Cohen	  2010).	  An	  implicit	  assumption	  is	  that	  
there	  are	  market	  drivers	  for	  innovation	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  which	  may	  not	  be	  the	  case	  as	  will	  be	  pre-­‐
sented	  in	  this	  study	  in	  regards	  to	  neglected	  diseases.	  	  	  
	  
Intellectual	  property	  is	  a	  legal	  system	  that	  allows	  the	  exclusion	  of	  potential	  users	  of	  an	  innovation	  
unless	  they	  meet	  the	  terms	  and	  conditions	  of	  the	  holder	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  (IPRs)	  over	  
it.	  IPRs	  are	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  commercialize	  a	  protected	  subject	  -­‐	  matter	  (i.e.	  creative	  work,	  mark,	  
design,	  product	  or	  process	   invention).	   The	   IPR	  holder	   can	  exercise	   the	   right	   to	  gain	  or	  maintain	  
market	   advantage.	   IPRs	   can	   take	   various	   forms,	   including	   patents,	   copyrights,	   trademarks,	   and	  
trade	  secrets.	  IPRs	  have	  limited	  durations	  (for	  trade	  secrets	  protection	  lasts	  as	  long	  as	  the	  informa-­‐
tion	  is	  kept	  secret,	  trademarks	  can	  be	  renewed	  indefinitely,	  unlike	  patents	  and	  copyright).	  IPRs	  can	  
be	  exercised,	  traded	  (sold	  or	  “rented”	  via	  a	  licensing	  contract,	  or	  otherwise	  transferred)	  or	  aban-­‐
doned	   (Rockett	   2010).	   Economics	   literature	   has	   given	   most	   attention	   to	   patents.	   A	   patent	   is	  
granted	  by	  government	  with	  regards	  to	  an	  invention	  that	  may	  be	  a	  product	  or	  a	  process,	  when	  the	  
application	  meets	  the	  patentability	  requirements	  and	  with	  the	  condition	  that	  the	  patent	  applicant	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publicly	   disclose	   information	   of	   the	   invention,	   sufficiently	   that	   it	   can	   be	   replicated	   and	  used	  by	  
others	  once	  the	  term	  of	  protection	   is	  expired.	   	  Trade	  secrets,	  of	  a	  different	  nature,	  may	  also	  be	  
used	  to	  protect	  innovations.	  The	  secret	  should	  not	  have	  been	  disclosed	  to	  the	  public	  and	  reason-­‐
able	  efforts	  must	  be	  done	  to	  keep	  the	  information	  secret.	  
Firms	  can	  use	  intellectual	  property	  in	  deciding	  whether	  and	  how	  to	  protect,	  use	  or	  transfer	  knowl-­‐
edge	  assets	   (including	   tacit	  and	  codified	  know	  how,	   technical	  and	  organizational)	   for	   their	   com-­‐
petitive	  advantage.25	  Nonetheless,	   knowledge	  generated	   through	  R&D	   is	  not	  perfectly	  appropri-­‐
able,	  nor	  is	  easily	  transferable,	  often	  because	  the	  knowledge	  is	  tacit.	  
Empirical	   studies	   point	   to	   an	   increased	   propensity	   of	   firms	   to	   patent,	   particularly	   in	   the	  United	  
States	  and	  Europe,	  but	  are	  inconclusive	  in	  explaining	  this	  trend.	  A	  review	  of	  empirical	  studies	  by	  
W.M.	  Cohen	  casts	  doubt	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  intellectual	  property	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  appro-­‐
priability	  (i.e.	  patents	  that	  are	  invented	  around)	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  patents	  on	  innovation	  (Cohen	  
2010).	  An	  empirical	   study	  by	   J.	   Lerner	  also	   finds	   that	  policy	   to	  strengthen	  patent	  protection	  has	  
not	  led	  to	  increased	  innovation	  (Lerner	  2009).	  A	  number	  of	  other	  mechanisms	  used	  as	  incentives	  
for	   innovation	   include	  government	  and/or	  philanthropic	   sponsored	  prizes	   and	  procurement,	   i.e.	  
direct	  subsidies,	  research	  grants	  or	  fellowships,	  or	  indirectly	  by	  employing	  scientists	  in	  public	  R&D	  
labs	   or	   universities	   (David	   et	   al.	   1999,	   Gallini	   &	   Scotchmer	   2002,	   Stephan	   2010,	   Hall	   &	   Lerner	  
2010).	  	  Economists	  have	  also	  pointed	  to	  defects	  of	  intellectual	  property	  as	  an	  incentive	  mechanism	  
due	  to	  the	  deadweight	  loss	  from	  monopoly	  pricing	  that	  reduce	  users	  (i.e.	  those	  unable	  or	  not	  will-­‐
ing	  to	  pay	  the	  price	  of	  the	  license)	  and	  inefficiencies	  that	  are	  caused	  by	  “patent	  races”.	  Inefficien-­‐
cies	  are	  due,	  among	  other	  factors,	  to	  the	  difference	  that	  may	  exist	  between	  the	  private	  value	  of	  
the	   intellectual	  property	  from	  the	  social	  value	  and	   imperfect	  sharing	  of	   information	  among	  R&D	  
competitors	  (Menell	  &	  Scotchmer	  2007).	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  joint	  ventures	  and	  other	  stra-­‐
tegic	  alliances	  are	  a	  way	  to	  reduce	  such	  inefficiencies	  related	  to	  “patent	  races”	  (Schotchmer	  2003),	  
though	  empirical	  evidence	  is	  lacking.	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Firms	  also	  rely	  on	  other	  means	  of	  appropriability	  to	  a	  greater	  extent	  that	  or	  in	  addition	  to	  IP,	  such	  as	  lead-­‐time/first-­‐
mover	  advantage,	  secrecy	  and	  complementary	  capabilities.	  See	  for	  example	  Cohen	  et	  al	  2000.	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3.2.2 The	  strategic	  use	  of	  IPRs	  by	  firms	  
	  
A	  growing	  body	  of	  literature	  is	  showing	  that	  firms	  increasingly	  claim	  IPRs,	  particularly	  patents,	  to	  
pursue	   a	   diversity	   of	   objectives,	   other	   than	  deriving	   profits	   from	   the	   commercialization,	   sale	   or	  
licensing	  of	  a	  patented	  invention.	  In	  this	  regard,	  an	  empirical	  study	  finds	  that	  firms	  use	  patents	  to	  
block	  rivals	   from	  patenting	  related	   inventions,	  to	  threat	  or	  protect	  against	   infringement	  suits,	   to	  
strengthen	   bargaining	   position	   in	   negotiations	   with	   other	   firms	   for	   protected	   technology	   (i.e.	  
cross-­‐licensing),	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  internal	  performance,	  and	  the	  enhancement	  of	  the	  firm's	  reputa-­‐
tion	  –	  with	  differences	  across	  firms	  and	  technologies	  (Cohen	  et	  al.	  2000).	  Similarly,	  a	  study	  on	  the	  
patenting	  behavior	   in	   the	   semiconductor	   industry	   finds	   that	  by	  building	   larger	  portfolios	  of	   IPRs	  
firms	  may	  reduce	  the	  holdup	  problem	  posed	  by	  external	  patent	  owners	  and	  enable	  firms	  to	  nego-­‐
tiate	  access	  to	  external	  technologies	  on	  more	  favorable	  terms	  (Hall	  et	  al.	  2001).	  	  
	  3.2.3 Use	  of	  IPRs	  in	  non-­‐profit	  institutions	  
	  
Economists	  have	  also	  given	  attention	  to	  the	   increased	  patenting	  and	   licensing	  by	  public	  and	  pri-­‐
vate	  universities,	  a	   trend	  attributed	   in	  part	   to	  changes	   in	   IP	   regulations.	  Historically,	  universities	  
and	  public	  laboratories	  did	  not	  claim	  IPRs.	  While	  universities	  continue	  to	  receive	  significant	  public	  
financing	  and	  play	  an	   important	   role	   in	   the	  dissemination	  of	  knowledge,	   legislations	  such	  as	   the	  
United	  States	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act	  of	  1980	  promote	  patenting	  by	  universities	  that	  restricts	  the	  dissemi-­‐
nation	  of	  the	  research	  results	  and	  inventions	  from	  university	  to	  stimulate	  higher	  levels	  of	  univer-­‐
sity	  -­‐	  industry	  interaction	  and	  technology	  transfer.	  Studies	  show	  that	  it	  is	  unclear	  what	  is	  the	  im-­‐
pact	  of	  increased	  university	  patenting	  and	  caution	  on	  negative	  effects	  of	  patents	  on	  inputs	  to	  fu-­‐
ture	  research	  that	  hinder	  downstream	  research	  and	  product	  development	  (Mowery	  and	  Sampat	  
2004,	  Geuna	  and	  Rossi	  2011).	  As	  argued	  by	  Sampat	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  
National	  Institute	  of	  Health	  in	  financing	  basic	  research,	  “if	  [publicly]	  funded	  institutions	  start	  to	  act	  
too	  much	   like	   firms	  with	   respect	   to	   their	   patenting	   and	   licensing	   activities,	   this	  would	   seriously	  
undercut	  the	  economic	  argument	  for	  public	  support,	   from	  either	   ‘market	  failure’	  or	  a	  more	  het-­‐
erodox	   perspective”	   (Sampat	   2009).	   Other	   literature	   points	   that	   universities	   that	   own	   IPRs	   can	  
foster	  access	  to	  medical	  technologies	  by	  changing	  licensing	  practices	  towards	  open	  licensing	  mod-­‐
els	  (Kapczynski,	  2005).	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3.2.4 Use	  of	  IPRs	  in	  R&D	  collaborations	  
Existing	  studies	  on	  the	  use	  of	  IPRs	  in	  R&D	  collaborations	  examine	  collaborations	  that	  involve	  firms	  
exclusively,	  or	  firms	  and	  universities	  in	  a	  single	  industry	  or	  across	  industries.	  One	  study	  finds	  that	  
firms	  make	  strategic	  use	  of	  pre-­‐existing	  IPRs	  as	  bargaining	  chips	  and	  also	  consider	  IPRs	  as	  impor-­‐
tant	   for	   protecting	   foreground	   knowledge	   created	   in	   the	   research	   partnership	   (Hertzfeld	   et	   al.	  
2006).	  Another	  study	  finds	  that,	   in	  first	  instance	  firms	  prefer	  to	  divide	  ownership	  of	  patents	  that	  
may	  result	  from	  research	  partnerships,	  as	  opposed	  to	  sharing	  (co-­‐ownership	  of	  patents),	  given	  the	  
co-­‐patenting	  creates	  fewer	  opportunities	  for	  the	  firm	  to	  appropriate	  the	  full	  value	  of	  the	  patent,	  
particularly	  where	  the	  firms	  have	  interest	  in	  exploiting	  the	  patent	  in	  the	  same	  domain	  of	  applica-­‐
tion	  (Belderbos	  et	  al.	  2014).	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Product	   Development	   Partnerships	   (PDPs)	   are	   an	   institutional	   response	   to	   private	   and	   public	  
under-­‐investment	  in	  R&D	  for	  neglected	  diseases.	  Both	  private	  and	  government	  financing	  for	  R&D	  
in	  neglected	  diseases	  remain	  very	  low	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  global	  burden	  of	  disease	  (Troullier	  et	  al.	  
2013).	  Medical	   product	   innovation	  by	   the	   private	   sector	   is	   driven	  by	  market	   dynamics.	  Medical	  
products	  are	  produced	  and	  traded	  as	  private	  goods.	  Governments	  however	  have	  a	  responsibility	  
to	   protecting	   the	   right	   to	   health,	   by	   providing	   conditions	   for	   all	   the	   population	   to	   be	   healthy	  
(OHCHR	  2008).	  Accordingly,	  public	  health	  policy	  may	  dictate	  that	  medical	  products	  should	  be	  ac-­‐
cessible	  to	  all,	  based	  on	  health	  needs	  and	  regardless	  of	  the	  ability	  to	  pay.	  PDPs	  combine	  elements	  
of	   private	   sector	   approach	   to	   medical	   product	   development	   with	   broader	   principles	   for	   public	  
support	  for	  R&D	  and	  provision	  of	  medical	  products	  as	  public	  goods.	  	  	  
	  
For	  purposes	  of	  this	  study	  PDPs	  are	  defined	  as	  independent,	  not-­‐for	  profit	  entities	  that	  drive	  R&D	  
for	  new	  medical	  products	  in	  the	  area	  of	  neglected	  diseases,	  and	  function	  as	  “system	  integrators”	  
that	  leverage	  the	  resources	  and	  capabilities	  of	  a	  diverse	  network	  of	  public,	  philanthropic	  and	  pri-­‐
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vate	  sector	  actors	   (Munoz	  et	  al.	  2014).	  Understood	   in	   this	  way,	  PDPs	  are	  discernible	   from	  other	  
forms	   of	   not-­‐for-­‐profit	   entities	   and	   public-­‐private	   collaborations,	   and	   one-­‐off	   initiatives	   or	   pro-­‐
jects.26	  The	  particularity	  of	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  organization	   is	   that	   its	  objective	   is	  not	  to	  earn	  profit,	  
but	  rather	  to	  serve	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  organization.27	  A	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  organization	  can	  be	  for-­‐
mally	  established	  as	  a	  legal	  entity	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  or	  informally	  (i.e.	  unregistered	  association).	  The	  
term	  “not-­‐for-­‐profit	  R&D	  organization”	  is	  used	  here	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  formally	  established	  organization	  
that	  pursues	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  objective	  that	  requires	  substantial	  amount	  of	  R&D	  activity.	  The	  objec-­‐
tive	  of	   the	  R&D	   is	   to	  amplify	   the	  social	  value	  of	   the	   innovation,	   in	  contrast	   to	   for-­‐profit	  R&D	  by	  
firms	   that	   aim	   to	   not	   capture	   as	  much	   profit	   as	   possible	   from	   their	   innovation.	   The	   number	   of	  
PDPs	  has	  grown	  in	  the	  past	  twenty	  years,	  covering	  a	  range	  of	  diseases	  and	  medical	  products.28	  	  	  
	  
The	  term	  “partnership”	   is	  used	  here	  to	  refer	  to	  collaboration	  among	  two	  or	  more	  parties	  to	  ad-­‐
vance	  an	  R&D	  project,	  in	  a	  broad	  sense	  (not	  limited	  to	  joint	  R&D).	  R&D	  partnerships	  in	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐
profit	  R&D	  organization	  may	  involve	  any	  number	  of	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  entities	  (public	  universities	  and	  
R&D	  labs,	  private	  foundations),	  for-­‐profit	  entities	  (i.e.	  firms)	  and	  government	  agencies.	  The	  roles	  
individual	   actors	   in	   the	   partnerships	   may	   vary,	   for	   example	   government	   or	   private	   charitable	  
foundation	  may	   provide	   financing,	   a	   university	   or	   firm	  may	   provide	   technology,	   know-­‐how	   and	  
information,	  background	  IPR,	  infrastructure.	  A	  partnership	  is	  distinct	  from	  a	  regular	  business	  prac-­‐
tice,	  such	  as	  the	  when	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  R&D	  organization	  purchases	  from	  any	  public	  or	  private	  en-­‐
tity	  a	  good	  or	  service	  against	  payment	  at	  market	  price.	  Moreover,	  for	  purposes	  of	  this	  study	  it	  is	  
understood	  that	  a	  for-­‐profit	  entity	  is	  in	  partnership	  when	  it	  is	  voluntarily	  engaged	  in	  an	  R&D	  pro-­‐
ject	  to	  support	  the	  objective	  of	  which	  underpins	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  R&D	  organization	  (as	  opposed	  
to	  gain	  profits).	  The	  common	  objective	  of	  an	  R&D	  collaboration	  under	  a	  PDP-­‐led	  R&D	  project	  is	  to	  
advance	  the	  non-­‐profit	  public	  health	  mission	  of	  the	  PDP,	  though	  partners	  may	  have	  other	  specific	  
motivations	   for	  entering	   the	  collaboration.29	  Various	   types	  of	  entities	  opt	   to	  engage	   in	  different	  
ways	  for	  the	  common	  purpose	  of	  advancing	  innovation	  for	  neglected	  diseases.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Public	  –	  private	  partnerships	  are	  generally	  established	  to	  mobilize	  private	  sector	  resources	  to	  deliver	  essential	  pub-­‐
lic	  services	  or	  involvement	  in	  mayor	  projects	  by	  creating	  favorable	  market	  conditions	  that	  otherwise	  would	  not	  exist.	  
Public	  –	  private	  partnerships	   in	  medical	  product	  development	  generally	   follows	  these	  same	   lines.	   In	  the	  area	  of	  ne-­‐
glected	  diseases	  there	  is	  generally	  a	  lack	  of	  commercial	  market	  opportunities	  for	  medical	  product	  development.	  There	  
may	  be	   various	   forms	  of	   public-­‐private	  partnerships	   in	   health,	   PDPs	   are	   a	   specific	   form	  with	   focused	  objectives	   on	  
product	  development,	  see	  for	  example	  Galea	  and	  McKee	  2014,	  Velasquez	  2014.	  	  	  
27	  However,	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  organizations	  can	  earn	  revenues	  to	  pursue	  their	  objective.	  They	  are	  legally	  exempted	  from	  
income	  tax	  as	  profits	  are	  not	  distributed	  for	  personal	  gain	  of	  its	  owners/shareholders.	  
28	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  PDPs	  see	  Munoz	  et	  al	  2014.	  	  	  
29	   Other	   studies	   have	   explored	   the	   specific	  motivations	   of	   entities	   involved	   in	   PDP	   R&D	   projects.	   See	   for	   example	  
Moral	  et	  al	  2005,	  Munoz	  et	  al	  2014.	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There	   is	  evidence	  that	  PDPs	  are	  playing	  an	   important	  role	   in	  driving	  new	  R&D	  and	   innovation	   in	  
the	  area	  of	  neglected	  diseases	   in	  which	  medical	  products	   -­‐medicines,	  vaccines,	  diagnostics	   -­‐	  are	  
lacking	  (Moral	  et	  al.	  2005,	  Moral	  et	  al.	  2010,	  Chataway	  et	  al.	  2010,	  Pedrique	  et	  al.	  2013,	  Munoz	  et	  
al.	  2014).	  A	  significant	  amount	  of	  collaborative	  R&D	  projects	  in	  the	  area	  of	  neglected	  diseases	  are	  
taking	  place	  through	  PDPs.30	  These	  involve	  a	  diversity	  of	  public	  and	  private	  actors,	   including	  aca-­‐
demic	   institutions,	  public	  research	   labs,	  hospitals,	  government	  health	  and	  regulatory	  authorities,	  
contract	  research	  organizations,	  biotechnology	  firms	  and	  pharmaceutical	  companies,	  among	  oth-­‐
ers.	  Assuming	  a	  common	  mission	  of	  PDPs	  and	  partners	  engaged	  in	  R&D	  projects,	  one	  can	  expect	  
that	  the	  approach	  to	  R&D	  collaboration	  under	  PDPs	  would	  differ	  from	  arrangements	  in	  the	  com-­‐
petitive,	  market-­‐driven	   and	   profit-­‐oriented	   environment	   of	   the	   pharmaceutical	   industry.	   Trends	  
observed	  in	  the	  pharmaceutical	   industry	  highlight	  the	  competitive	  nature	  of	  medical	  product	  de-­‐
velopment.	  These	  include	  the	  consolidation	  of	  large	  firms,	  the	  decline	  in	  innovation	  as	  measured	  
by	  the	  number	  of	  new	  medicines	  coming	  to	  the	  market	  despite	  strong	  use	  of	  IPRs,	  and	  increased	  
use	  of	  defensive	  patenting	  strategies	  to	  extend	  the	  commercial	  life	  of	  their	  products	  and	  delay	  the	  
entry	   of	   generic	   medicines	   to	   the	   market	   (EU	   Commission	   2009,	   Comanor	   and	   Sherer	   2013,	  
Sternitzke	   2013).31	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   contractual	   R&D	   partnerships	   and	   licensing	   is	   common	  
among	  large	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  and	  small	  biotechnology	  firms.	  Empirical	  studies	  associate	  the	  
growth	  in	  joint	  R&D	  agreements	  and	  licenses	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  various	  strategic	  motives,	  including	  
to	  access	  financial	  resources,	  technology	  and	  know-­‐how,	  to	  reduce	  cost	  and	  speed	  up	  R&D,	  and	  to	  
reach	  new	  markets	  (Hagedoorn	  2002,	  Arnold	  et	  al.	  2001,	  Roijjakers	  and	  Hagedoorn	  2006).	  	  	  
	  
Private	   firms	  are	  generally	   reluctant	   to	   invest	  alone	   in	  R&D	   in	  neglected	  diseases	   if	   there	   is	   low	  
prospect	  of	  commercial	   returns	   (Matter	  &	  Keller	  2008).	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  academia	  and	  small	  
firms	   lack	  the	  capacity	  to	  move	  basic	  research	  on	  to	  translational	  research.	  The	  PDP	  approach	  is	  
one	  way	  address	  both	  these	  problems,	  by	  taking	  the	  burden	  of	  financing	  R&D	  away	  from	  the	  part-­‐
ners	  involved	  in	  the	  R&D	  project,	  and	  by	  coordinating	  different	  actors	  in	  R&D	  and	  integrating	  the	  
diverse	  set	  of	  capabilities	  into	  single	  R&D	  projects	  that	  are	  managed	  by	  expert	  staff	  in	  PDPs.	  In	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  The	  emergence	  and	  growth	  of	  PDPs	  in	  the	  neglected	  disease	  R&D	  landscape	  can	  be	  associated	  to	  growing	  concern	  
of	  the	  public	  health	  problem	  and	  new	  opportunity	  for	  action	  in	  light	  of	  financial	  resources	  available,	  in	  particular	  from	  
philanthropic	  sources	   (Gates	  Foundation).	  However,	   the	  scarcity	  and	  unpredictability	  of	   funds,	  concentration	  of	   few	  
donors	  puts	  at	  risk	  the	  sustainability	  of	  PDPs	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  	  
31	  Generic	  medicines	  refer	  to	  equivalent,	  unpatented	  versions	  of	  medicines	  that	  are	  usually	  cheaper	  than	  their	  patent-­‐
protected	  counterparts.	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manner,	  PDPs	  are	  able	  to	  de-­‐link	  the	  cost	  of	  R&D	  from	  the	  price	  for	  medical	  products,	  provided	  
there	  are	  no	  monopoly	  price	  distortions	  resulting	  from	  IPRs.	  	  
 3.3.2 IP	  management	  by	  PDPs	  
	  
There	  are	  a	   few	  studies	  that	  explore	  the	  question	  of	  how	  PDPs	  are	  affected	  by	  pre-­‐existing	   IPRs	  
and	  how	  they	  may	  use	  IPRs	  in	  pursuing	  their	  goals.32	  In	  this	  study	  we	  broadly	  refer	  to	  these	  ques-­‐
tions	  as	  “IP	  management”.	  Existing	  studies	  explore	  IP	  management	  policies,	  practices	  or	  strategies	  
of	  a	  single	  or	  selected	  number	  PDPs,	  rather	  than	  the	  whole	  population	  of	  PDPs.	  In	  particular	  there	  
is	  a	   lack	  of	  empirical	  study	  of	  the	  IP	  management	  policies	  by	  PDPs	  and	  the	  terms	  of	  IPRs	  in	  R&D	  
deals	  and	  licenses	  with	  partners.33	  	  
	  
This	  study	  aims	  to	  identify	  and	  understand	  the	  IP	  management	  policies	  by	  PDPs.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  
study	  draws	  a	  distinction	  between	  PDPs	  as	  “users”	  of	  IPRs,	  and	  PDPs	  as	  “producers”	  of	  IPRs.	  The	  
term	  “users”	  of	  IPRs	  includes	  instances	  related	  to	  obtaining	  access	  to	  a	  technology	  or	  know-­‐how	  
that	  is	  protected	  by	  IPRs	  and	  ensuring	  that	  the	  PDP	  or	  no	  partner	  in	  an	  R&D	  project	  infringes	  (in	  
violation	  of)	  any	  pre-­‐existing	  IPRs	  of	  third	  parties.	  The	  second	  is	  PDPs	  as	  “producers”	  of	  IPRs.	  This	  
concerns	   the	  decision	  of	  a	  PDP	  whether	   to	  protect	   the	  know-­‐how	  or	   innovations	   resulting	   from	  
R&D	  projects	  with	   IPRs,	  whether	  to	  allow	  partners	   in	  an	  R&D	  project	  to	  do	  so,	  or	  allow	  for	   joint	  
IPRs,	  and	  whether	  to	  buy	  as	  opposed	  to	  in-­‐license	  an	  IPR	  (i.e.	  patent)	  held	  by	  a	  third	  party.	  	  	  
	  
	  
PDPs	  as	  “users”	  of	  IPRs	  
The	  term	  “users	  of	  IPRs”	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  study	  as	  obtaining	  authoriza-­‐
tion	  from	  the	  IPR-­‐holder	  to	  use	  IPR-­‐protected	  technology	  or	  know	  how	  or	  any	  situations	  where	  the	  
PDP	  can	  use	  the	   IPR-­‐protected	  technology	  or	  know	  how	   lawfully.	  An	  assumption	  of	   this	  study	   is	  
that	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  PDP	  is	  not	  to	  access	  IPR	  per	  se	  (i.e.	  to	  build	  their	  own	  IP	  portfolios	  through	  in-­‐
licensing),	  but	  to	  access	  technology	  and	  know-­‐how	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  initiate	  or	  advance	  an	  R&D	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Studies	  include	  Mahoney	  et	  al	  2007,	  Eiss	  et	  al	  2007,	  Taubman	  2010,	  Global	  Coalition	  for	  Health	  Research	  2013.	  	  
33	  This	   is	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  research	  agreements	  and	  licenses	  are	  generally	  confidential.	  Some	  
individual	   PDPs	  do	   report	  publicly	   their	   IP	  policies	   that	   guide	   their	   IPR	  practices.	  Munoz	  et	   al	   2014	  emphasize	   that	  
greater	  transparency	  by	  PDPs	  and	  partners	  should	  be	  encouraged	  the	  donor	  and	  public	  health	  community.	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project	   in	   the	   PDP	   portfolio.	   In	   following,	   the	   study	   assumes	   that	   gaining	   rights	   to	   use	   to	   pre-­‐
existing	  IP	  held	  by	  external	  sources	  is	  pursued	  when	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  kick	  off	  or	  advance	  an	  R&D	  
project,	  or	  where	  not	  doing	  so	  may	  lead	  to	  legal	  action.	  PDPs	  may	  be	  either	  “passive”	  or	  “active”	  
users	  of	  IPRs.	  	  
	  
Most	  PDPs	  do	  not	  have	  or	  have	  limited	  in-­‐house	  capacity	  (i.e.	  own	  labs,	  manufacturing	  facilities),	  
to	   carry	  out	   the	   full	   range	  of	  R&D	  activities	   for	  medical	  product	  development.	  Most	  PDPs	  build	  
their	  portfolio	  of	  R&D	  projects	  by	  defining	  a	  target	  product	  and	  then	  tapping	  into	  the	  various	  sour-­‐
ces	  of	  knowledge	  for	  various	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  actors	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  protected	  by	  
IPR	  (from	  university,	  biotechnology	  firms,	  pharmaceutical	   firms),	  and	  coordinate	  and	  finance	  the	  
participation	  of	  those	  actors	  and	  activities	  through	  the	  course	  of	  an	  R&D	  project.	  This	  means	  that	  
PDPs	  often	  negotiate	  access	   (free	  or	   subject	   to	  payment)	   to	   IPR-­‐protected	   technology	  or	   know-­‐
how	  as	  inputs	  for	  their	  R&D	  projects.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Where	  IPR	  is	  present,	  access	  to	  a	  technology/product	  embodying	  the	  IPR	  requires	  negotiating	  user	  
rights,	  usually	  in	  the	  form	  of	  licensing.34	  Ensuring	  rights	  to	  use	  third	  party	  IPRs	  is	  critical	  to	  allow	  
the	   PDP	   to	   develop	   and	  market	   new	  medical	   products	   that	   are	   accessible	   to	   the	   target	   patient	  
group.	   The	   extent	   that	   pre-­‐existing	   IPRs,	   particularly	   granted	   patents,	   can	   inhibit	   the	   ability	   of	  
PDPs	  to	  use	  the	  needed	  technology	  or	  know-­‐how	  may	  this	  be	  dependent	  on	  the	  terms	  of	  use	  that	  
PDPs	  are	  able	  to	  negotiate	  with	  partners.	  Previous	  studies	  indicate	  that	  patents	  can	  pose	  obstacles	  
for	  new	  product	  development	  for	  PDPs.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  where	  patents	  granted	  in	  disease-­‐endemic	  
developing	  countries	  and	  existing	  “patent	  thickets”35	  hinder	  new	  R&D	  and	  innovation	  by	  PDPs,	  as	  
in	  the	  reported	  case	  of	  malaria	  and	  HIV	  vaccines	  (Mahoney	  et	  al.	  2007,	  Clark	  et	  al.	  2011).	  These	  
studies	  also	  note	  that	  some	  PDPs	  undertake	  mapping	  and	  analysis	  of	  existing	  patents	  (also	  known	  
as	  patent	  landscaping	  or	  patent	  mining)	  to	  gain	  information	  to	  determine	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  ex-­‐
isting	  patents	  are	  a	  hindrance	  and	  also	  to	  define	  the	  options	  available	  for	  the	  PDP,	  such	  as	  to	  seek	  
to	  undertake	  collaborative	  research	  with	  the	  patent	  holder,	  or	  a	  license.	  Once	  patents	  are	  identi-­‐
fied,	   negotiating	   licenses	  may	   still	   be	   a	   very	   complex	  process,	   particularly	   in	   the	   case	  of	   patent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  R&D	  agreements	  are	  commonly	  done	  in	  the	  discovery	  phase.	  PDPs	  get	  access	  to	  the	  technology	  by	  the	   license	  to	  
the	  IP,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  the	  know-­‐how.	  	  Know-­‐how	  may	  be	  added	  to	  the	  agreement	  and	  may	  be	  no	  less	  important	  
than	  access	  to	  the	  technology.	  We	  may	  want	  to	  add	  some	  discussion	  on	  this	  here	  or	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  study	  to	  clarify	  
that	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  PDP	  is	  to	  access	  technology	  and	  know	  how	  and	  innovate,	  where	  IP	  is	  relevant	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  
that	  it	  may	  be	  conducive	  or	  a	  barrier	  to	  this	  goal,	  but	  it	  certainly	  is	  only	  part	  of	  the	  whole	  picture.	  	  
35A	  patent	  thicket	  refers	   to	  a	  set	  of	  overlapping	  patent	  rights	   that	  require	  that	   those	  seeking	  to	  commercialize	  new	  
technology	  obtain	  licenses	  from	  multiple	  patentees	  (Shapiro	  2001).	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thickets,	  were	   the	  PDP	  may	  need	   to	  get	  a	   license	   from	  multiple	  patent	  holders	   to	   start	  an	  R&D	  
project.	  	  
	  
Another	  alternative	  to	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  patent	  barriers	  would	  be	  for	  patent	  holders	  to	  volun-­‐
tarily	   facilitate	   licenses	  on	  reasonable	  terms	  to	  foster	   innovation	  and	  repurposing	  of	  existing	  pa-­‐
tented	  medical	  products	   for	  neglected	  diseases.36	  This	   is	   readily	   foreseeable	  given	  the	   low	  pros-­‐
pects	  of	  revenues	  from	  licenses	  and	  from	  enforcing	  patents.	  One	  way	  for	  patent	  holders	  to	  facili-­‐
tate	  collaborative	  licensing	  with	  reduced	  transaction	  costs	  for	  the	  patent	  holders	  is	  through	  patent	  
pools.37	   UNITAID	   started	   the	   first	   patent	   pool	   for	   drugs	   -­‐	   The	  Medicines	   Patent	   Pool	   Initiative	  
(MPP)	  –	  which	  functions	  since	  2010	  for	  HIV	  drugs	  (Hoen	  E.	  et	  al.	  2011).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  MPP,	  a	  
key	  objective	  is	  to	  speed	  up	  the	  entry	  of	  generic	  competition	  to	  bring	  down	  prices	  for	  newer	  pa-­‐
tented	  anti-­‐retroviral	   drugs	   and	   facilitate	   the	  development	  of	  new	   fixed-­‐dose	   combinations	  and	  
formulations	  adapted	  in	  resource-­‐poor	  settings.	  The	  conditions	  of	  the	  licenses	  are	  negotiated	  be-­‐
tween	  the	  licensor	  with	  MPP.	  The	  MMP	  also	  manages	  the	  pool	  of	  patents	  and	  licenses	  with	  third	  
parties.	  All	  licenses	  are	  published	  in	  full.38	  
Another	  example	  of	  a	  voluntary	  initiative	  to	  facilitate	  licensing	  and	  opportunities	  for	  collaboration	  
is	  the	  WIPO	  Re:	  Search,	  an	  open	  centralized	  database	  system	  run	  by	  the	  World	  Intellectual	  Prop-­‐
erty	  Organization	   (WIPO).	  Any	  party	  can	  offer	   IP,	  but	  also	  non-­‐patented	  proprietary	   information	  
such	  as	  know-­‐how	  and	  services,	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  database.	  A	  number	  of	  pharmaceutical	  com-­‐
panies	  are	  currently	  members.	  For	  both	  providers	  and	   interested	  potential	  users,	  the	  system	  re-­‐
duces	  transaction	  costs	  of	  seeking	   information	  and	   licenses.	  Under	  the	  WIPO	  Re:	  Search,	  parties	  
commit	  to	  certain	  guiding	  principles	  the	  licenses	  are	  not	  centrally	  managed.	  This	  means	  that	  there	  
is	  ample	  scope	  to	  negotiate	  the	  terms	  of	  the	   licenses,	  other	  than	  the	  broad	  terms	  prescribed	  by	  
WIPO	  Re:	  Search,	  for	  instance	  the	  commitment	  of	  providers	  to	  grant	  royalty-­‐free	  licenses	  for	  the	  
use	  and	  sale	  of	  products	  under	  the	  license	  in	  all	  least	  developed	  countries.	  A	  summary	  of	  collabor-­‐
ation	  agreements,	  but	  not	  IPR	  licenses	  and	  their	  terms	  are	  published.39	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  A	  third	  alternative	  is	  the	  use	  of	  non-­‐voluntary	  measures.	  Governments	  can	  issue	  compulsory	  licenses	  and	  govern-­‐
ment	  use	  to	  allow	  production	  and	  sale	  of	  a	  patented-­‐drug	  without	  the	  authorization	  than	  the	  patent	  holder.	  These	  can	  
be	  issued	  on	  various	  grounds,	  such	  as	  when	  a	  patent	  holder	  refuses	  to	  grant	  a	  license	  on	  reasonable	  terms	  (refusal	  to	  
deal)	  or	  for	  public	  interest	  for	  instance	  when	  prices	  of	  the	  drug	  are	  considered	  too	  high,	  or	  to	  remedy	  anti-­‐competitive	  
practices.	  	  
37	  A	  patent	  pool	   is	  a	  voluntary	  measure,	  whereby	  any	  patent	  holder	  can	  make	  available	  a	  patent	  to	  the	  pool	  for	  the	  
purpose	  of	  facilitating	  licences.	  
38	  See	  http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/current-­‐licences/	  
39	  See	  http://www.wipo.int/research/en/collaboration.html.	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It	   has	  been	  noted	   that	   facilitating	  use	  of	  patented	   information	  and	  know-­‐how	   for	   innovation	   in	  
neglected	   diseases	   requires	   a	   change	   in	  mindset	   from	   the	   patent	   holders	   to	   be	  more	   open	   to	  
managing	  their	  IPR	  flexibly	  (Hoen	  E.	  et	  al.	  2011).	  Indeed,	  this	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  greatest	  obstacle	  
given	   that	   the	  profit	  prospects	   for	  academic	  and	   industry	  PDP	  partners	   in	   the	  area	  of	  neglected	  
diseases	  are	  low	  or	  inexistent.	  Banerji	  and	  Pecault	  describe	  the	  difficulties	  of	  a	  PDP	  in	  negotiating	  
a	  licensing	  agreement	  with	  a	  university:	  “throughout	  the	  protracted	  negotiations,	  staff	  at	  the	  uni-­‐
versity’s	  business	  development	  department	  were	  supportive	  of	  DNDi’s	   IP	  policy	  and	  commercial	  
goals.	  The	  main	  obstacle	  was	  simply	  the	  difficulty	  faced	  by	  the	  legal	  representatives	  when	  asked	  to	  
step	  away	  from	  the	  standard	  pro	  forma	  protocol	  and	  negotiate	  an	  agreement	  that	  flew	  in	  the	  face	  
of	  their	  obligation	  to	  negotiate	  the	  best	  return	  on	  IP.”	  (Banerji	  and	  Pecault	  2007).	  
	  
PDPs	  as	  “producers”	  of	  IPRs	  
PDPs	  may	  choose	  between	  the	  various	  alternatives	  for	  the	  appropriation	  of	  results	  derived	  from	  
R&D	  projects	  through	  IPRs:	  the	  PDP	  does	  not	  seek	  IPRs;	  neither	  the	  PDP	  nor	  partners	  seek	  IPRs;	  
the	  PDP	  and	  partners	   jointly	   seek	   IPRs;	  PDP	  seek	   IPRs;	  or	  partner	  seeks	   IPRs.	   It	   is	  expected	   that	  
these	   choices	  may	   vary	   among	  PDPs	   and	  even	   across	  R&D	  projects	   of	   a	   PDP	  on	   a	   case	  by	   case	  
basis,	   in	  accordance	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  factors,	  such	  as	  whether	  the	  PDP	  has	  a	  pre-­‐defined	  IP	  policy,	  
the	  specific	  disease	  (i.e.	  if	  there	  is	  any	  commercial	  market	  potential),	  the	  target	  profile	  of	  the	  pro-­‐
duct	   to	  be	  developed,	   the	  stage	  of	  R&D	  and	   the	   type	  of	  partner(s)	   involved.	  PDPs	  are	  generally	  
involved	   in	  R&D	  for	  diseases	  that	  have	  no	  or	   little	  commercial	  market	  potential,	   though	  there	   is	  
significant	  variance	  among	  diseases.	  Table	  3	  illustrates	  the	  diseases	  that	  PDPs	  are	  working	  on	  and	  
their	  market	  characteristic.	  	  
	  
The	  term	  “producers”	  of	  IP	  is	  used	  in	  this	  study	  to	  refer	  to	  ownership	  of	  IPRs	  by	  PDPs.	  The	  exclu-­‐
sionary	   effect	   of	   IPRs	   and	   potential	   impact	   on	  monopoly	   pricing	   and	   restriction	   of	   competition	  
appears	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  mission	  of	  PDPs	  that	   is	   to	  make	   innovations	  accessible	   to	  all	  based	  on	  
health	  needs.	  Patents	  are	  one	  of	  various	  factors	  that	  may	  affect	  prices	  and	  affordability	  of	  medical	  
products,	  as	   it	  confers	  the	  patent	  holder	  monopoly	  rights	  over	  the	  marketing	  of	   the	  product	   for	  
the	  period	  of	  the	  patent	  protection.	  Medical	  products	  in	  general,	  where	  available,	  are	  largely	  unaf-­‐
fordable	  for	  large	  populations	  in	  developing	  countries.	  	  Thus,	  the	  protection	  of	  IPRs	  by	  PDPs	  may	  
cause	  tension	  with	  their	  global	  access	  mission.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  well	  acknowledged	  that	  patents	  are	  
not	   an	   effective	  mechanism	   to	   stimulate	  R&D	   in	   neglected	  diseases	   given	   that	   opportunities	   to	  
make	  profits	  do	  not	  exist	  to	  begin	  with	  (World	  Health	  Organization	  2006).	  	  This	  is	  more	  so	  the	  case	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for	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  innovation	  where	  the	  profit	  -­‐	  motive	  is	  inexistent.	  	  
 
Table	  3.	  Disease	  coverage	  by	  PDP40	  
	   Product	  Development	  Partnership	   Disease	  covered	   Parallel	   Commercial	  
market	  
1	   Malaria	  Vaccine	  Initiative	  (MVI)	  	   Malaria	   Yes	  
2	   Consortium	   for	   Parasitic	   Drug	   Development	  
(CPDD)	  
African	   trypanosomiasis,	   leishmania-­‐
sis	  
No	  
3	   Dengue	  Vaccine	  Initiative	  (DVI)	   Dengue	   No	  
4	   European	  Vaccine	  Initiative	  (EVI)	   Malaria,	  tuberculosis,	  HIV,	  	  
Chagas,	  dengue,	  leishmaniasis,	  	  
Yes	  	  
No	  
5	   HIV	  Vaccine	  Trials	  Network	  (HVTN)	   HIV	   Yes	  
6	   IVCC	   Vector	  control	   Yes	  
7	   Meningitis	  Vaccines	  Project	  (MVP)	  	   Meningitis	  B	   No	  
8	   Sabin	  Vaccine	  Institute	  PDP	  	   Soil-­‐transmitted	   helminths,	   schisto-­‐
somiasis,	  	  
	  
9	   South	  African	  AIDS	  Vaccine	  Initiative	  (SAAVI)	   HIV	   Yes	  
10	   Tuberculosis	  Vaccine	  Initiative	  (TBVI)	   Tuberculosis	   Yes	  
11	   Microbiocides	   Development	   Programme	  
(MDP)	  
HIV	   Yes	  
12	   Foundation	   for	   Innovative	   New	   Diagnostics	  
(FIND)	  
Tuberculosis,	  malaria,	  	  
african	  trypanosomiasis,	  chagas	  
Yes	  
No	  
13	   CONRAD	   HIV	   Yes	  
14	   Drugs	  for	  Neglected	  Diseases	  Initiative	  (DNDi)	   Malaria,	  HIV,	  
african	   trypanosomiasis,	   leishmania-­‐
sis,	  chagas,	  filarial	  diseases	  	  
Yes	  
No	  
15	   International	  Vaccine	  Institute	  (IVI)	   cholera,	  typhoid	   Yes	  
16	   International	   Partnership	   for	   Microbiocides	  
(IPM)	  
HIV	   Yes	  
17	   Global	  Alliance	   for	  TB	  Drug	  Development	   (TB	  
Alliance)	  
Tuberculosis	   Yes	  
18	   Medicines	  for	  Malaria	  Venture	  (MMV)	   Malaria	   Yes	  
19	   Institute	  for	  One	  World	  Health	  (iOWH)	   Malaria,	  	  




20	   The	  International	  AIDS	  Vaccine	  Initiative	   HIV	   Yes	  




22	   AERAS	   Tuberculosis	   Yes	  
	  
	  
Accordingly,	  the	  model	  of	  knowledge	  management	  that	  one	  could	  expect	  to	  be	  preferred	  by	  not-­‐
for-­‐profit	  innovative	  ventures	  would	  be	  one	  of	  no	  IPRs	  at	  all,	  particularly	  patents.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  ex-­‐
pected	  that	  PDPs	  would	  be	  “passive”	  rather	  than	  “active”	  producers	  of	  IPRs.	  As	  noted	  in	  Maurer	  et	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  The	  diseases	  listed	  are	  all	  “neglected”	  in	  that	  they	  mainly	  affect	  developing	  countries,	  particularly	  poor	  settings	  and	  
there	  is	  a	  dearth	  of	  R&D	  on	  new	  medical	  products	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  social	  need.	  This	  table	  draws	  a	  distinction	  be-­‐
tween	   neglected	   diseases	   that	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   policy	   (economic	   or	   regulatory)	   incentives	   nonetheless	   draw	  
variant	  levels	  of	  commercial	  interest	  (i.e.	  market	  in	  developed	  countries)	  from	  neglected	  diseases	  which	  draw	  none	  at	  
all.	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al.	  2004,	  there	  are	  significant	  benefits	  of	  an	  open	  source	  discovery	  model	  for	  neglected	  diseases	  in	  
sharing	  capabilities	  and	  containing	  costs,	  while	  private	   firm	  collaboration	  can	  be	   incentivized	  via	  
contract	  payments	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	   IPRs	   (Maurer	  et	  al.	  2004).	  Moreover,	   the	  PDP	  model	  has	  
the	  advantage	  that	  payment	  for	  the	  cost	  of	  R&D	  is	  delinked	  from	  the	  prices	  of	  medical	  products.41	  	  
That	  said,	  some	  PDPs	  reveal	  that	  they	  may	  file	  patent	  applications	  and	  use	  other	  forms	  of	  IPRs	  as	  
part	  of	  their	  business	  model	  –	  as	  “active”	  producers	  of	  patents.	  A	  patent	  right	  allows	  the	  PDP	  to	  
decide	  who	  can	  use	  the	  patented	  product	  and	  set	  conditions	  for	  use.	  Table	  4	  explores	  the	  possible	  




Table	  4.	  Functions	  for	  why	  a	  PDP	  may	  patent	  
Function	   Likelihood	  
A. Incentive	  for	  monopoly	  pricing	  	   No.	   Not	   consistent	   with	   the	   not-­‐for-­‐profit	  
mission	  to	  provide	  access.	  	  
B. Revenues	  for	  financing	  activities	   No.	  Not	  consistent	  with	  the	  funder	  funding	  
model	  if	  financing	  is	  assured.	  PDP	  financing	  
of	  R&D	  is	  de-­‐linked	  from	  product	  sales.	  	  
C. Enhance	  powers	  of	  transaction	  	   Yes.	   For	   instance,	   a	   PDP	  may	   condition	   li-­‐
censes	   to	   produce	   specific	   amounts	   of	  
product	   to	  be	  sold	  at	   low	  price,	  or	  negoti-­‐
ate	  terms	  of	  use/license	  to	  third	  party	  pat-­‐
ents	   in	   return	   for	   use/license	   to	   the	   pat-­‐
ents	  held	  by	  the	  PDP	  (cross-­‐license).	  	  
D. Prevent	   private	   appropriation	   by	   third	  
parties	  
Yes.	   For	   instance,	   to	   control	   use	   of	   the	  
product	   and	   avoid	   monopoly	   pricing	   by	  
third	  parties	  if	  these	  filed	  patents.	  	  	  
E. Raise	   interest	   of	   partners	   in	  manufactur-­‐
ing	  and	  distribution.	  	  	  
Yes,	   in	   particular	   for	   large,	   for	   –	   profit	  
pharmaceutical	  firms.	  	  
F. Managing	  different	  worlds	  	   Yes,	   for	  diseases	  commanding	  a	  dual	  mar-­‐
ket.	  For	   instance,	  patents	  may	  be	   licensed	  
for	  use	  in	  developed	  countries	  in	  return	  for	  
royalty	  payments	   to	   the	  PDP,	  while	   assur-­‐
ing	   low	   product	   prices	   in	   developing	   and	  
least	  developed	  countries.	  	  
 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  PDPs	  seek	   financing	   for	  R&D	  from	  external	  sources;	  donations	  and	  grants	  by	  public	  and	  philanthropic	   institutions	  
allow	  PDPs	  to	  maintain	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  status.	  Donors,	  in	  support	  of	  the	  public	  health	  objective	  of	  PDPs,	  could	  require	  
PDPs	  to	  openly	  disclose	  and	  disseminate	  R&D	  results	  to	  facilitate	  follow	  on	  research,	  and	  oversee	  that	  these	  results	  
are	  not	  privately	  appropriated	  or	  that	  IPRs	  are	  enforced	  in	  ways	  that	  restrict	  further	  innovation	  and	  access	  to	  medical	  
products.	  However,	   there	   is	   no	  public	   information	   to	   suggest	   that	   donors	   systematically	   define	   rules	   concerning	   IP	  
management	  as	  conditions	  for	  overall	  funding	  or	  grant	  disbursements	  to	  PDPs.	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Given	   the	  broad	  number	  and	  diversity	  of	  partners	  and	  R&D	  projects	  of	  PDPs,	   it	   is	  assumed	  that	  
decisions	  by	  a	  PDP	  on	  whether	  to	  file	  a	  patent	  are	  either	  defined	  by	  an	  pre-­‐established	  IP	  policy	  as	  
a	  baseline	  (with	  some	  degree	  of	  flexibility)	  or	  are	  taken	  on	  a	  case-­‐to-­‐case	  basis.	  	  
	  
Interaction	  user	  and	  producer	  PDP	  
It	  is	  assumed	  that	  there	  is,	  in	  specific	  cases,	  an	  interaction	  between	  the	  role	  of	  a	  PDP	  as	  a	  user	  of	  
IPRs	  and	  the	  role	  of	  a	  PDP	  as	  a	  producer	  of	  IPRs.	  For	  instance,	  to	  improve	  negotiation	  capacity	  to	  
use	   third	  party	  patents,	  a	  PDP	  may	  seek	  patents	   from	   its	  R&D	  portfolio	  as	  a	  bargaining	   tool	   for	  
cross	  -­‐	  licensing.	  Likewise,	  a	  PDP	  that	  is	  a	  passive	  user	  of	  patents	  -­‐in	  the	  case	  of	  PDPs	  that	  mainly	  
disburse	  funds	  and	  outsource	  R&D	  to	  partners-­‐	  is	  likely	  to	  also	  be	  a	  passive	  producer	  of	  patents.	  In	  
contrast,	   a	  PDP	   that	   is	   at	   the	   forefront	  of	   the	   technology	  may	  be	  a	  passive	  user	  of	  patents	  but	  
either	  a	  passive	  or	  active	  producer	  of	  patents	  –subject	  to	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  PDP.	  	  	  
	  
Whether	  a	  PDP	  is	  an	  active	  producer	  of	  patents	  may	  also	  be	  related	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  PDP	  
allows	  third	  parties	  to	  pursue	  patents	  or	  not.	   It	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  PDPs	  have	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  
autonomy	  and	  freedom	  in	  their	  work	  to	  make	  alliances	  and	  strike	  deals,	  through	  licensing	  or	  con-­‐
tracts,	   to	  pursue	  their	  objectives	   (World	  Health	  Organization	  2006).	   In	  situations	  where	  a	  PDP	   is	  
able	  to	  cover	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  partners	  in	  the	  R&D	  project	  (presuming	  they	  engage	  
on	  a	  voluntary	  basis	  in	  agreement	  with	  the	  common	  public	  health	  objective),	  it	  would	  not	  appear	  
that	  partners	  would	  need	  additional	  incentives	  in	  the	  form	  of	  IPRs	  would	  be	  necessary	  or	  desirable	  
to	  engage	  partners	  in	  R&D	  collaboration.	  However,	  variance	  can	  be	  expected	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  
deals	  that	  PDPs	  strike	  with	  partners.	  Variance	  may	  be	  dependent	  on	  numerous	  factors	   including	  
the	  disease	  area	  (whether	  there	  is	  commercial	  potential	  in	  a	  segment	  of	  the	  market	  or	  application	  
of	  the	  technology	  in	  other	  diseases	  with	  attractive	  markets),	  the	  bargaining	  position	  –power	  bal-­‐
ance-­‐	  of	   the	  PDP	  vis	  a	  vis	   the	  partner	   in	   the	  particular	  negotiation	   related	   to	   the	  “value”	  of	   the	  
technology,	   the	  experience	  of	  PDPs	   in	   IP	   related	  negotiations,	  and	   the	   inclination	  of	   the	  PDP	   to	  
adopt	  business-­‐like	  practices	  with	   respect	   to	   IPRs.	  As	   an	  example,	   a	  PDP	  may	  allow	  an	   industry	  
partner	   to	  reserve	  the	  right	   to	  claim	  patents	   for	   the	   innovations	  derived	   from	  the	  results	  of	   the	  
PDP-­‐led	  R&D	  project	  for	  the	  same	  indication	  in	  markets	  of	  commercial	  interest	  to	  the	  partner,	  (i.e.	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  HIV/AIDS	  or	  Malaria	  in	  developed	  countries)	  known	  as	  “dual	  market	  or	  market	  seg-­‐
mentation”,	  or	  for	  other	  indications.	  Likewise,	  PDPs	  may	  request	  that	  partners	  make	  access	  com-­‐
mitments	  to	  ensure	  affordability	  of	  the	  product	  once	  developed,	  such	  as	  not	  claiming	  IPRs	  for	  the	  
application	  of	  the	  R&D	  project.	  	  
	  	   54	  
	  
Limited	   information	   is	   available	   concerning	   these	   practices	   to	   allow	   for	   a	   detailed	   examination.	  
Nonetheless,	   it	   provides	   a	  backdrop	   for	   the	  analysis	   of	   the	  question	   that	   concerns	   this	   study	   in	  
assessing	  how	  PDPs	  manage	  IP	  related	  questions,	   in	  accessing	  technology	  or	  know-­‐how	  for	  their	  
R&D	  projects,	   in	  engaging	  partners	   into	  R&D	  projects,	  or	   in	  making	  use	  of	   IPRs	  on	   their	  own	  or	  
with	  partners	  to	  pursue	  their	  public	  interest	  objective.	  	  
	  3.4 Method	  
	  
This	   study	   is	   based	   on	   a	   survey	   of	   PDPs	   and	   an	   analysis	   of	   patents	   granted	   to	   PDPs.	   The	   study	  
aimed	  to	  cover	  the	  whole	  population	  of	  PDPs.42	  
	  3.4.1 The	  survey	  
	  
The	  initial	  sample	  was	  list	  of	  23	  PDPs.	  The	  survey	  questionnaire	  was	  built	  from	  in	  January	  2014	  and	  
integrated	  into	  an	  on-­‐line	  platform	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  response	  to	  be	  done	  remotely.	  The	  final	  sam-­‐
ple	  was	  a	  list	  of	  22	  PDPs.43	  The	  total	  response	  rate	  for	  each	  survey	  completed	  was	  76%.44	  The	  tar-­‐
get	  respondents	  for	  the	  survey	  were	  the	  individual(s)	  responsible	  for	  IP	  within	  the	  PDP.	  We	  com-­‐
municated	  with	  the	  PDPs	  to	  allow	  self-­‐identification	  of	  the	  appropriate	  survey	  respondent.	  Most	  
of	  the	  respondents	  were	  legal	  counsels.	  	  
The	   survey	   was	   composed	   of	   multiple	   selection	   questions	   and	   open	   response	   questions.	   The	  
multiple	   selection	  questions	  also	  allowed	   the	   respondent	   to	  add	  comments.	   The	  questions	   con-­‐
cerned	  the	  importance	  of	  IP	  management	  for	  the	  PDP,	  the	  benefits	  or	  limitations	  of	  having	  IP	  poli-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  These	  PDPs	  were	  selected	  in	  accordance	  to	  the	  definition	  in	  Section	  III.1,	  developed	  in	  Munoz	  et	  al	  2014.	  	  
43	  The	  initial	  sample	  included	  Pediatric	  Dengue	  Vaccine	  Initiative	  (PDVI)	  and	  Dengue	  Vaccine	  Initiative	  (DVI).	  PDVI	  final-­‐
ized	   its	  work	  and	  continued	  as	  DVI.	  The	  sample	   includes	   Institute	   for	  One	  World	  Health	   (iOWH)	  as	  an	   independent	  
entity	  though	  it	  has	  now	  merged	  with	  PATH	  and	  is	  now	  named	  “medical	  product	  development	  program”.	  The	  sample	  
also	  includes	  Consortium	  for	  Parasitic	  Drug	  Development	  (CPDD)	  and	  Microbiocides	  Development	  Programme	  (MDP),	  
that	  are	  no	  longer	  in	  operation.	  	  
44	  The	  16	  PDPs	  that	  responded	  the	  survey	  were	  Drugs	  for	  Neglected	  Diseases	   Initiative	  (DNDi),	  Tuberculosis	  Vaccine	  
Initiative	  (TBVI),	  Dengue	  Vaccine	  Initiative	  (DVI),	  Global	  Alliance	  for	  TB	  Drug	  Development	  (TB	  Alliance),	  IVCC,	  Interna-­‐
tional	  Vaccine	  Institute	  (IVI),	  Malaria	  Vaccine	  Institute	  (MVI),	  Foundation	  for	  Innovative	  New	  Diagnostics	  (FIND),	  Sabin	  
Vaccine	  Institute	  PDP,	  International	  Partnership	  for	  Microbiocides	  (IPM),	  Medicines	  for	  Malaria	  Venture	  (MMV),	  Men-­‐
ingitis	  Vaccines	  Project	   (MVP)	  of	  PATH,	  AERAS,	  CONRAD,	  European	  Vaccine	   Initiative	  (EVI)	  and	  Microbiocides	  Devel-­‐
opment	  Programme	  (MDP).	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cies,	  factors	  that	  influence	  the	  PDP	  approach	  to	  IP	  management,	  internal	  governance	  structure	  for	  
IP	  management,	  activities	  in	  relation	  to	  IP	  management,	  the	  use	  of	  third-­‐party	  IPRs	  by	  PDPs,	  the	  
types	  of	  IPRs	  that	  PDPs	  produce	  and	  their	  motivations	  for	  doing	  so,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  PDPs	  con-­‐
sider	  collaboration	  to	  be	  useful,	  policy	  on	  claiming	  results	  from	  collaborative	  R&D	  projects,	  factors	  
that	  influence	  patent	  licensing	  agreements	  or	  R&D	  agreements,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  patents	  held	  
by	  the	  PDP	  or	  by	  partners	  can	  be	  obstacles	  for	  successful	  conclusion	  of	  partnership	  agreements,	  
whether	  PDPs	  have	  had	  cases	  of	  patent	  litigation	  or	  infringement.	  	  
	  3.4.2 Patent	  data	  
	  
A	  search	  was	  undertaken	  for	  patent	  applications	  and	  granted	  patents	  for	  the	  23	  PDPs	  identified,	  
using	  Thompson	  Reuters	  and	  Spacenet.	  The	  search	  was	  conducted	  for	  the	  period	  1990	  –	  2014,	  for	  
all	  national	  patent	  offices	  covered.	  Patent	  families	  are	  counted	  as	  a	  single	  patent.	  There	  are	  some	  
differences	  in	  method	  amonsgt	  the	  two	  systems.	  In	  Spacenet,	  patent	  documents	  that	  all	  have	  the	  
same	  priority	  number	  and	  appear	  as	  “also	  published	  as”	  documents.	  While	  Spacenet	  harmonizes	  
equivalent	  documents,	  Thompson	  finds	  individual	  patent	  documents	  (raw	  data).	  
	  3.5 Results	  
	  3.5.1 Survey	  Results	  
	  
This	  section	  summarizes	  the	  survey	  results.	  The	  full	  survey	  is	  available	  in	  Table	  11	  the	  appendix.	  	  
	  
Importance	  of	  IP	  management	  and	  policy	  
	  
The	  majority	  (67%)	  of	  PDPs	  indicated	  that	  IP	  management	  is	  important	  for	  the	  PDP.	  No	  PDP	  con-­‐
sidered	  IP	  management	  to	  be	  of	  low	  importance.	  	  
	  
Most	  PDPs	  report	  having	  a	  defined	  IP	  management	  policy	  (87%),	  however	  most	  PDPs	  do	  not	  make	  
the	  IP	  management	  policy	  publicly	  available	  (62%).	  Most	  PDPs	  consider	  that	  a	  defined	  IP	  manage-­‐
ment	  policy	  has	  the	  benefit	  of	  providing	  clarity	   internally	   (management	  team,	  board)	  and	  exter-­‐
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nally	  (donors,	  partners)	  and	  as	  guidelines	  for	  decision-­‐making,	  negotiations	  and	  to	  execute	  agree-­‐
ments	  with	  third	  parties	  (i.e.	  contracts,	  material	  transfer	  agreements,	  sublicenses,	  business	  plans).	  
The	  IP	  policy	  set	  the	  scope	  of	  what	  is	  permitted	  or	  not,	  and	  how	  the	  PDP	  operates	  on	  IP	  matters.	  
Other	  benefits	  of	  IP	  management	  policies	  that	  were	  noted	  included	  consistency	  and	  speed	  in	  deci-­‐
sion-­‐making	  and	  standardization	  between	  partners.	  It	  was	  also	  noted	  that	  an	  IP	  policy	  ensures	  that	  
programs	  can	  be	  advanced	  without	  any	  potential	  or	  perceived	  barriers.	  Similarly,	  it	  was	  noted	  that	  
an	  IP	  policy	  serves	  to	  ensure	  that	  products	  will	  be	  made	  available	  to	  the	  target	  populations	  in	  low	  
income	  setting	  at	  affordable	  prices.	  One	  PDP	  noted	  that	  the	  IP	  policy	  serves	  to	  assure	  its	  private	  
sector	  partners	  that	  it	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  IP	  situation	  and	  will	  respect	  and	  promote	  IP	  protection	  for	  
the	  benefit	  of	  the	  companies	  and	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  public	  sector.	  	  
One	  PDP	  was	  of	  the	  view	  that	  not	  having	  a	  defined	  IP	  management	  policy	  is	  beneficial	  because	  it	  
adds	  flexibility.	  	  
	  
Characteristics	  of	  the	  PDP	  that	  influence	  the	  PDP	  approach	  to	  IP	  management	  
The	  characteristics	  of	   the	  PDP	   that	   influence	   the	  PDP	  approach	   to	   IP	  management	  are	   the	  R&D	  
plus	   access	  mission	   (88%),	   non-­‐profit	   nature	   (81%),	   and	   that	   they	  work	   to	   large	  extent	   through	  
R&D	   partnerships/collaborations	   (75%).	   Another	   characteristic	   noted	   is	   that	   PDPs	   advance	   pro-­‐
ducts	  that	  have	  no	  commercial	  return.	  	  
	  
IP	  management	  governance	  	  
Some	  PDPs	  have	  staff	  explicitly	  dedicated	  to	  IP	  management	  (44%)	  while	  many	  do	  not	  (56%).	  Di-­‐
verse	  responses	  were	  received	  on	  the	  question	  on	  the	  internal	  governance	  structure	  for	  IP	  man-­‐
agement.	  In	  some	  PDPs,	  the	  responsibility	  lies	  with	  the	  head	  of	  legal	  (i.e.	  director	  or	  counsel).	  One	  
PDP	  uses	  a	  consulting	  firm.	  In	  some	  PDPs	  the	  responsibility	  is	  shared	  or	  lies	  with	  business	  devel-­‐
opment,	  or	  with	  the	  head	  of	  R&D	  portfolio	  management.	   In	  some	  PDPs,	   IP	  decisions	  require	  ap-­‐
proval	  of	  executive	  management	  (i.e.	  Director	  General).	  In	  some	  PDPs,	  IP	  decisions	  are	  brought	  to	  
review	  bodies,	   such	  as	   an	  executive	  board	   committee	  or	   a	  portfolio	  management	   committee,	   a	  
programme	  liaison	  group	  or	  programme	  management	  board.	  In	  some	  PDPs	  there	  are	  no	  commit-­‐
tees	  or	  review	  bodies	  with	  such	  functions.	  One	  PDP	  noted	  IP	  management	  is	  a	  contract	  manage-­‐
ment	  function	  and	  it	  also	  responds	  to	  “clear	  donor	  guidelines.”	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IP	  management	  activities	  
The	  survey	  asked	  PDPs	  to	  identify	  the	  main	  IP	  management	  activities	  it	  carries	  out.	  The	  responses	  
varied.	  Some	  PDPs	  noted	  that	  IP	  issues	  are	  regulated	  in	  contracts	  and	  agreements	  with	  partners	  to	  
serve	   various	   purposes.	   These	   included	   ensuring	   access	   provisions	   (that	   products	   will	   be	  made	  
available	  at	  affordable	  prices)	  and	  freedom	  to	  operate	  (operate	  without	  infringing	  IPRs).	  Another	  
purpose	  noted	  was	  the	  in	  -­‐	   licensing	  of	  IPR-­‐protected	  technology	  from	  third	  parties	  or	  to	  license	  
from	  one	  party	  to	  another.	  Some	  PDPs	  report	  as	  main	  activity	  the	  filing	  of	  patents	  to	  protect	   in-­‐
ventions,	  including	  review	  of	  projects	  and	  publications	  and	  other	  disclosure	  for	  the	  timely	  filing	  of	  
patent	  applications.	  The	  activities	  may	  also	  include	  protecting	  trade	  secrets	  and	  trademarks.	  
Other	  PDPs	  reported	  limited	  activities	  on	  IP	  management.	  Some	  PDPs	  report	  they	  do	  not	  hold	  any	  
IPRs	  as	  a	  policy	  or	  practice,	  though	  they	  may	  include	  conditions	  on	  use	  of	  the	  technology	  in	  their	  
agreements	  with	   partners	   or	   allow	   partners	   to	   claim	   IPRs	   under	   agreed	   conditions.	   It	   was	   also	  
noted	  by	  a	  PDP	  that	  where	  partners	  are	  allowed	  to	  hold	   IPRs	  the	  PDPs	  does	  not	  support	  patent	  
filing	  and	  prosecution	  costs.	  One	  PDP	  reported	  that	  its	  role	  is	  that	  of	  monitoring	  the	  IP	  situation,	  
where	  all	  partners	  may	  hold	  IPR	  and	  have	  their	  own	  freedom	  to	  operate.	  	  
	  
PDPs	  as	  users	  of	  IPRs	  
Most	  PDPs	  (75%)	  report	  they	  are	  a	  user	  of	  IPRs	  (described	  in	  the	  survey	  as	  “have	  gained	  rights	  or	  
obtained	  a	  license	  to	  use	  third	  party	  IP-­‐protected	  technology”).	  The	  main	  form	  of	  IPRs	  which	  PDPs	  
seek	   use	   is	   patents	   (87%),	   followed	   by	   copyrights	   (40%)	   and	   trade	   secrets	   (40%),	   trademarks	  
(33%).	  One	  PDP	  reported	  “data”	  as	  an	  additional	  input	  that	  PDPs	  use	  which	  may	  be	  protected	  by	  
third-­‐party	  IPRs.	  	  
The	  purposes	  of	  the	  use	  of	  patents	  vary.	  Those	  identified	  by	  the	  PDPs	  in	  the	  survey	  were	  to	  trans-­‐
fer	   technology	   to	   third	  parties	   (62%)	   to	  obtain	  access	   to	  a	   technology	  or	  knowledge	  that	   is	  pro-­‐
tected	  by	  a	  patent	  (54%),	  for	  freedom	  to	  operate	  (54%).	  
The	  majority	  of	  PDPs	  consider	  of	  high	  importance	  (80%)	  to	  access	  the	  related	  know-­‐how	  or	  capa-­‐
bilities	  of	  the	  patent	  holder,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  right	  of	  use	  or	  license.	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PDPs	  report	  that	  they	  never	  or	  rarely	  (76%)	  obtain	  an	  exclusive	  patent	  license	  (as	  opposed	  to	  non-­‐
exclusive).	   There	   is	   significant	   variance	   in	   the	   extent	   that	   PDPs	  may	   obtain	   royalty-­‐free,	   as	   op-­‐
posed	  to	  royalty-­‐bearing	  patent	  licenses.	  	  
Some	   PDPs	   indicated	   that	   patent	   status	   of	   a	   technology	   does	   not	   influence	   the	   choice	   of	   that	  
technology	  for	  an	  R&D	  project	  if	  it	  is	  considered	  the	  best	  technology	  for	  the	  project	  (47%).	  Other	  
PDPs	   indicated	   that	  where	   there	   is	  alternative	   technology	  available	   to	   the	  patented	   technology,	  
the	  PDP	  would	  choose	  alternative	  (27%).	  	  
	  
Third	  party	  sharing	  IP	  with	  PDPs	  
The	  majority	  of	  PDPs	  (87%)	   indicate	  that	   it	   is	  useful	   for	   third	  parties	  to	  share	  patents	   (allow	  the	  
PDP	  uncompensated	  use	  of	  a	  patent)	  with	  the	  PDP.	  Most	  PDPs	  noted	  that	  sharing	  is	  equally	  useful	  
in	  all	  R&D	  stages	  (64%),	  while	  others	  noted	  that	  in	  early	  development/discovery	  it	  is	  more	  useful,	  
or	  in	  process/product	  development.	  Two	  PDPs	  indicated	  that	  the	  royalty-­‐free	  sharing	  of	  patents	  to	  
the	  PDP	  would	  not	  be	  useful	  at	  all.	  	  
	  
PDPs	  as	  producers	  of	  IPRs	  
Most	  PDPs	  reported	  to	  claim	  ownership	  of	  some	  form	  of	  IPR	  (69%).	  Others	  reported	  not	  to	  claim	  
any	  IPRs	  (31%).	  
For	  PDPs	  that	  claim	  IPRs,	  the	  main	  form	  is	  patents	  (42%).	  Others	  include	  copyright,	  trade	  secret,	  
trademarks	  and	  data.	  Some	  PDPs	  reported	  that	  technology	  and	  know-­‐how	  is	  protected	  in	  agree-­‐
ments	  with	  partners.	  For	  instance,	  one	  PDP	  reported	  that	  it	  protects	  technology	  by	  requiring	  the	  
partner	  to	  agree	  to	  transfer	  the	  technology	  if	  it	  is	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  fulfil	  its	  obligations.	  Simi-­‐
larly,	  another	  PDP	  noted	  that	  it	  only	  reserves	  IPRs	  in	  case	  of	  a	  partners’	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  con-­‐
tractual	  obligations.	  
There	  are	  several	  nuances	  in	  the	  patent	  strategies	  of	  PDPs.	  Some	  PDPs	  that	  do	  not	  seek	  ownership	  
of	   patents	   nonetheless	   allow	   the	   partner	   to	   file	   patents.	   This	  may	   include	   allowing	   the	   patent	  
holder	  to	  operate	  in	  the	  same	  area	  in	  which	  the	  PDP	  operated	  (in	  addition	  to	  allowing	  the	  partner	  
to	  patent	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  areas	  of	  application	  of	  the	  invention,	  such	  as	  for	  other	  diseases	  with	  
commercial	  markets).	  Conditions	  may	  nonetheless	  be	  placed	  by	  PDPs	  on	  the	  patent	  holder.	  One	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PDP	  described	  that	  allowing	  a	  partner	  to	  claim	  patents	  is	  conditioned	  to	  a	  grant-­‐back,	  royalty-­‐free,	  
non-­‐exclusive	  license	  to	  the	  PDP	  to	  continue	  to	  use	  the	  patent	  in	  its	  activities.	  	  
The	  majority	  of	  PDPs	  have	  a	  policy	  on	  who	  may	  seek	  patents	  on	  the	  results	  of	  R&D	  projects	  (60%),	  
while	  others	  do	  not	  (40%).	  The	  policies	  diverge	  significantly.	  	  	  
For	   PDPs	   that	   allow	   patents	   on	   results	   of	   the	   R&D	   projects,	   there	   are	   a	   variety	   of	   approaches.	  
There	  is	  variance	  among	  PDPs	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  to	  define	  whether	  to	  file	  a	  patent	  
(i.e.	  whether	  the	  PDP	  alone	  decides,	  the	  partner	  alone	  decides,	  or	  the	  partner	  and	  PDP	  decide	  to-­‐
gether),	  who	  files	  the	  patent	  (i.e.	  the	  inventor	  or	  the	  institution)	  and	  what	  happens	  after	  the	  pat-­‐
ent	  is	  filled	  (i.e.	  whether	  the	  patent	  is	  then	  assigned	  on).	  	  
Among	  the	  PDPs	  that	  claim	  patents	  a	  diverse	  of	  purposes	  were	  reported.	  One	  of	  the	  purposes	  re-­‐
ported	   is	   to	   license-­‐on	   the	  patent	   to	   industry,	   raising	   their	   interest	   in	  partnering	   in	  manufactur-­‐
ing/distribution	  (50%).	  PDPs	  also	  reported	  that	  patents	  are	  used	  as	  part	  of	  a	  defensive	  strategy,	  to	  
avoid	  third	  parties	  from	  unauthorized	  use	  of	  the	  technology	  or	  claiming	  ownership	  of	  patents	  over	  
the	   technology	   (44%).	   Another	   strategic	   use	   of	   patents	   reported	  was	   to	   cross-­‐license	   to	   access	  
technology	  owned	  by	  third	  parties.	  Two	  PDPs	  reported	  to	  claim	  patents	  as	  a	  way	  to	  generate	  in-­‐
come	  via	  licensing	  to	  fund	  activities	  (13%).	  One	  PDP	  reported	  that	  a	  patent	  allows	  the	  PDP	  to	  exert	  
control	  in	  the	  development	  and	  manufacturing	  of	  a	  product	  to	  ensure	  its	  proper	  use	  and	  quality.	  
Another	  PDP	   reported	   it	   files	  patents	   to	   fulfil	  pre-­‐existing	  obligations	   to	  commercial	  partners	  or	  
funders.	  	  
With	  regards	  to	  the	  results	  of	  R&D	  projects	   in	  the	  PDP	  portfolio,	  a	  variety	  of	   IP	  approaches	  may	  
follow.	  A	  partner	   can	  hold	   a	  patent,	  with	  pre-­‐agreed	   licensing	   terms	   to	   the	  PDP	   (67%)	  or	  other	  
conditions	  placed	  in	  the	  contract	  that	  the	  products	  must	  be	  made	  available	  at	  affordable	  prices	  in	  
target	  populations.	   	  A	  PDP	  can	  hold	  a	  patent	  (60%).	  The	  PDP	  and	  partner	  or	  partners	  can	   jointly	  
hold	  a	  patent	  (60%).	  	  
	  
Sharing	  of	  IP	  by	  PDPs	  with	  third	  parties	  and	  open	  approaches	  to	  R&D	  collaboration	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  PDPs	  that	  claim	  patents,	  they	  are	  not	  generally	  allowing	  third	  parties	  to	  make	  un-­‐
compensated	   use	   of	   the	   patents.	   That	   said,	   some	   report	   doing	   so,	   or	   considering	   doing	   so,	   for	  
cases	  where	  the	  use	  is	  for	  non-­‐profit	  goals	  (i.e.	  with	  academic	  partners)	  or	  non-­‐commercial	  uses	  
by	  partners,	  or	  for	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  partner	  (academia).	  One	  PDP	  noted	  it	  is	  comfortable	  licensing	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patents	  on	  an	  exclusive	  basis	   in	  developed	  countries	  and	  on	  a	  non-­‐exclusive	  basis	   in	   least	  devel-­‐
oped	  countries.	  Another	  PDP	  noted	   that	   it	  has	   cross-­‐licensed	  or	   shared	   its	  patents	   in	   return	   for	  
global	  access	  to	  the	  final	  product.	  
For	  most	  PDPs,	  open	  R&D	  collaboration	  (no	  patent	  claims	  for	  results	  of	  the	  R&D	  collaboration)	  is	  
considered	  useful	   (67%),	  while	  others	  do	  not	   consider	   it	   to	  be	  useful	   (20%).	  Open	  collaboration	  
was	  noted	  to	  be	  particularly	  useful	  in	  the	  discovery	  stage.	  
	  
Patent	  and	  licensing	  agreements	  
A	  variety	  of	  factors	  were	  reported	  as	  influencing	  patent	  licensing	  agreements	  or	  R&D	  agreements	  
between	  the	  PDP	  and	  partners.	  Some	  of	  the	  factors	  more	  often	  recognized	  were	  the	  R&D	  stage	  
(80%),	  the	  target	  profile	  of	  the	  product	  to	  be	  developed	  (73%),	  the	  specific	  disease	  targeted	  (67%),	  
the	   regions/countries	   targeted	   (60%),	   the	   type	  of	  partner	   (60%),	   the	   target	  price	  of	   the	  medical	  
product	   (53%).	   	   Other	   factors	   noted	   were	   the	   choice	   of	   sources	   to	   obtain	   the	   technol-­‐
ogy/knowledge/resources	   (47%),	   the	  markets	   that	  are	   targeted	   (private,	  public,	  purchasing	  enti-­‐
ties)	   (47%),	   the	   source	  of	   funds	  of	   the	  PDP	   (40%),	   the	   estimated	   cost	   of	   production	   (40%),	   and	  
commitment	  to	  providing	  access	  to	  the	  product	  to	  those	  most	  in	  need	  in	  developing	  countries.	  	  
	  
Patents	  as	  barriers	  
PDPs	  reported	  that	  pre-­‐existing	  patents	  held	  by	  partners	  were	  sometimes	  (43%)	  or	  rarely	  (36%)	  an	  
obstacle	   for	   the	   successful	   conclusion	   of	   partnerships	   at	   any	   R&D	   stage.	   In	   contrast,	   PDPs	   con-­‐
sidered	  that	  the	  patents	  held	  by	  the	  PDP	  are	  never	  (79%)	  or	  rarely	  (21%)	  an	  obstacle	  for	  the	  suc-­‐
cessful	  conclusion	  of	  partnerships	  at	  any	  R&D	  stage.	  Negotiations	  on	  the	  terms	  for	  ownership	  of	  
future	  patents	  were	  considered	  as	  sometimes	  (47%)	  or	  rarely	  (40%)	  an	  obstacle	  for	  the	  successful	  
conclusion	  of	  partnerships	  at	  any	  R&D	  stage.	  	  
	  
IPR	  infringement	  and	  enforcement	  
All	  PDPs	  reported	  that	  they	  have	  never	  sought	  opposition	  or	  invalidation	  of	  any	  IPR	  held	  by	  a	  third	  
party.	  Most	  PDPs	  also	  reported	  that	  they	  have	  not	  had	  any	  cases	  of	  patent	   litigation	  or	   infringe-­‐
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ment	  to	  deal	  with	  (81%	  as	  compared	  to	  19%).	  One	  PDP	  noted	  that	  it	  has	  been	  cautious	  to	  proceed	  
with	  a	  particular	  compound	  that	  is	  held	  by	  a	  biotech	  company	  because	  of	  the	  patents	  surrounding	  
that	  compound	  and	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  PP	  to	  obtain	  a	  license	  to	  that	  compound.	  	  
	  3.5.2 Patent	  data	  results	  
	  
Table	  5.	  Patents	  held	  by	  PDPs,	  operating	  model	  and	  disease	  	  
	  	   Patents	   in	   Thompson	   -­‐	  
search	  all	  	  
Patents	  in	  Spacenet	   In-­‐house	  R&D	  	  
MVI	   0	   0	   0	  
CPDD	   0	   0	   0	  
DVI	   0	   0	   0	  
EVI	   0	   0	   0	  
HVTN	   0	   0	   0	  
IVCC	   0	   0	   0	  
MVP	   0	   0	   0	  
Sabin	   0	   0	   1	  
SAAVI	   0	   0	   0	  
TVI	   0	   0	   0	  
MDP	   0	   0	   0	  
DNDI	   2	   2	   0	  
CONRAD	   1	   1	   1	  
FIND	   0	   0	   0	  
IPM	   4	   4	   0	  
IVI	   3	   3	   1	  
TB	  alliance	   25	   5	   0	  
MMV	   96	   15	   0	  
IOWH	   70	   22	   1	  
IAVI	   89	   36	   0	  
IDRI	   96	   36	   1	  
AERAS	   67	   65	   1	  
 
The	  patent	   landscape	   results	   in	   Table	   5	   show	  high	  heterogeneity	   among	  PDPs	   in	   terms	  of	   their	  
patent	  portfolio.	  	  
	  
Over	  half	  of	  the	  PDPs	  (54.5%)	  do	  not	  hold	  any	  patents.	  Out	  of	  the	  PDPs	  that	  hold	  at	  least	  one	  pat-­‐
ent	  (45.5%),	  half	  of	  the	  PDPs	  hold	  between	  1	  and	  5	  patents,	  while	  the	  other	  half	  hold	  between	  15	  
and	  65	  patents.	  	  
	  
All	  of	  the	  PDPs	  that	  work	  exclusively	  on	  diseases	  that	  have	  no	  potential	  parallel	  commercial	  mar-­‐
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kets	  have	  no	  patents.	  Three	  out	  of	   five	  PDPs	   (DNDI,	   iOWH,	  and	   IDRI)	   that	  work	  on	  both	  on	  dis-­‐
eases	  with	  potential	  parallel	  commercial	  markets	  and	  diseases	  with	  no	  commercial	  markets	  hold	  
patents,	  between	  2	  (DNDi)	  and	  36	  	  (IDRI)	  patents.	  Of	  the	  thirteen	  PDPs	  that	  work	  on	  diseases	  with	  
potential	  parallel	  commercial	  markets,	  six	  do	  not	  patent.	  	  
	  
The	  three	  PDPs	  that	  have	  in-­‐house	  R&D	  capacity	  hold	  patents;	  two	  of	  these	  PDPs	  are	  also	  among	  
the	  PDPs	   that	  hold	   the	  most	  patents.	  A	  number	  of	  PDPs	   that	   focus	  on	  managing	  R&D	  collabor-­‐
ations	  and	  outsourcing	  the	  R&D	  activities	  also	  hold	  patents.	  These	  results	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  
section.	  	  	  	  
	  3.6 Discussion	  
	  
The	  survey	   results	   indicate	   that	  PDPs	  consider	   IP	  management	   to	  be	  an	   important	  activity.	  That	  
said,	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  variance	  among	  PDPs	  in	  the	  approaches	  to	  IP	  management,	  as	  evidenced	  
by	   the	   diversity	   of	   responses	   to	   the	   survey	   by	   PDPs	   and	   the	   divergence	   in	   patenting	   trends	   re-­‐
vealed	  by	  the	  patent	  data.	  
	  
PDPs	  as	  users	  of	  IP	  
Most	  PDPs	  recognized	  the	  organization	  as	  a	  user	  of	  IPRs	  held	  by	  third	  parties,	  which	  indicate	  that	  
the	  activities	  of	  PDPs	   involve	  some	   form	  of	  access	   to	  pre-­‐existing	  background	   technology,	  know	  
how	  or	  data.	  The	  purposes	  of	  using	  third	  party	  IPRs,	  as	  noted	  by	  over	  half	  of	  the	  surveyed	  PDPs,	  
include	  either	  or	  all	  of	  the	  following:	  the	  transfer	  of	  technology	  to	  third	  parties;	  to	  obtain	  access	  to	  
a	   technology	  or	  knowledge	   that	   is	  protected	  by	  a	  patent;	   and	   for	   freedom	  to	  operate.	  Approxi-­‐
mately	   half	   of	   the	   PDPs	   responded	   that	   patent	   status	   of	   a	   technology	   does	   not	   influence	   the	  
choice	  of	  that	  technology	  for	  an	  R&D	  project	  if	  it	  is	  considered	  the	  best	  technology	  for	  the	  project.	  
This	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  indication	  that	  PDPs	  are	  eager	  and	  able	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  patented	  
technology	  by	  third	  parties,	  which	  may	  be	  the	  case	  because	  most	  PDPs	  are	  transferring	  to	  partners	  
(or	   in	   the	   case	   of	   a	   few	  PDPs,	   developing	   themselves)	   technology	   that	   builds	   upon	   pre-­‐existing	  
technology	   (e.g.	   new	   drug	   formulations)	   as	   opposed	   to	   radical	   new	   innovations,	   and	   therefore	  
there	  are	  limited	  alternatives	  to	  the	  patented	  technology.	   It	  may	  also	  be	  the	  case	  that	  such	  pre-­‐
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existing	  patents	  are	  not	  insurmountable	  barriers.	  One	  PDP	  noted	  that	  pre-­‐existing	  patents	  is	  a	  mi-­‐
nor	  issue	  on	  the	  broader	  decision	  of	  what	  R&D	  project	  to	  pursue.	  	  
A	   third	  of	  PDPs	   responded	   that	  where	   there	   is	   alternative	   technology	  available	   to	   the	  patented	  
technology,	  the	  PDP	  would	  choose	  alternative.	  One	  explanation	  is	  that	  the	  PDP	  would	  rather	  avoid	  
royalty	  payments	  due	   from	   licenses	  or	  otherwise	   the	   transaction	  costs	  of	  entering	   into	  negotia-­‐
tions	  with	   patent	   holders.	   This	   interpretation	   is	   also	   supported	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  majority	   of	  
PDPs	   indicated	  that	   it	   is	  useful	   for	  third	  parties	  to	  share	  patents	   (allow	  the	  PDP	  uncompensated	  
use	  of	  a	  patent)	  with	  the	  PDP.	  	  
Two	  PDPs	  indicated	  that	  the	  royalty-­‐free	  sharing	  of	  patents	  to	  the	  PDP	  would	  not	  be	  useful	  at	  all.	  
It	  is	  interesting	  to	  try	  to	  interpret	  why	  a	  PDP	  would	  consider	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case,	  as	  an	  assumption	  
in	  this	  study	  was	  that	  PDPs	  would	  aim	  to	  avoid	  the	  exclusionary	  effect	  of	  patents.	  For	  one	  of	  the	  
two	  PDPs	  (TBVI),	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  PDP	  does	  not	  consider	  it	  would	  benefit	  from	  royalty-­‐free	  ac-­‐
cess	  to	  a	  patent	  as	  the	  PDP	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  make	  use	  of	  the	  patented	  technology	  (the	  PDP	  indi-­‐
cated	  it	  does	  not	  does	  not	  use	  any	  IP	  and	  in	  principle	  no	  IP	  is	  owned	  by	  the	  IP).	  It	  would	  also	  ap-­‐
pear	  that	  the	  PDP	  does	  not	  play	  a	  role	   in	  the	  transfer	  of	  technology	  to	  third	  parties.	  The	  second	  
PDP	  (DVI)	  noted	  that	  the	  PDP	  mainly	  monitors	  the	  IP	  situation	  (although	  inventors	  can	  apply	  for	  a	  
patent	  and	  assign	  it	  to	  the	  PDP)	  and	  does	  not	  consider	  that	  the	  field	  is	  impeded	  by	  competing	  or	  
overlapping	  IP	  claims.	  This	  last	  assertion	  may	  be	  particular	  to	  the	  specific	  disease	  area	  where	  DVI	  
operates	  –dengue-­‐	  on	  which	  it	  has	  been	  reported	  that	  there	  is	  low	  degree	  of	  overlap	  among	  pa-­‐
tents	  related	  to	  dengue	  vaccines	  under	  development	  (Krattiger	  et	  al.	  2012).	  However,	  this	  may	  not	  
be	   the	   case	   for	   other	   diseases	   as	   has	   been	   found	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Malaria,	   tuberculosis	   and	  
HIV/AIDS45.	  
Importantly,	  for	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  PDPs	  it	  is	  very	  important	  to	  access	  to	  the	  related	  know-­‐how	  
or	  capabilities	  of	  the	  patent	  holder,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  right	  of	  use	  or	  license.	  As	  noted	  prior,	  most	  
PDPs	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  transfer	  of	  technology	  to	  partners.	  Patents	  provide	  information	  but	  the	  
replication	  of	  a	  patented-­‐technology	  can	  be	  complex,	   largely	  due	  to	  the	  tacit	  elements	  of	  know-­‐
ledge	  that	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  transfer.	  Therefore,	  effective	  technology	  transfer	  by	  the	  PDP,	  meas-­‐
ured	  by	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  partner	  to	  “learn”	  how	  to	  absorb	  and	  adapt	  the	  background	  technology,	  
requires	  that	  the	  PDP	  can	  access	  and	  provide	  to	  the	  partner	  these	  additional	  inputs	  in	  addition	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  The	  UNITAID	  Medicines	  Patent	  Pool	  makes	  available	  data	  on	  the	  patent	  status	  of	  selected	  HIV	  medicines	  in	  low	  and	  
middle	  income	  countries,	  see	  http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/patent-­‐data/patent-­‐status-­‐of-­‐arvs/.	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the	  patent.	  Accordingly,	  IP	  clauses	  are	  usually	  part	  of	  broader	  R&D	  or	  technology	  transfer	  agree-­‐
ments,	  rather	  than	  single	  in-­‐licensing	  or	  out-­‐licensing	  deals.	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
PDPs	  as	  producers	  of	  IP	  
The	  survey	  and	  patent	  data	  results	  show	  divergence	  in	  the	  extent	  that	  PDPs	  are	  producers	  of	  IPRs.	  
The	  initial	  assumption	  of	  this	  study	  was	  that	  PDPs	  would	  not	  be	  inclined	  to	  seek	  patents	  and	  prefer	  
open	  collaborative	  model	  of	  R&D	  and	   innovation	   to	  avoid	   the	  exclusionary	  effects	  of	   IPRs.	   That	  
said,	  it	  was	  also	  foreseen	  that	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  could	  influence	  the	  decision	  of	  a	  PDP	  to	  patent,	  
as	  summarized	  in	  Table	  2.	  In	  addition,	  two	  PDP	  characteristics	  were	  also	  considered	  alongside	  the	  
patent	  data	  results	  in	  Table	  3.	  The	  first	  being	  whether	  the	  PDP	  has	  in-­‐house	  R&D	  capacity	  on	  top	  
of	  a	  role	  in	  managing	  collaborative	  R&D	  and	  disbursing	  financing	  to	  third	  parties.	  The	  second	  was	  
whether	  the	  diseases	  in	  which	  the	  PDP	  carries	  out	  R&D	  have	  or	  not	  parallel	  commercial	  markets.	  
The	  patent	  data	  results	  showed	  that	  PDPs	  that	  work	  solely	  on	  diseases	  for	  which	  there	  is	  no	  po-­‐
tential	  parallel	   commercial	  markets	  do	  not	  patent.	   This	   is	   consistent	  with	   the	   initial	   assumption	  
that	  PDPs	  would	  not	  be	   inclined	  to	  seek	  patents.	  However,	   the	  reverse	  case	  does	  not	  hold	  true.	  
There	  is	  no	  trend	  in	  the	  patent	  data	  to	  indicate	  that	  PDP	  that	  work	  on	  diseases	  for	  which	  parallel	  
markets	  do	  exist	  tend	  to	  seek	  patents.	  In	  contrast,	  whether	  a	  PDP	  has	  in-­‐house	  R&D	  capacity	  does	  
appear	  to	  be	  associated	  to	  an	  increased	  interest	  in	  seeking	  patents.	  	  
	  
As	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   patent	   data,	   the	   results	   of	   the	   survey	   on	   PDPs	   as	   producers	   of	   IPRs	   also	  
showed	  significant	  divergence	  among	  PDPs.	  Approximately	  half	  of	  the	  surveyed	  PDPs	  have	  no	  or	  
very	  little	  activity	  in	  terms	  of	  filling	  applications,	  either	  as	  a	  practice	  or	  as	  a	  principle	  made	  explicit	  
(publicly	  available)	  or	  implicit	  (not	  publicly	  available)	  policy	  of	  not	  filling	  any	  patents.	  This	  result	  is	  
consistent	  with	  the	  earlier	  proposition	  in	  this	  study	  that	  PDPs,	  as	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  entities	  that	  aim	  to	  
ensure	  access	  to	  new	  medical	  products,	  would	  prefer	  open	  approaches	  to	  innovation	  as	  opposed	  
to	  producing	  patents.	   The	  PDP	   can	  promote	   that	   knowledge	   remains	   in	   the	  public	   domain.	   The	  
survey	  reveals	  that	  PDPs	  consider	  the	  decision	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  pursuing	  the	  mission	  and	  objectives	  
of	  the	  PDP.	  	  
In	  some	  PDPs	  the	  decision	  whether	  to	  patent	  or	  not,	  or	  potentially	  to	  allow	  partners	  to	  patent,	  is	  a	  
strategic	  one,	  while	  for	  others	  it	  reflects	  the	  low	  priority	  that	  IPRs	  represents	  for	  the	  PDPs.	  A	  limi-­‐
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tation	  in	  this	  analysis	  is	  that	  from	  the	  survey	  and	  patent	  data	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  observe	  whether	  
PDPs	   that	   are	  not	  patenting	   are	  nonetheless	   allowing	  partners	   to	   seek	  patents	   and	  under	  what	  
conditions,	  if	  any.	  This	  would	  be	  important	  in	  understanding	  the	  strategic	  decision	  of	  a	  PDP	  not	  to	  
patent	  versus	  allowing	  partners	  to	  patent	  (potentially	  as	  an	  incentive	  mechanism	  for	  the	  partner	  
to	  enter	  into	  collaboration	  with	  the	  PDP).	  The	  survey	  reveals	  that	  some	  PDPs	  that	  allow	  partners	  
to	  patent	  in	  respect	  to	  results	  of	  PDP-­‐led	  R&D	  projects.	  However,	  the	  PDPs	  generally	  place	  condi-­‐
tions	  that	  are	  defined	  in	  contracts	  related	  to	  the	  access	  mission	  of	  PDPs	  (i.e.	  grant	  back	  license	  to	  
the	  PDP	  for	  continued	  use	   in	   the	  specific	   field,	  making	  available	  products	  at	  affordable	  prices	   in	  
developing	  countries,	  requiring	  technology	  transfer	  if	  the	  partner	  is	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  fulfil	  its	  
obligations).	  
The	  other	  half	  of	   the	   surveyed	  PDPs	   is	   a	  group	  of	  producers	  of	  patents.	   Each	  PDP	   in	   this	   group	  
holds	  at	  least	  one	  patent	  and	  up	  to	  65	  patents.	  In	  effect,	  patents	  allows	  a	  PDP	  to	  exclude	  others	  
from	  making,	   using,	   selling	   and	   importing	   the	   protected	   product,	  which	   raises	   concerns	   on	   the	  
enclosure	  of	  knowledge,	  particularly	  when	  financed	  from	  public	  and	  philanthropic	   financing.	  We	  
explored	  in	  the	  Table	  1	  in	  this	  study,	  various	  ideas	  where	  explored	  for	  why	  PDPs	  may	  pursue	  ex-­‐
clusionary	  patent	  rights.	  As	  expected,	  the	  survey	  results	  show	  that	  monopoly	  pricing	  by	  the	  PDP	  is	  
not	  a	  motivating	  factor.	  Rather,	  PDPs	  may	  seek	  patents,	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  alternative	  would	  be	  to	  
allow	  a	  partner	  to	  patent,	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  an	  upper	  hand	  in	  negotiating	  licensing	  terms.	  The	  survey	  
results	  also	  show	  that	  PDP	  patents	  may	  be	  linked	  to	  raising	  the	  interest	  of	  for-­‐profit	  pharmaceu-­‐
tical	  firm	  or	  other	  private	  sector	  partners	  in	  an	  R&D	  project,	  particularly	  at	  the	  stage	  of	  manufac-­‐
turing	  and	  distribution,	  or	  to	  strengthen	  negotiation	  position	  for	  obtaining	  licenses	  to	  third-­‐party	  
protected	  material	  or	  know-­‐how	  (cross-­‐licensing).	  It	  can	  be	  a	  risky	  proposition,	  requiring	  able	  ne-­‐
gotiation	  skills	  on	  the	  part	  of	  PDPs	  to	  obtain	  a	  licensing	  deal	  that	  strikes	  an	  adequate	  balance	  be-­‐
tween	  access	  and	  affordability	  objectives	  while	  leveraging	  the	  commercial	  or	  other	  interest	  of	  the	  
partner.	   It	  also	   requires	  a	  PDP	   to	   invest	   resources	   into	  obtaining,	  maintaining	  and	  enforcing	  pa-­‐
tents.	  However,	   the	  alternative	  of	   the	  PDP	  allowing	  partners	   to	  patent	  material	  developed	  from	  
PDP	  R&D	  projects,	   subject	   to	   negotiated	   conditions,	  may	  be	   a	   simpler,	   but	   high	   risk	   formula.	   It	  
requires	  that	  PDPs	  have	  strong	  negotiation	  capacity	  and	  means	  for	  enforcement	  in	  cases	  of	  non-­‐
compliance	  of	  the	  contractual	  conditions.	  The	  outcomes	  of	   licensing	  deals,	   from	  patents	  held	  by	  
PDPs	  or	  partners,	  are	  not	  observable	  from	  the	  survey.	  The	  alternative	  of	  neither	  the	  PDP	  nor	  part-­‐
ners	  seeking	  patents	  would	  have	  the	  benefit	  of	  allowing	  the	  knowledge	  to	  be	  in	  the	  public	  domain,	  
which	  facilitates	  follow-­‐on	  innovation	  and	  the	  pace	  at	  which	  the	  products	  can	  reach	  those	  in	  need.	  
The	  main	  obstacle	  is	  ensuring	  financing	  for	  manufacturing,	  scale-­‐up	  and	  distribution.	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The	   survey	   reveals	   that	   external	   factors,	   such	   as	   regulations	   or	   prior	   contractual	   commitments,	  
can	  affect	  the	  PDP	  decision	  to	  patent.	  For	  example,	  one	  PDP	  noted	  that	  it	  is	  required	  by	  the	  fund-­‐
ing	  agency	   to	  seek	  patents	  and	  engage	   in	   licensing	  on	   the	   terms	  pre-­‐defined	  by	   the	   funding	  ag-­‐
ency.	  	  
Contrary	   to	   the	   expected	   results,	   two	  PDPs	   reported	   a	  motivation	   to	  produce	   IPRs	   to	   earn	   rev-­‐
enues	  to	  invest	  in	  their	  activities.46	  The	  result	  appears	  to	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  financing	  model	  of	  
PDPs.	  However,	   it	  may	  be	  a	   strategy	  consistent	  with	   the	  PDP	  mission	   in	   cases	   for	  diseases	  with	  
dual	  markets.	   In	   such	   cases,	   PDPs	   can	  earn	   licensing	   revenues	   from	  developed	   countries	  where	  
there	  are	  buyers	   for	   the	  PDP	   licenses	  willing	   to	  pay	  a	  higher	  price	   for	   the	  patented	   technology,	  
while	   maintaining	   low	   prices	   for	   developing	   and	   least	   developed	   countries.	   Some	   other	   unex-­‐
pected	  responses	  by	  PDPs	  were	  that	  patents	  are	  sought	  to	  enable	  the	  PDP	  to	  “control	  the	  devel-­‐
opment,	  manufacturing	  of	  a	  compound	  to	  ensure	  proper	  use,	  quality	  and	  access”	  and	  to	  “ensure	  
access	  to	  products	  at	  affordable	  prices	   in	  the	  target	  populations”.	  The	  responses	  appear	  to	   indi-­‐
cate	  a	  sense	  of	  risk	  in	  allowing	  third	  parties	  either	  to	  patent	  the	  material	  or	  to	  make	  inadequate	  
use	   the	  material.	  That	  said,	   there	   is	  no	  direct	   link	  between	  patent	  protection	  and	  the	  quality	  or	  
proper	   use	   or	   affordability	   of	   a	   protected	   product.	   All	   medical	   products	   require	   regulatory	   ap-­‐
proval	  before	   they	  can	   legally	  be	  sold	  on	   the	  market.	   It	   is	  a	  qualitative	   judgment	  on	   the	   role	  of	  
PDPs	  but	  not	  a	  basis	  for	  defining	  whether	  an	  exclusionary	  patent	  right	  is	  warranted.	  With	  respect	  
to	  pricing,	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  there	  are	  no	  patents	  held	  by	  any	  party,	  increased	  competition	  from	  
additional	  producers	  of	  the	  products	  would	  aid	  to	  drive	  prices	  down.	  The	  main	  problem	  in	  the	  area	  
of	  neglected	  diseases	  is	  that	  there	  is	  insufficient	  interest	  in	  the	  first	  place	  in	  R&D	  for	  new	  medical	  
products.	  	  
	  
Sharing	  of	  IP	  and	  open	  approaches	  to	  R&D	  collaboration	  
Contrary	   to	   the	  assumption	  of	   the	  study	  of	  PDPs	  of	  being	   favourable	   to	  open	   innovation	  due	  to	  
their	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  mission	  and	  public	  and	  philanthropic	  financing,	  the	  evidence	  is	   limited.	  While	  
PDPs	   report	  being	  open	   to	  R&D	  collaboration	   (no	  patent	  claims	   for	   results	  of	   the	  R&D	  collabor-­‐
ation),	  and	  find	  useful	   for	  third	  parties	  to	  share	  patents,	  they	  are	  not	  generally	  allowing	  uncom-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  The	  Infectious	  Disease	  Research	  Institute	  (IDRI)	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  PDP	  with	  a	  policy	  to	  license	  patented	  technolo-­‐
gies	  it	  develops	  to	  third	  parties	  (i.e.	  biotechnology	  companies)	  for	  applications	  outside	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  neglected	  dis-­‐
eases	  (i.e.	  cancer)	  to	  reinvest	  royalties	  from	  licenses	  in	  its	  activities	  (Global	  Health	  Technologies	  Coalition	  2013).	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pensated	  use	  of	  the	  patents	  by	  third	  parties	  or	  only	  for	  very	  specific	  cases.	  It	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  ob-­‐
serve	  from	  the	  survey	  results	  whether	  there	   is	  distinction	  between	  diseases	  that	  command	  dual	  
markets	   and	   those	   that	   do	   not	   (arguably	   where	   commercial	   markets	   exist	   the	   PDP	   may	   seek	  
royalty	  payments	  for	  use	  of	  the	  patent).	  	  
	  
Patent	  and	  licensing	  agreements	  
As	  expected,	   the	   terms	  of	  patent	   licenses	  and	  R&D	  agreements	   that	  PDPs	  negotiate	  and	  obtain	  
can	  vary	  on	  a	  case-­‐to-­‐case	  basis,	  influenced	  by	  a	  number	  of	  factors.	  These	  include	  the	  target	  pro-­‐
file	  of	   the	  product	   to	  be	  developed,	   the	  R&D	  stage,	   the	  disease,	   the	   regions/countries	   targeted	  
and	  the	  type	  of	  partner.	  This	  results	  in	  a	  wide	  diversity	  of	  outcomes,	  which	  are	  not	  readily	  observ-­‐
able	  as	  the	  terms	  of	  patent	  license	  deals	  and	  R&D	  agreements	  are	  for	  the	  most	  part	  confidential.	  	  
	  
Patents	  as	  barriers	  
The	  survey	  shows	  that	  patents	  held	  by	  third	  parties	  can	  be	  an	  obstacle	  for	  the	  successful	  conclu-­‐
sion	  of	  partnerships	  at	  any	  R&D	  stage,	  while	  patents	  held	  by	  the	  PDPs	  are	  seen	  as	  less	  of	  an	  obsta-­‐
cle.	  One	  PDP	  noted	  that	  it	  has	  been	  cautious	  to	  proceed	  with	  a	  particular	  compound	  that	  is	  held	  
by	  a	  biotech	  company	  because	  of	  the	  patents	  surrounding	  that	  compound	  and	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  
PDP	   to	  obtain	   a	   license	   to	   that	   compound.	  Disagreement	  on	   the	   terms	   for	   ownership	  of	   future	  
patents	  can	  also	  be	  an	  obstacle	  in	  negotiations	  among	  PDPs	  and	  partners.	  	  	  
	  
IPR	  infringement	  and	  enforcement	  
As	  noted	  previously,	   the	   threat	  of	   litigation	   in	   relation	   to	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  patent	   can	  deter	   a	  PDP	  
from	  pursuing	  a	  technology.	  That	  said,	  patent	  litigation	  due	  to	  patent	  infringement	  is	  not	  a	  regular	  
practice	  for	  PDPs,	  though	  PDP	  partners	  may	  be	  involved	  in	  patent	  litigation.	  There	  can	  be	  various	  
interpretations	  for	  this	  finding.	  For	  instance,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  obtaining	  licenses	  to	  the	  PDP	  patented	  
technology	  is	  not	  difficult,	  or	  there	  may	  be	  few	  players	  involved	  in	  R&D	  in	  the	  same	  area,	  or	  that	  
the	  patents	  are	  not	  strictly	  enforced	  by	  PDPs.	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3.7 Conclusions	  
	  
Inventions	  in	  the	  area	  of	  public	  health	  can	  be	  developed	  as	  public	  goods	  to	  ensure	  dissemination	  
and	  access	  to	  all	  populations.	  Models	  of	  innovation	  that	  de-­‐link	  the	  costs	  of	  R&D	  and	  innovation	  
from	  the	  prices	  of	  medical	  products,	  such	  as	  that	  employed	  by	  PDPs	  in	  the	  area	  of	  neglected	  dis-­‐
eases,	  can	  serve	  this	  purpose.	  PDPs	  are	  an	  institutional	  experiment	  that	  aims	  to	  respond	  to	  dearth	  
of	  private	  R&D	   for	  neglected	  diseases,	   that	  present	  no	  or	   very	   small	   commercial	  markets.	   PDPs	  
have	   demonstrated	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   bring	   about	   innovation	   in	   medical	   products	   as	   public	  
goods.	  	  
	  
Given	  the	  above,	  an	  early	  assumption	  of	  this	  study	  was	  that	  patents	  and	  other	  IPRs	  would	  play	  a	  
very	  limited	  role	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  PDPs	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  innovation.	  The	  findings	  show	  that	  con-­‐
sistent	  with	  other	  literature,	  IPRs	  do	  not	  act	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  R&D	  and	  innovation	  in	  PDP	  institu-­‐
tions	   in	  the	  same	  sense	  as	   IPRs	  are	  expected	  to	  do	  so	  for	  private,	  profit-­‐maximizing	  firms.	  How-­‐
ever,	  the	  management	  of	  IP	  more	  broadly	  is	  an	  activity	  of	  relative	  importance	  for	  PDPs,	  as	  poten-­‐
tial	  “users”	  of	  background	  IPRs	  held	  by	  third	  parties	  over	  technology,	  data	  or	  know-­‐how	  that	  the	  
PDP	  seeks	  to	  access,	  and	  as	  “producers”	  of	  IPRs.	  Accordingly,	  this	  study	  finds	  that	  PDPs	  use	  IP	  for	  
strategic	   purposes	   to	   advance	   their	   not-­‐for-­‐profit	   and	   access	  mandate.	   This	   requires	   significant	  
skills	  from	  PDPs	  to	  manage	  the	  “IP	  labyrinth”	  in	  aiming	  to	  ensure	  that	  IPRs	  do	  not	  become	  barriers	  
to	  access	  to	  medical	  products	  and	  further	  innovation,	  particularly	  in	  cases	  where	  PDPs	  allow	  part-­‐
ners	  to	  patent	  or	  grant	  partners	  exclusive	  licenses	  to	  a	  PDP-­‐held	  patent.	  	  	  
	  
PDPs	  are	  playing	  an	   important	   role	   in	  advancing	  R&D	   in	  areas	  where	   there	   is	  under-­‐investment	  
from	  the	  private	  sector.	  Nevertheless,	  PDPs	  remain	   institutional	  experiments	  whereby	  long-­‐term	  
sustainability	  is	  not	  ensured.	  Policy	  makers	  are	  encouraged	  to	  pay	  closer	  attention	  to	  the	  evidence	  
of	  the	  strategic	  use	  of	  IPRs	  by	  PDPs	  as	  not-­‐for-­‐profits	  that	  are	  funded	  through	  public	  moneys	  and	  
manage	   R&D	   collaborations	   involving	   private	   firms.	   The	   public	   health	   community	   can	   increase	  
oversight	  of	  PDP	  activities	  and	  request	  greater	  transparency	  to	  ensure	  that	  PDPs	  and	  their	  part-­‐
ners	  manage	  IP	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  does	  not	  hinder	  access.	  A	  limitation	  of	  this	  study	  is	  that	  the	  im-­‐
pact	  of	  IPRs	  held	  on	  the	  results	  of	  PDP	  R&D	  portfolios,	  whether	  held	  by	  PDPs	  or	  by	  partners,	  was	  
not	  observed.	  The	  study	  was	  also	  unable	  to	  observe	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  IPR	  licensing,	  contracts,	  
technology	  transfer,	  R&D	  and	  other	  agreements	  between	  PDPs	  and	  R&D	  partners	  or	  other	  third	  
parties	  (i.e.	  donors),	  which	  may	  also	  define	  conditions	  on	  use	  of	  IPRs.	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Finally,	  a	  broader	  lesson	  for	  the	  economic	  analysis	  of	  patenting	  activities	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  this	  
study.	  Beyond	  the	  basic	  feature	  (IPR	  holder	  can	  exclude	  others	  from	  use),	  IPRs	  can	  serve	  very	  dif-­‐
ferent	  interests	  and	  functions	  according	  to	  the	  institutional	  nature	  of	  the	  patent	  holder.	  The	  eco-­‐
nomic	  analysis	  of	   IPRs	  tends	  to	  study	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  effects	  of	   IPRs	  disconnected	  from	  
the	   analysis	   of	   the	   institution	   that	   produces	   and	  manages	   them.	  However,	   as	   this	   study	   shows,	  
there	   is	  much	  that	  can	  be	   learned	  about	   the	  effects	  of	   IPRs	  by	   linking	  the	  analysis	  of	   the	  use	  of	  
IPRs	  with	  the	  analysis	  of	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   institution	  producing	   it.	  For	  example,	   this	  study	   finds	  
important	  particularities	  in	  the	  IP	  management	  by	  a	  private	  agent	  beyond	  the	  for-­‐profit	  firm	  (the	  
usual	  unit	  of	   analysis	   in	  economic	   research	  on	   IPRs).	  Accordingly,	   the	  economic	  analysis	  of	   IPRs	  
should	  do	  more	  studies	  on	  the	  functions	  of	  IPRs	  and	  IP	  management	  activities	  in	  connection	  with	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Chapter	  4 The	  Role	  of	  Institutions	  in	  Support	  of	  Traditional	  Medical	  Knowledge47	  
	  
Experiential	  knowledge	  is	  a	  valuable	  form	  of	  knowledge.	  By	  nature,	  it	  is	  fragile	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  
suffer	  from	  deterioration	  or	  even	  disappearance,	  as	  compared	  to	  scientific	  knowledge.	  The	  loss	  of	  
experiential	   knowledge	   leads	   to	   reduced	   capacity	   for	   effective	   action	   in	   certain	   socioeconomic	  
contexts	   and	   circumstances	   in	  which	   such	  knowledge	  was	  previously	  useful	  or	   can	  be	  useful.	   In	  
this	  study	  we	  examine	  in	  particular	  the	  case	  of	  traditional	  medicinal	  knowledge.	  We	  advance	  that	  
in	  light	  of	  the	  deterioration	  of	  traditional	  institutions,	  the	  formation	  of	  supportive	  new	  institutions	  
can	  assist	   to	  at	   the	   least	  attenuate	  the	  rate	  of	   loss	  of	  useful	   traditional	  medical	  knowledge,	  and	  
promote	  its	  use	  and	  reproduction	  to	  address	  local	  health	  needs	  and	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  mod-­‐
ern	  medicine.	  
	  4.1 Introduction	  
	  
Knowledge	  empowers	  human	  beings	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  act	  on	  a	  physical	  or	  intellectual	  level.	  This	  
ability	  to	  act	  is	  exercised	  in	  the	  domains	  of	  production,	  consumption,	  and	  also	  anticipation.	  Know-­‐
ledge	  is	  thus	  “expertise”	  or	  “competence”	  that	  is	  embodied	  in	  people,	  and	  can	  range	  from	  general	  
to	  specialized.	  	  
The	   study	  of	   economics	   of	   knowledge	  has	   emphasized	   the	   role	   of	   scientific	   codified	   knowledge	  
production	   and	  diffusion	   in	   the	   context	   of	   knowledge-­‐based	   economies	   (Foray	   2006).	   Scientific,	  
formal	  knowledge	  is	   important	  to	  develop	  capabilities	  for	  technical,	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  innova-­‐
tion	   and	   tapping	   into	   global	   knowledge.	  However,	   different	   kinds	   of	   knowledge	   and	   knowledge	  
systems	  are	  also	  relevant	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  today’s	  world.	  The	  dynamics	  of	  experiential	  knowl-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  This	  Chapter	  is	  based	  on	  a	  paper	  developed	  in	  collaboration	  with	  Dominique	  Foray.	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edge	   is	  one	  area	  that	   is	  understudied,	  despite	   its	   important	  role	   in	  many	  fields	  such	  as	  environ-­‐
mental	  conservation	  and	  research	  (Fazey	  et	  al.	  2006).	  
Knowledge	  is	  often	  experiential	   in	  nature.	  That	  is,	   it	  springs	  form	  the	  experience	  –active	  involve-­‐
ment-­‐	  of	   individuals	  and	  organisations.	  Experiential	  knowledge	  is	  not	  anti-­‐scientific;	   it	  has	  simply	  
not	  undergone	  the	  tests	  that	  give	  a	  piece	  of	  knowledge	  the	  scientific	  status.	  It	  is	  nonetheless	  wide-­‐
ranging,	  sound,	  rational	  and	  effective	  in	  a	  particular	  circumstance	  or	  life	  event.	  No	  doubt	  it	  is	  less	  
general	   than	  other	  knowledge	  since	   the	  experiences	   that	  generated	   it	  are	   local	  and	  specific.	  Ex-­‐
periential	  knowledge	  is	  a	  valuable	  source	  of	  prior	  knowledge.	  We	  know	  from	  educational	  research	  
that	  ones’	  prior	  knowledge	  or	  existing	  knowledge	  base	   is	  pivotal	   for	  subsequent	   learning.	  More-­‐
over,	  while	  experimental	  knowledge	  is	  rooted	  in	  past	  experience,	  it	  is	  a	  source	  of	  knowledge	  to	  be	  
utilized	  in	  future	  action.	  	  
Experiential	   knowledge	  can	  be	  private	  or	  collective	   in	  nature.	  Private	   experiential	   knowledge	   in-­‐
cludes	  know-­‐how,	  manual	  skills,	  practices	  that	  are	  kept	  secret	  or	  shared	  by	  a	  small	  number	  of	  in-­‐
dividuals.	  Collective	  experiential	  knowledge	  is	  held	  and	  exercised	  by	  a	  community,	  tribe	  or	  popula-­‐
tion,	  such	  as	  know-­‐how	  and	  techniques	  used	  in	  daily	  life.	  
A	   specific	   form	  of	   experiential	   knowledge	   is	   traditional	   knowledge	   that	   has	   been	   build	   up	   over	  
time	  and	  is	  held	  locally,	  and	  informs	  shared	  understandings,	  beliefs,	  practices,	  social	  interactions,	  
etc.	  It	  is	  a	  source	  of	  valuable	  experiential	  knowledge	  such	  as	  on	  uses	  of	  natural	  resources	  that	  are	  
most	   relevant	   in	   connection	   to	   sustaining	   local	   livelihoods	   and	   sustainable	   development.	  Tradi-­‐
tional	   medicinal	   knowledge	   plays	   an	   important	   role	   in	   public	   health,	   particularly	   in	   countries	  
where	  it	  is	  the	  main	  or	  sole	  source	  of	  health	  care.	  It	  also	  has	  modern	  applications	  in	  fields	  such	  as	  
pharmaceuticals	  and	  biotechnology	   that	   in	   turn	  has	   increased	  the	   interest	   in	   its	  use	  beyond	  the	  
local	  context,	  as	  evidenced	  by	   the	  number	  of	  government	  policies	  aiming	   to	  generate	  economic	  
value	  from	  its	  use	  (World	  Health	  Organization	  2013).	  	  	  
The	  central	  argument	  of	  this	  study	  is	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  traditional	  institutions	  that	  served	  to	  
support	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  reproduction	  and	  transmission,	  such	  knowledge	  becomes	  
fragile	  and	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  suffer	  from	  deterioration	  or	  even	  disappearance,	  as	  compared	  to	  sci-­‐
entific	  knowledge.	  The	  loss	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  leads	  to	  reduced	  capacity	  for	  effec-­‐
tive	   action	   in	   certain	   socioeconomic	   contexts	   and	   circumstances	   in	   which	   such	   knowledge	  was	  
previously	  useful.	  We	  advance	  that	  more	  efforts	  should	  be	  directed	  at	  building	  institutions	  to	  sup-­‐
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port	  the	  reproduction	  and	  transmission	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  to	  meet	  health	  needs	  at	  
the	  local	  level,	  as	  well	  as	  national	  and	  global	  level.	  	  
	  
Following	  this	  introduction,	  Section	  2	  explains	  the	  main	  elements	  of	  the	  economics	  of	  knowledge,	  
as	  a	  basis	   to	  analyse	   the	   fundamental	  problems	  raised	  by	   the	  nature	  of	  experiential	  knowledge,	  
emphasizing	  the	  general	  difficulties	  in	  its	  reproduction	  and	  transmission	  due	  to	  its	  tacit	  and	  local	  
character.	   Section	   3	   describes	   traditional	   medical	   knowledge,	   as	   compared	   to	   other	   forms	   of	  
medical	   knowledge,	   the	   role	   of	   traditional	   institutions	   in	   the	   local	   community	   context,	   and	   dis-­‐
cusses	  market	  failures	  in	  relation	  to	  broader	  applications	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge.	  Section	  
5	  discusses	  the	  critical	  role	  of	   institutions	   in	  supporting	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge.	  Section	  6	  
focuses	  on	  the	  institutions	  of	  intellectual	  property	  and	  access	  and	  benefit	  sharing	  laws.	  Section	  7	  
concludes.	  	  
	  4.2 The	  economics	  of	  scientific	  and	  experiential	  knowledge	  
	  
Looking	  at	  and	  comparing	  between	  the	  organisation	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  production	  and	  distri-­‐
bution,	   and	   the	   disorganisation	   of	   experiential	   knowledge,	   one	   can	   easily	   contrast	   the	   current	  
strength	  and	  vigour	  of	  the	  processes	  of	  creating,	  codifying	  and	  circulating	  scientific	  know-­‐how	  and	  
the	  fragile	  nature	  of	  experiential	  knowledge.	  This	  contrast	  is	  characteristic	  of	  numerous	  domains:	  
health,	  environment,	  food	  security,	  regional	  planning	  and	  development,	  natural	  risk	  management.	  	  
In	   comparing	   the	   strength	   and	   vigour	   of	   the	   creation	   and	   management	   processes	   of	   scientific	  
knowledge	  with	  the	  fragility	  of	  experiential	  knowledge,	  we	  must	  ask	  ourselves	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  
difficulties	   of	   a	  market	   system	   to	   correctly	   allocate	   resources	   in	   the	   knowledge	   production	   and	  
management	  domain	  are	  more	  serious	  or	  less	  well	  corrected	  in	  the	  area	  of	  experiential	  knowledge	  
than	  in	  that	  of	  scientific	  knowledge.	  
This	  question	  was	  not	  relevant	  during	  “the	  good	  old	  days”	  when	  traditional	  institutions	  and	  norms	  
were	   rather	   effective	   in	   supporting	   the	   creation,	   improvement	   and	   distribution	   of	   experiential	  
knowledge	  such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  (to	  which	  we	  will	  turn	  below).	  
However,	  as	  this	  system	  of	  institutions	  becomes	  less	  robust	  and	  is	  collapsing,	  then	  the	  question	  of	  
what	  socio-­‐economic	  institutions	  can	  be	  relied	  upon	  to	  produce	  and	  distribute	  experiential	  know-­‐
ledge	  in	  an	  efficient	  manner	  becomes	  central.	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We	  will	  first	  discuss	  the	  set	  of	  institutions	  that	  play	  this	  role	  in	  the	  case	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  and	  
then	  ask	  whether	  such	  institutions	  could	  be	  extended	  to	  the	  case	  of	  experiential	  knowledge,	  as	  a	  
substitute	  of	  the	  traditional	  institutional	  framework	  that	  is	  slowly	  disappearing.	  4.2.1 Market	  failures	  and	  institutional	  solutions	  in	  the	  case	  of	  scientific	  knowl-­‐edge	  
	  
Economists	  tend	  to	  identify	  three	  generic	  causes	  of	  market	  failure	  (see	  for	  example,	  Swann,	  2003).	  
The	  first	   is	   that	  externalities	  drive	  a	  wedge	  between	  private	  and	  social	   returns	   from	  a	  particular	  
private	  investment.	  If	  externalities	  are	  positive	  some	  socially	  desirable	  investments	  will	  not	  appear	  
privately	  profitable,	  so	  the	  market	  does	  not	  support	  enough	  activity.	  If	  externalities	  are	  negative,	  
then	  the	  private	  investments	  create	  a	  greater	  cost	  to	  society	  that	  to	  the	  consumer,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  activities	  causing	  environmental	  degradation.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  economic	  activities	  are	  subject	  
to	  increasing	  returns.	  The	  third	  is	  that	  of	  asymmetric	  information.	  The	  usual	  working	  hypothesis	  is	  
that	  the	  most	  important	  source	  of	  market	  failure	  that	  arises	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  production	  and	  
management	  of	  knowledge	   is	   the	  existence	  of	  positive	  externalities	   from	  such	  activities,	  such	  as	  
research	  and	  development,	  whereby	  third	  parties	  are	  able	  to	  benefit	  without	  sharing	  the	  cost.	  	  
We	  can	  go	  further	  by	  distinguishing	  different	  types	  of	  externality	  that	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  these	  mar-­‐
ket	  failures.	  
*Public	  good	  externalities	  (Samuelson,	  1954):	  a	  public	  good	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  extreme	  form	  of	  
externality.	  It	  is	  defined	  according	  to	  two	  properties.	  First,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  exclude	  anyone	  from	  the	  
benefits	  of	  a	  public	  good.	  Second,	  the	  marginal	  cost	  of	  enjoying	  the	  good	  is	  zero	  (consumption	  is	  
non	  -­‐	  rivalrous).	  Knowledge	  has	  both	  of	  these	  properties	  (it	  is	  difficult	  to	  exclude	  others	  from	  the	  
benefits	  of	  the	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  marginal	  cost	  of	  an	  additional	  person	  making	  use	  of	  an	  idea	  is	  
zero)	  and	  as	  with	  all	  public	  goods,	  private	  markets	  are	  likely	  to	  provide	  an	  undersupply	  of	  know-­‐
ledge.48	  
	  *Ownership	  externalities	  (Bator,	  1958):	  it	  is	  often	  difficult	  to	  attribute	  to	  a	  resource	  its	  real	  social	  
value	  (the	  shadow	  value),	  which	  generates	  an	  inability	  to	  allocate	  resources	  correctly.	  This	  there-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  A	  whole	  series	  of	  phenomena	  exists	  that	  mitigate	  the	  public	  good	  nature	  of	  knowledge	  while	  not	  altering	  the	  eco-­‐
nomic	   logic	   of	   the	   argument.	   In	   particular,	   although	   it	   is	   correct	   to	   recognize	   that	   developing	   human	   capability	   to	  
make	   use	   of	   knowledge	   involves	   processes	   that	   entail	   fixed	   costs,	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   latter	   does	   not	   vitiate	   the	  
proposition	  that	  reuse	  of	  the	  knowledge	  will	  neither	  deplete	  it	  nor	  impose	  significant	  further	  marginal	  costs.	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fore	  concerns	  the	  difficulty	  of	  measuring	  the	  social	  value	  of	  a	  resource	  and	  thus	  attributing	  to	  it	  a	  
series	  of	  results	  to	  which	  its	  contribution	  is	  difficult	  to	  observe.	   	  Certain	  «	  goods	  »	  with	  determi-­‐
nate	  positive	  shadow	  values	  are	  simply	  not	  attributed,	  simply	  because	  «	  keeping	  account	  »	  on	  who	  
produces	  and	  who	  gets	  what	  may	  be	   impossible,	  clumsy	  or	  costly	   in	  terms	  of	  resources.	  Clearly,	  
this	  is	  the	  case	  of	  knowledge.	  Evidence	  about	  the	  positive	  (direct	  and	  indirect)	  effects	  of	  the	  pro-­‐
duction	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  society	  and	  the	  economy	  is	  difficult	  to	  build	  and	  it	  is	  also	  difficult	  to	  
try	  to	  measure	  returns	  on	  individual	  research	  projects.	  
The	  difference	  between	  these	  two	  types	  of	  externalities	  is	  that	  in	  the	  latter	  case,	  the	  difficulty	  only	  
concerns	  keeping	  account	  and	  might	  be	  eliminated	  if	  correct	  measurements	  are	  made	  and	  attribu-­‐
tion	  devices	  set	  up.	  This	  is	  just	  a	  failure	  by	  enforcement	  (Bator,	  1958).	  Whereas	  the	  difficulty	  re-­‐
vealed	   in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  first	  externality	  (public	  good)	  cannot	  be	  eliminated	  -­‐	  this	   is	  a	  failure	  by	  
existence	  (ibid).	  The	  public	  good	  nature	  of	  the	  resource	  implies	  that	  the	  price	  that	  would	  encour-­‐
age	  private	  agents	  to	  produce	  the	  optimal	  quantity	  of	  this	  good	  would	  inevitably	  be	  inefficient	  as	  
regards	  the	  allocation	  of	  this	  resource:	  because	  the	  marginal	  cost	  of	  an	  additional	  person	  making	  
use	  of	   the	  knowledge	   is	   zero,	   the	  maximisation	  of	   allocative	  efficiency	   requiring	  prices	  equal	   to	  
marginal	  cost	  will	  make	  the	  activity	  unprofitable.	  
*Tyranny	  of	  small	  decisions	  (Kahn,	  1966):	  Finally	  a	  last	  type	  of	  externality	  seems	  important	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  knowledge	  production	  and	  management.	   It	  expresses	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  market	  economy	  
makes	  its	  major	  allocation	  decision	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  host	  of	  ‘smaller	  decisions’	  (smaller	  in	  size	  and	  
time	  dimension).	  The	   tyranny	  of	   small	  decisions	   suggests	   that	   the	   total	  effect	  of	   small	  decisions	  
may	  not	  be	  optimal,	  because	  the	  decisive	  determinations	  are	  individually	  too	  small	  –	  in	  terms	  of	  
size,	  scope	  and	  time	  perspective.	  If	  one	  hundred	  consumers	  choose	  option	  x,	  and	  this	  causes	  the	  
market	  to	  make	  decision	  X	  (where	  X	  =	  100	  x),	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  true	  that	  those	  same	  consumers	  
would	  have	  voted	  for	  X	  if	  that	  large	  decision	  had	  ever	  been	  presented	  for	  their	  explicit	  consider-­‐
ation.	  According	  to	  Weisbrod	  (1964),	  there	  is	  an	  externality	  and	  hence	  a	  market	  failure	  when:	  a)	  
the	  option	  is	  not	  (always)	  exercised;	  b)	  revenues	  from	  actual	  purchasers	  are	  insufficient	  to	  cover	  
the	  costs	  of	  continued	  operation;	  and	  c)	  expansion	  or	  restarting	  of	  production	  at	  the	  time	  when	  
occasional	  purchasers	  wish	  to	  make	  a	  purchase	  is	  difficult	  or	  impossible.	  The	  external	  benefit	  here	  
is	   the	  mere	   availability	   of	   the	   service	   (or	   the	   knowledge)	   to	   non-­‐users,	   the	   continued	   ability	   to	  
satisfy	  as	  yet	  un-­‐exerted	  option	  demand.	  The	  deterioration	  or	  even	  disappearance	  of	  a	  great	  deal	  
of	  knowledge	  is	  often	  caused	  by	  this	  externality.	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These	  different	  types	  of	  externality	  apply	  to	  both	  the	  scientific	  knowledge	  and	  experiential	  know-­‐
ledge	   domains.	   However,	   science	   has	   developed	   institutions	   allowing	   them	   to	   be	   corrected	   or	  
their	  effects	  to	  be	  attenuated	  and	  it	  would	  therefore	  be	  the	  presence	  of	  these	  institutions	  in	  one	  
case	  and	  their	  absence	  in	  the	  other	  that	  could	  explain	  the	  contrast	  between	  the	  vigour	  and	  power	  
of	   the	  creation	  and	  circulation	  processes	  of	   scientific	  knowledge	  and	   the	   fragility	  of	  experiential	  
knowledge.	  An	  additional	  step	  is	  thus	  necessary	  to	  explain	  this	  contrast.	  This	  consists	  of	  identifying	  
and	  assessing	  the	  institutional	  solutions	  that	  science	  benefits	  from	  but	  that	  are	  not	  applied	  in	  the	  
other	  case.	  	  
Firstly,	  the	   institutional	  solutions	  allowing	  the	  problem	  of	  public	  good	  externalities	  to	  be	  attenu-­‐
ated	   are	  well	   known.	   Pigou	  was	   the	   first	   to	   identify	   the	   three	  mechanisms	   for	   providing	   public	  
goods:	  directed	  governmental	  production,	  subsidies	  and	  regulated	  monopoly.	  These	  three	  mecha-­‐
nisms	  have	  a	  clear	  application	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  production	  and	  R&D.	  The	  first	  
mechanism	   consists	   of	   the	   government	   engaging	   itself	   directly	   in	   the	  production	  of	   knowledge;	  
the	  second	  mechanism	  is	  one	  where	  production	  is	  undertaken	  by	  private	  agents	  who	  in	  turn	  are	  
subsidized	  for	  their	  effort	  by	  the	  public	  purse.	  The	  third	  mechanism	  is	  to	  establish	  a	  competitive	  
market	  mechanism	   for	   some	   type	   of	   knowledge	   to	   which	   private	   ownership	   can	   be	   legally	   as-­‐
signed	  and	  whose	  ownership	  can	  be	  enforced	  (Dasgupta,	  1988,	  David,	  1993).	  	  
Secondly,	  the	  scientific	   institution	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  the	  development	  of	   institutional	  mechanisms	  
to	  evaluate	  and	  even	  measure	   the	   intrinsic	   value	  of	  new	   scientific	   knowledge.	  According	   to	   the	  
historical	  analysis	  of	  Paul	  David	  (2007),	  the	  competition	  for	  the	  “best”	  scientists	  between	  potential	  
patrons	  required	  open	  science	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  asymmetric	  information	  problem	  that	  the	  pat-­‐
rons	  faced,	  namely	  to	  identify	  the	  truly	  leading	  scientists	  of	  their	  generation.	  Only	  within	  commu-­‐
nities	   in	   which	   full	   disclosure	   was	   exercised	   could	   the	   scientific	   findings	   be	   evaluated	   and	   dis-­‐
cussed	  and	  credible	  reputations	  be	  established	  that	  would	  allow	  wealthy	  patrons	  to	  identify	  truly	  
distinguished	  scientists	  from	  fraudulent	  ones.	  From	  these	  historical	  origins	  the	  institutionalisation	  
of	  effective	  mechanisms	  for	  the	  systematic	  evaluation	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  took	  place	  as	  a	  valu-­‐
able	  solution	  to	  the	  Bator	  ownership	  externalities.	  
Finally,	   as	   in	   the	   case	  of	  many	  other	   types	  of	   public	   good,	   decisions	   regarding	   the	   allocation	  of	  
resources	  to	  scientific	  research	  are	  delegated	  to	  administrative	  entities	  operating	  at	  the	  appropri-­‐
ate	  levels	  –	  usually	  at	  the	  national	  level	  but	  also	  in	  certain	  domains	  at	  the	  supra-­‐national	  (case	  of	  
the	  CERN)	  level,	  which	  allows	  the	  «	  tyranny	  of	  small	  decisions	  »	  effects	  to	  be	  avoided.	  Developing	  
and	  protecting	  appropriate	  upper	  levels	  of	  decision-­‐makers	  in	  science	  means	  that	  the	  fundamental	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allocation	  choices	  do	  not	  occur	  by	  surprise	  ex	  post	  –	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  series	  of	  individual	  micro-­‐
decisions	  –	  but	  are	  made	  ex	  ante.	   Table	  6	   summarizes	   the	   types	  of	  externalities	   that	   can	   cause	  
market	   failure	   in	   the	   production	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	   and	   institutions	   developed	   to	   correct	  
them.	  	  	  
Table	  6.	  Market	  failure	  in	  the	  production	  of	  scientific	  knowledge:	  externalities	  and	  in-­
stitutional	  solutions	  
	  
Type	  of	  externalities	   Examples	  of	  institutions	  to	  address	  externalities	  
Public	  good	  	   Subsidies,	   directed	   government	   production,	   regulated	  
monopoly	  (intellectual	  property	  right)	  	  
Ownership	  	   Open	   science	   as	   a	   mechanism	   for	   public	   demonstration	  
and	  evaluation	  of	  the	  new	  knowledge	  
Tyranny	  of	  small	  decisions	   Upper	  levels	  of	  decision	  making	  
	  
And	  yet	  none	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  seems	  to	  really	  exist	  in	  the	  experiential	  knowledge	  domain.	  Or	  
rather,	  you	  have	  to	  search	  thoroughly	  for	  a	  long	  time	  to	  discover	  more	  or	  less	  hidden	  mechanisms,	  
likely	  to	  offer	  solutions	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  externalities	  	  -­‐	  and	  that	   is	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  
the	  study.	  	  
	  4.2.2 How	   did	   experiential	   knowledge	   become	   fragile	   and	   is	   it	   an	   important	  socio-­‐economic	  problem?	  
	  
Traditional	   institutional	   arrangements	   (such	   as	   oral	   intergenerational	   passing	   on,	   role	   of	   tradi-­‐
tional	   healers,	   community	  management	   of	   natural	   resources,	   customary	   law)	   worked	   generally	  
well	   to	   address	   failures	   in	   knowledge	  management,	   in	   a	   broad	   sense,	  within	   their	   local	   context	  
where	   the	   traditional	   and	   experiential	   knowledge	   was	   originally	   used	   (see	   for	   instance	  
Goody,1998;	  Delbos	  and	  Jorion,2009;	  Perriault,	  1993;	  Epstein,	  1998).	  	  
But	  when	  traditional	  institutions	  come	  under	  strain	  (because	  of	  migration	  that	  dislocates	  commu-­‐
nities,	  younger	  generations	  are	  no	  longer	   interested	  acquiring	  the	  knowledge	  passed	  down	  from	  
other	  generations	  or	  are	  more	  interested	  in	  learning	  modern	  medicine,	  loss	  of	  social	  capital	  -­‐trust	  
among	   community	  members-­‐,	   commercial	   interests	   become	  more	   prominent,	   loss	   of	   access	   to	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local	   natural	   resources	   due	   to	   expropriation	  of	   land,	   competition	  with	  modern	  methods),	   tradi-­‐
tional	  knowledge	  becomes	  fragile	  and	  new	  mechanisms	  are	  necessary	  to	  ensure	   its	  preservation	  
and	  use.	  	  
It	   is	  a	  dangerous	   illusion	   to	  believe	   that	  a	   society	  could	   function	  solely	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   scientific	  
knowledge	  -­‐	  the	  sort	  of	  society	  that	  would	  have	  all	  the	  possible	  «	  vaccines	  »	  at	  its	  disposal	  to	  rec-­‐
tify	  problems	  and	  could	  therefore	  do	  without	  the	  experiential	  knowledge	  that	  is	  generally	  speak-­‐
ing	  applied	  beforehand	  to	  prevent	  these	  problems	  from	  ever	  occurring.	  The	  objective	  of	  the	  eco-­‐
nomics	  of	  knowledge	   is	  thus	  certainly	  not	  a	  society	   in	  which	  all	   the	  vaccines	  would	  be	  available,	  
but	  a	  society	  in	  which	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  allocation	  of	  resources	  between	  scientific	  knowledge	  and	  
experiential	  knowledge	  is	  properly	  protected.	  
If	   experiential	   knowledge	  and	   scientific	   knowledge	  are	  not	   substitutable,	   as	   it	   is	   claimed	  above,	  
then	  the	  disinvention	  problem	  (loss	  of	  knowledge)	  may	  be	  socially	  costly	  if	  the	  experiential	  know-­‐
ledge	  considered	  was	  valuable	  in	  certain	  contexts	  and	  circumstances	  and	  these	  circumstances	  are	  
likely	  to	  happen	  again.	   It	   is	   therefore	  useful	   to	   identify	  some	  potential	  solutions	  and	   institutions	  
that	  can	  be	  relied	  upon	  to	  maintain,	  reproduce	  and	  exploit	  experiential	  knowledge;	  that	  is	  institu-­‐
tions	  that	  can	  sustain	  an	  efficient	  “infrastructure”	  to	  reproduce	  this	  particular	  type	  of	  knowledge.	  
	  4.3 The	  important	  but	  insufficient	  role	  of	  codification	  
	  
In	  view	  of	  these	  problems,	  the	  museum	  solution	  rapidly	  springs	  to	  mind.	  Societies	  have	  built	  and	  
sustained	  institutions	  –	  such	  as	  libraries,	  archives	  and	  museums	  –	  to	  collect,	  organize	  and	  provide	  
access	  to	  knowledge-­‐bearing	  objects	  for	  more	  than	  two	  millennia	  (Hedstrom	  and	  King,	  2006).	  It	  is,	  
therefore,	  legitimate	  to	  think	  of	  a	  potential	  role	  for	  this	  so-­‐called	  “epistemic	  infrastructure”	  when	  
issues	  of	  knowledge	  loss	  and	  of	  disinvention	  need	  to	  be	  addressed.	  This	  calls	  to	  mind	  the	  UNESCO	  
project	  aimed	  at	  setting	  up	  a	  world	  bank	  in	  Florence	  to	  make	  an	  inventory	  of,	  safeguard	  and	  pro-­‐
mote	   traditional	   know-­‐how.49	   This	   is	   certainly	   a	   laudable	  objective.	  However,	   as	   already	   stated,	  
experiential	  knowledge	  involves	  more	  than	  a	  mere	  catalogue	  of	  traditional	  techniques.	  Museums	  
are	  no	  doubt	  necessary	  but	  under	  no	  circumstances	  sufficient	  to	  obtain	  the	  appropriate	  balance	  
between	  scientific	  know-­‐how	  and	  experiential	  knowledge.	  The	  main	  question	  is	  therefore	  less	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  See	  www.tkwb.org	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of	  the	  creation	  of	  libraries	  or	  conservatories	  than	  that	  of	  the	  capacity	  of	  living	  communities	  to	  ad-­‐
apt	  and	  utilise	  their	  experiential	  knowledge	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  their	  current	  socioeconomic	  
activities;	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  attribute	  a	  certain	  economic	  value	  to	  this	  knowledge.	  	  
Certainly	  the	  codification	  of	  experiential	  knowledge	  is	  an	   important	  tool.	  Knowledge	  codification	  
involves	  a	  set	  of	  operations	  aiming	  at	  detaching	  the	  knowledge	  from	  the	  person	  in	  possession	  of	  it,	  
with	  a	  view	  of	  inscribing	  it	  in	  a	  medium.	  The	  process	  starts	  with	  some	  forms	  of	  modelling	  of	  tacit	  
knowledge	  (ranging	  from	  delivering	  a	  simple	  but	  careful	  description	  to	  building	  complex	  systems	  
of	  causal	  relationships)	  and	  may	  require	  the	  mobilization	  of	  languages	  other	  than	  natural	  language	  
(Foray,	  2006).	  Through	  a	  codification	  process,	  a	  piece	  of	  knowledge	  is	  detached	  from	  the	  individ-­‐
ual	  and	  the	  memory	  and	  communication	  capacity	  created	  is	  made	  independent	  of	  human	  beings.	  
Although	  it	  involves	  high	  fixed	  costs,	  codification	  also	  enables	  agents	  to	  perform	  a	  number	  of	  op-­‐
erations	  at	  a	  very	   low	  marginal	   cost	   (Cowan	  et	  al.	  2000).	   It	   reduces	   the	  costs	  and	   improves	   the	  
reliability	  of	  storage	  and	  memorization.	  As	  long	  as	  the	  medium	  remains	  legible	  and	  the	  code	  has	  
not	  been	  forgotten,	  codified	  scripts	  can,	  theoretically,	  be	  stored	  and	  retrieved	  indefinitely.	  Other	  
aspects	  of	  transmission	  –	  such	  as	  transport,	  transferral,	  reproduction	  and	  even	  access	  and	  search	  
–	  are	  functions	  whose	  costs	  always	  decrease	  with	  codification.	  Because	  codified	  script	   is	  easy	  to	  
reproduce,	  the	  number	  of	  copies	  can	  be	  multiplied.	  This	  makes	  it	  easier	  to	  retrieve	  and	  transport.	  
Considering	  our	  focus	  -­‐	  the	  fragility	  of	  experiential	  knowledge-­‐	  the	  highlighted	  function	  of	  codifica-­‐
tion	  that	  is	  of	  creating	  memory,	  communication	  and	  learning	  capabilities	  is	  crucial.	  When	  codifying	  
became	   common,	   as	   Goody	   (1977:	   37)	   writes,	   “no	   longer	   did	   the	   problem	   of	  memory	   storage	  
dominate	  man’s	  intellectual	  life”.	  Codification	  generates	  new	  opportunities	  for	  knowledge	  repro-­‐
duction.	  For	  example,	  a	  written	  recipe	  is	  a	  ‘learning	  programme’	  enabling	  people	  who	  are	  not	  in	  
direct	   contact	  with	   those	  who	  possess	   the	   knowledge,	   to	   reproduce	   it	   at	   a	   ‘lower’	   cost.	  Goody	  
(ibid:	   143)	   writes:	   “The	   written	   recipe	   serves	   in	   part	   to	   fill	   the	   gap	   created	   by	   the	   absence	   of	  
Granny,	  Nanna	  or	  Mémé	  (who	  has	  been	  left	  behind	  in	  the	  village,	  or	  in	  the	  town	  before	  last)”.	  “In	  
part”	  is	  the	  important	  term	  here.	  Naturally,	  codification	  mutilates	  knowledge.	  Getting	  the	  written	  
recipe	  does	  not	  totally	  eliminate	  the	  learning	  costs.	  What	   is	  expressed	  and	  recorded	  is	  not	  com-­‐
plete	  knowledge;	   it	   is	  a	   learning	  programme	  that	  helps	   to	  reproduce	  knowledge.	  When	  a	  young	  
technician	  receives	  a	  user’s	  manual,	  he	  or	  she	  is	  not	  directly	  given	  knowledge	  on	  “how	  to	  run	  the	  
machine”.	  That	  said,	  the	  manual	  is	  helpful	  and	  will	  serve	  to	  reduce	  the	  costs	  of	  knowledge	  repro-­‐
duction.	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As	   just	  argued,	  knowledge	  codification	  provides	   societies	  with	   stronger	  capabilities	   for	  memory,	  
communication	  and	  learning.	  However,	  as	  for	  any	  economic	  operation,	  agents	  are	  responding	  to	  
incentives:	  costs	  and	  benefits	  will	  explain	  the	  decision	  to	  codify,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  case	  of	  “codifiable	  
but	  not	  yet	  codified	  knowledge”	  (Cowan	  et	  al	  2000).50	  This	  is	  where	  price	  considerations	  come	  in	  
as	  well	   as	   the	   expected	  private	   and	  public	   value	  of	   the	   codified	   form	  of	   the	   experiential	   know-­‐
ledge.	  Viewed	   in	   this	   perspective,	   the	  demand	   for	   codification	   is	   influenced	  by	   a	   set	   of	   factors,	  
including	  institutional	  arrangements	  affecting	  the	  structure	  of	  incentives	  for	  codification	  activities.	  
They	  also	  concern	  the	  state	  of	   technology,	  which	  determines	  codification	  costs.	  This	  position	  on	  
the	  endogenous	  nature	  of	  boundaries	  between	  tacit	  and	  codified	  knowledge	  and	  the	  importance	  
of	  economic	  determinants	  is	  in	  fact	  very	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  Nelson	  and	  Winter	  (1982).	  
Thus,	  knowledge	  codification,	  like	  all	  other	  knowledge	  memorisation	  and	  management	  processes,	  
are	   consequences	   of	   economic	   dynamics	   rather	   than	   their	   cause.	   So	   the	  main	   issues	   to	   be	   ad-­‐
dressed	  concern	  not	  so	  much	  the	  mobilizing	  of	  the	  epistemic	  infrastructure	  or	  proceeding	  to	  mas-­‐
sive	  codification	  but	  for	  the	  experiential	  knowledge	  to	  regain	  its	  vigour	  and	  strength	  through	  over-­‐
coming	  some	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  market	  failures	  which	  create	  inefficiencies	  in	  the	  way	  experi-­‐
ential	  knowledge	  is	  produced,	  managed,	  distributed	  and	  used.	  The	  main	  issue	  is	  for	  any	  piece	  of	  
experiential	  knowledge	  to	  regain	  its	  former	  status:	  instruments	  and	  tools	  that	  give	  the	  individual	  
and	  the	  community	  the	  capacity	  for	  effective	  action	  in	  the	  current	  socioeconomic	  contexts.	  	  
We	  will	  apply	  this	  framework	  to	  the	  particular	  case	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge.	  
	  4.4 Traditional	  Knowledge	  
	  
Traditional	  knowledge	  is	  a	  form	  of	  experiential	  knowledge	  that	  is	  very	  interesting	  to	  study	  given	  its	  
long	  history	   and	   applications	   in	  many	   areas,	   including	  health	   care	   and	  use	   and	  management	   of	  
resources	  such	  as	  land,	  forest,	  water,	  plant,	  and	  animals	  (i.e.	  farming	  practices,	  water,	  woodland,	  
and	   livestock	   management	   and	   conservation).	   One	   of	   the	   specific	   characteristics	   of	   traditional	  
knowledge	  is	  that	  it	  is	  developed,	  sustained	  and	  passed	  on	  from	  generation	  to	  generation	  within	  a	  
group	  of	  people	  (community),	  often	  forming	  part	  of	   its	  cultural	  or	  spiritual	   identity.51	  Traditional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	   The	   “codifiability”	   of	   knowledge	   depends	   on	   the	   existence	   of	   appropriate	   languages,	   printing	   technologies	   and	  
modelling	  capabilities	  for	  the	  knowledge	  under	  consideration.	  
51	  There	  is	  no	  internationally	  agreed	  legal	  definition	  of	  traditional	  knowledge.	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  World	  Intellectual	  
Property	  Organization	   (WIPO)	   are	   currently	   discussing	   the	  definition	  of	   traditional	   knowledge	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	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knowledge	   includes	   ‘knowledge,	   know-­‐how,	   skills,	   innovations	   or	   practices	   that	   are	   passed	   be-­‐
tween	  generations,	   in	  a	   traditional	  context,	  and	   that	   form	  part	  of	   the	   traditional	   lifestyles	  of	   in-­‐
digenous	  and	  local	  communities	  who	  act	  as	  their	  guardian	  or	  custodian.”52	  It	  is	  valuable	  in	  several	  
ways.	  It	  supports	  local	  livelihoods	  in	  addition	  to	  forming	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  a	  local	  culture,	  lifestyle,	  
and	   identity.	  Outside	   the	   local	   context,	   traditional	   knowledge	   is	   also	   a	   source	  of	   knowledge	   for	  
modern	   innovations.	  For	  example,	  knowledge	  related	   to	   the	  properties	  and	  use	  of	  biological	   re-­‐
sources	  can	  be	  of	  use	  for	  scientific	  research	  or	  for	  commercial	  development	  of	  products	  and	  ser-­‐
vices	   in	   a	   number	   of	   industries	   including	   food,	   agriculture,	   forestry,	   cosmetics,	   bio	   pesticides,	  
pharmaceuticals,	  neutraceuticals,	  among	  others.	  	  
Traditional	   knowledge	   can	   also	   be	   individual	   or	   of	   a	   collective	   nature	   whereby	   it	   is	   produced,	  
shared,	  known,	  and	  practised	  by	  all	  members	  of	  a	  community.	  Some	   forms	  of	   traditional	  know-­‐
ledge,	  particularly	  that	  which	  is	  considered	  sacred	  (of	  special	  spiritual	  value)	  may	  be	  kept	  closely	  
guarded,	   or	   practised	   and	   passed	   only	   by	   certain	   persons	   in	   the	   community,	   such	   a	   spiritual	  
leader.	  	  
Some	  forms	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  can	  be	  made	  explicit	  and	  as	  such	  are	  codifiable,	  while	  much	  
of	  it	  is	  tacit.	  Explicit	  forms	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  can	  be	  embodied	  in	  products	  such	  as	  medical	  
remedies	  or	  in	  expressions	  such	  as	  art	  and	  crafts	  or	  remain	  dis-­‐embodied	  (i.e.	  rituals	  or	  practices).	  
In	  the	  remaining	  part	  of	  this	  study	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  traditional	  medical	  know-­‐
ledge;	  a	   specific	   form	  of	   traditional	   knowledge	   that	   continues	   to	  be	  highly	   relevant	   for	  meeting	  
health	  care	  needs.	  Some	  forms	  of	   traditional	  medicine	  are	  also	  being	  formally	   incorporated	   into	  
national	  health	   systems	  alongside	  modern	  medicine.	   Traditional	  medicine	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  
“the	   sum	   total	   of	   the	   knowledge,	   skills	   and	  practices	   based	  on	   the	   theories,	   beliefs	   and	  experi-­‐
ences	   indigenous	   to	   different	   cultures,	   whether	   explicable	   or	   not,	   used	   in	   the	   maintenance	   of	  
health	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  prevention,	  diagnosis,	   improvement	  or	  treatment	  of	  physical	  and	  mental	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Intergovernmental	   Committee	   on	   Intellectual	   Property,	   Genetic	   Resources,	   Traditional	   Knowledge	   and	   Traditional	  
Cultural	  Expressions	   (TCEs).	  The	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity,	  Art	  8(j)	  entitled	  “Traditional	  Knowledge,	   Innova-­‐
tions	  and	  Practices”	  refers	  to	  “knowledge,	  innovations	  and	  practices	  of	  indigenous	  and	  local	  communities	  embodying	  
traditional	  lifestyles”.	  
52	  See	  WIPO,	  ‘Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  Resources,	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  Traditional	  Cultural	  Expressions’	  
(Publication	  No	  933,	  2012).	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illness.”53	   	   Some	   well-­‐known	   forms	   of	   traditional	   medicine	   include	   Chinese	   medicine,	   Indian	  
Ayurveda,	  Sidhha	  and	  South-­‐Asian	  and	  Arabic	  Unani	  medicine.	  	  
In	  some	  countries	  traditional	  medicine	  is	  incorporated	  into	  the	  national	  health	  system	  (i.e.	  China,	  
India)	  while	  in	  others	  some	  forms	  of	  traditional	  medicine	  can	  be	  considered	  “complementary”	  or	  
“alternative”	  (i.e.	  Europe,	  Switzerland,	  United	  States)	  alongside	  other	  forms	  of	  herbal-­‐based,	  non-­‐
conventional	  treatments	  that	  do	  not	  fall	  strictly	  under	  the	  definition	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowl-­‐
edge,	  such	  as	  naturopathy	  and	  certain	  forms	  of	  manual	  therapies	  such	  as	  chiropractic	  or	  osteopa-­‐
thy.54	  	  
Traditional	  medicine	  products	  and	  complementary	  medicine	  products	  (T&CM)	  are	  jointly	  defined	  
as	  by	  the	  WHO	  as	  products	  that	  “include	  herbs,	  herbal	  materials,	  herbal	  preparations	  and	  finished	  
herbal	  products	  that	  contain	  parts	  of	  plants,	  other	  plant	  materials	  or	  combinations	  thereof	  as	  ac-­‐
tive	  ingredients.	  In	  some	  countries	  herbal	  medicines	  may	  contain,	  by	  tradition,	  natural	  organic	  or	  
inorganic	  active	  ingredients	  that	  are	  not	  of	  plant	  origin”	  (WHO	  2013).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  T&CM	  
practices	  “include	  medication	  therapy	  and	  procedure-­‐based	  health	  care	  therapies	  such	  as	  herbal	  
medicines,	   naturopathy,	   acupuncture	   and	  manual	   therapies	   such	   as	   chiropractic,	   osteopathy	   as	  
well	  as	  other	  related	  techniques	  including	  qigong,	  tai	  chi,	  yoga,	  thermal	  medicine	  and	  other	  physi-­‐
cal,	  mental,	  spiritual	  and	  mind-­‐body	  therapies”	  (WHO	  2013).	  
The	  use	  of	  traditional	  medicine	  is	  associated	  to	  a	  number	  of	  factors,	  including	  availability	  (choice	  
of	  alternatives),	  accessibility	  (geographical	  proximity	  for	  treatment,	  ease	  of	  practice),	  affordability	  
(cost	  as	  compared	  to	  other	  systems	  of	  medicine)	  and	  acceptability	  (consumer	  preferences,	  dissat-­‐
isfaction	  with	   allopathic	  medicine).	   For	   example,	   studies	   reveal	   high	   acceptability	   of	   traditional	  
medicine	  in	  selected	  African	  countries	  (Peltzer	  2009,	  Abdullahi	  2011)	  and	  more	  generally	   in	  con-­‐
texts	  where	  traditional	  medicine	   is	  closely	   linked	  with	  peoples’	  cultures	   (Mander	  et	  al.	  2007).	   In	  
developing	   countries,	   particularly	   in	   rural	   areas,	   traditional	   medicine	   can	   be	   the	   only	   form	   of	  
health	  care	  available	  relying	  on	  local	  practitioners	  or	  “healers”.	  Moreover,	  where	  the	  costs	  of	  tra-­‐
ditional	  or	  complementary	  medicine	  are	  lower	  as	  compared	  to	  conventional	  medicine,	  it	  can	  be	  a	  
source	  of	  cost	  savings	  for	  public	  health	  systems.	  Accordingly,	  the	  World	  Health	  Organization	  rec-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/traditional/definitions/en/,	  Accessed	  7	  October	  2014.	  	  
54	  The	  WHO	  defines	  “complementary	  medicine”	  and	  “alternative	  medicine”	  as	  “a	  broad	  set	  of	  health	  care	  practices	  
that	  are	  not	  part	  of	  that	  country’s	  own	  tradition	  or	  conventional	  medicine	  and	  are	  not	  fully	  integrated	  into	  the	  domi-­‐
nant	   health-­‐care	   system.	   They	   are	   used	   interchangeably	   with	   traditional	   medicine	   in	   some	   countries.”	  
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/traditional/definitions/en/.	  Accessed	  7	  October	  2014.	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ommends	   that	   countries	   integrate	   traditional	   medicine	   in	   national	   health	   systems	   to	   improve	  
health	  outcomes	  -­‐	  promote	  universal	  health	  coverage	  (WHO	  2013).55	  Given	  the	  widespread	  use	  in	  
developing	  countries,	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  is	  a	  relevant	  pre-­‐existing	  knowledge	  base	  and	  
competence	  that	  should	  be	  drawn	  upon	  to	  meet	  local	  health	  needs.	  It	  can	  also	  be	  developed	  as	  a	  
source	   of	   more	   radical	   innovations	   (i.e.	   modern	   drugs).	   Currently,	   much	   of	   traditional	   medical	  
knowledge	  is	  suffering	  from	  neglect	  and	  de-­‐learning.	  	  
The	  rise	  in	  global	  demand	  for	  traditional	  and	  complementary	  medicine	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  factors	  
driving	  the	  new	  wave	  of	  national	  country	  policies	  and	  initiatives	  aimed	  at	  its	  promotion.	  In	  2007,	  
approximately	  38	  percent	  of	  US	  adults	  aged	  18	  years	  and	  over	  and	  approximately	  12	  percent	  of	  
children	  used	  some	  form	  of	  complementary	  or	  alternative	  medicine	  (Barnes	  et	  al.	  2008).	  In	  the	  EU	  
it	  is	  estimated	  that	  approximately	  65%	  of	  the	  population	  have	  used	  complementary	  or	  alternative	  
medicine	  (CAMDOC	  Alliance	  2010).	  	  
From	   the	   consumer/patient	   perspective,	   a	   characteristic	   and	   appealing	   feature	   of	   traditional	  
medicine	  is	  the	  holistic	  nature	  of	  treatment.	  While	  in	  allopathic	  medicine	  the	  emphasis	  is	  on	  single	  
pills	  and	  search	   for	  cure-­‐alls,	   traditional	  medicine	  stresses	   that	   individuals,	  given	   their	  particular	  
constitutions	   (even	   temperament),	   are	   affected	   differently	   by	   disease,	   illness	   or	   stress/lifestyle	  
factors,	  and	  thus	  respond	  differently	  to	  medication	  or	  treatment	  (EUROCAM	  2012).	  The	  practitio-­‐
ner	  can	  alter	   the	   treatment	  accordingly.	  The	   focus	   is	  often	   to	  prevent	   illness	  or	   improve	  health,	  
rather	  than	  tackle	  a	  particular	  pathogen/disease.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  characteristic	  of	  experiential	  
knowledge	  for	  health;	  it	  is	  generally	  applied	  beforehand	  to	  prevent	  broader	  problems	  (illness)	  be-­‐
fore	  it	  can	  occur.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  can	  be	  a	  useful	  complement	  to	  allopathic	  medicine,	  rather	  than	  
an	  alternative.	  It	  is	  also	  appealing	  that	  traditional	  or	  complementary	  medicine	  treatments	  can	  be	  
are	  less	  invasive,	  less	  toxic	  and	  less	  costly	  as	  compared	  to	  biomedical	  treatment	  with	  conventional	  
drugs.	  
Traditional	   medical	   knowledge	   is	   also	   of	   interest	   as	   a	   source	   for	   potential	   new	   drug	   discovery	  
based	  on	  natural	  products.	  Many	  modern	  medicines	  have	  been	  developed	  from	  plant	  sources	  and	  
associated	  traditional	  medicinal	  knowledge,	  and	  it	  is	  increasingly	  possible	  with	  biotechnology	  and	  
synthetic	  biology	  (Cragg	  and	  Newman	  2013).	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  20–25	  per	  cent	  of	  pharmaceutical	  
products	  are	  derived	  from	  genetic	  resources,	  in	  a	  market	  that	  is	  worth	  US$640	  billion	  (Greiber	  et	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	   See	   also	   Sixty	   -­‐	   Seventh	   World	   Health	   Assembly,	   Resolution	   WHA67.18,	   Traditional	   Medicine,	   24	   May	   2014.	  
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA67/A67_R18-­‐en.pdf	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al.	  2012).	  There	   is	  ample	  evidence	   in	  different	  settings	  that	   leads	  of	  the	  properties	  of	  plants	  are	  
being	   gathered	   from	   traditional	   medicine	   as	   input	   for	   new	   drugs	   in	   modern	   medicine	   (Calixto	  
2005,	  Singh	  et	  al.	  2013).	  	  
	  4.4.1 Traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  compared	  to	  hybrid	  systems	  and	  biomedi-­‐cal	  knowledge	  
In	  order	   to	  understand	  the	  specificities	  and	  dynamics	  of	   traditional	  medical	  knowledge,	  we	  con-­‐
sider	   that	   it	   is	   relevant	  distinguish	  between	   traditional	  medicine,	  hybrid	   systems	  and	  biomedical	  
medicine.	   These	   different	   knowledge	   systems	   can	   nonetheless	   be	   complementary.	  We	   refer	   to	  
hybrid	  systems	  as	  those	  that	  combine	  traditional	  medicine	  and	  other	   forms	  of	  non-­‐conventional	  
medicine	  that	  have	   integrated	  modern	  medicine	  approaches,	   for	  example	  that	  have	  adapted	  re-­‐
search	  methods,	  practices	  or	  institutions	  of	  allopathic,	  biomedical	  medicine.	  	  
Table	  7	  summarizes	  features	  of	  each	  of	  these	  medical	  knowledge	  systems.	  	  
Table	  7.	  Comparison	  of	  medical	  knowledge	  systems	  
Knowledge	  	  
	  
Traditional	  Medicine	  	   Hydrid/	   integrative	  
medicine	  
Biomedical	  science	  	  







T&CM	  products	  	  
	  
Pharmaceuticals	   based	  





TM	  practices,	  variable	  
	  
T&CM	   practices,	   to-­‐
wards	  standardization	  	  
	  






TM	   practitioners,	   i.e.	   spiri-­‐
tual	  leaders	  in	  villages	  
	  
Accredited	   T&CM	  
practitioners	  
and	   conventional	  
medicine	   profession-­‐
als	   and	   health	   work-­‐
ers	  
	  
Conventional	   medicine	  
professionals	   and	  
health	   care	   workers,	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One	  of	  the	  particularities	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  is	  the	  difficulty	  in	  ensuring	  its	  transmis-­‐
sion.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	   tacit	  knowledge	   is	  difficult	   to	  make	  explicit	   for	   transfer	  and	  reproduc-­‐
tion,	  and	  it	  is	  also	  a	  costly	  process.	  Tacit	  knowledge	  is	  not	  detached	  from	  the	  person	  in	  possession	  
of	   the	  knowledge,	  unless	   it	   is	  codified	  which	   is	  most	  often	  not	   the	  case	  with	  traditional	  medical	  
knowledge.	  Therefore,	   its	   reproduction	  of	  depends	  to	  a	   large	  extent	  on	  the	  groups’	  social	  cohe-­‐
sion.	  Much	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	   is	  embedded	   in	  the	  specific	  practitioners	  who	  have	  
acquired/learnt	  the	  experiential	  knowledge.	  
It	  is	  the	  case	  that	  “means	  of	  reproducing	  knowledge	  can	  easily	  fail	  to	  operate	  when	  social	  ties	  un-­‐
ravel,	   when	   contact	   is	   broken	   between	   older	   and	   younger	   generations	   and	   when	   professional	  
communities	   lose	   their	   capacity	   to	   act	   in	   stabilising,	   preserving	   and	   transmitting	   knowledge.	   In	  
such	  cases,	  reproduction	  grinds	  to	  a	  halt	  and	  the	  knowledge	  in	  question	  is	  in	  imminent	  danger	  of	  
being	  lost	  and	  forgotten”	  (David	  and	  Foray	  2003).	  	  
In	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  systems	  knowledge	  production	  and	  circulation	  evolves	  over	  time	  
within	  the	  local	  context,	  it	  is	  not	  static.	  The	  community	  of	  practitioners	  and	  users	  are	  affected	  by	  
changes	  in	  the	  ecosystem	  and	  external	  factors	  that	  can	  impact	  the	  knowledge	  base.	  Loss	  of	  know-­‐
ledge	  and	  de-­‐learning	   is	   taking	  place	  within	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  systems	  due	  to	  chan-­‐
ging	  lifestyles	  (i.e.	  urbanization),	  as	  well	  as	  to	  increased	  difficulty	  to	  access	  to	  plant	  and	  other	  re-­‐
sources	  required	  for	  the	  production	  of	  medicinal	  products	  and	  lack	  of	  skilled	  practitioners	  to	  pass	  
on	  know-­‐how.	  Changing	   lifestyles	  can	  also	  render	  this	  prior	  knowledge	   less	  relevant	  when	  it	  can	  
no	  longer	  be	  relied	  on	  to	  support	  livelihoods.	  Indeed,	  the	  strong	  role	  of	  traditional	  practitioners	  in	  
the	  traditional	  medicine	  systems	  as	  compared	  to	  hybrid	  systems	  and	  biomedical	  science	  is	  a	  sig-­‐
nificant	  difference	  among	  the	  knowledge	  systems	  and	  their	  robustness.	  	  
Studies	  show	  there	  is	  a	  generational	  loss	  of	  traditional	  medicine	  knowledge	  describing	  the	  use	  of	  
plants	   as	   medicines	   and	   overall	   diminishing	   knowledge	   and	   information	   available	   on	  medicinal	  
knowledge	  of	   plants	   (Buenz	   2005).	   This	   loss	   is	   also	   associated	   to	   the	  historic	  marginalization	  of	  
traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  and	  traditional	  practitioners	  at	  the	  periphery	  of	  modern	  medicine	  
due	  to	  colonial	  pressures	  and	  increased	  professionalization	  and	  regulation	  of	  traditional	  medicine	  
(Ongugo	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Davey	  2013).	  With	  growing	  global	  demand	  for	  plant-­‐based	  medicine,	  the	  lack	  
of	  availability	  of	  quality	  raw	  materials	  is	  also	  considered	  problematic	  for	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  industry	  
(Pardawan	  et	  at	  2005).	  	  
The	   fact	   that	   traditional	  medicine	  continues	   to	  be	  used	  widely,	  even	  as	   conventional,	   allopathic	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medicine	  is	  increasingly	  available,	  can	  be	  an	  indication	  that	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  and	  its	  
practice	  is	  highly	  resilient	  and	  endures	  over	  time,	  despite	  its	  fragile	  nature.	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  
a	  cause	  for	  concern	  that	  the	  knowledge	  base	  (residing	  with	  traditional	  practitioners)	  that	  is	  essen-­‐
tial	  for	  the	  safe	  and	  effective	  use	  and	  practice	  of	  traditional	  medicine,	  appears	  to	  be	  weakening.	  
	  4.5 Medical	  knowledge	  and	  public	  health	  
	  
Before	  we	  move	  on	  to	  discuss	  market	  failures	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge,	  it	  is	  
worth	  noting	  that	  the	  market	  has	   intrinsic	   limitations	  for	  the	  efficient	  allocation	  of	  resources	  for	  
the	  production	  and	  management	  of	  medical	  knowledge	  and	  innovation,	  given	  the	  special	  charac-­‐
teristics	  or	  “ab-­‐normal	  economics”	   in	   the	  health	  sector	   (Hsiao	  1995).	  Not	  only	   is	  not	  possible	   to	  
rely	  on	  a	  competitive	  market	  regime	  for	  the	  economically	  efficient	  generation	  of	  medical	  knowl-­‐
edge,	  given	  that	  is	  a	  public	  good,	  but	  also	  it	  is	  considered	  in	  many	  societies	  that	  allowing	  the	  mar-­‐
ket	  to	  provide	  medical	  products	  (diagnostics,	  vaccines,	  drugs)	  and	  services	  (health	  care)	  purely	  as	  
private	   goods	   (purchasable	   on	   the	  market	   based	   on	   consumers’	   preferences	   and	  willingness	   to	  
pay)	  is	  less	  than	  socially	  optimal.	  The	  market	  system	  does	  not	  distinguish	  among	  income	  levels	  and	  
therefore	   part	   of	   the	   population	   is	   excluded	   from	   access	  when	   costs	   of	   goods	   and	   services	   are	  
higher	  than	  can	  be	  afforded	  by	  those	  who	  are	  poor.	  Hence,	  there	  is	  a	  central	  government	  role	  in	  
public	  health	  to	  ensure	  access	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  health	  needs	  rather	  than	  ability	  to	  pay.	  In	  this	  sense,	  
medical	  products	  take	  on	  characteristics	  of	  public	  goods	  (non-­‐exclusive	  and	  non-­‐rival	  in	  consump-­‐
tion),	  whether	  they	  are	  be	  provided	  directly	  by	  the	  government	  or	  by	  private	  sector	  (under	  strict	  
government	  regulation)	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  two.	  	  
	  
A	  number	  of	  governments	  have	  introduced	  universal	  health	  care	  coverage	  (achieved	  through	  dif-­‐
ferent	  models	  of	  financing)	  for	  greater	  equity	  in	  health,	  whereby	  people	  can	  access	  health	  services	  
independent	  of	   income.	  This	   is	   in	   line	  with	  the	  right	   to	  health,	  a	   fundamental	  human	  right,	   that	  
every	  human	  being	  is	  entitled	  to	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  the	  highest	  attainable	  standard	  of	  physical	  and	  
mental	  health.56	  As	  noted	  by	  Hsiao	  (1995),	  decisions	  about	  where	  government	  should	  intervene	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	   The	   right	   to	   health	   is	   recognized	   in	   the	   1946	   Constitution	   of	   the	  World	  Health	  Organization,	   the	   1948	  Universal	  
Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (UDHR),	  the	  1966	  International	  Convenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights,	  Arti-­‐
cle	  12,	  and	  other	  international	  human	  right	  legal	  instruments.	  It	  is	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  General	  Comment	  No.	  14	  
of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights,	  E/C.12/2000/4.	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the	  market	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  health	  sector	  rests	  on	  the	  social	  values	  that	  a	  national	  embraces,	  
and	  these	  social	  values	  in	  turn	  shape	  policies	  that	  trade	  off	  among	  equity,	  efficiency	  and	  control	  of	  
health	  costs.	  
	  4.6 Market	  failures	  in	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  
	  
We	  already	  argued	  that	  the	  precious	  traditional	   institutions	  are	  coming	  under	  strain.	  This	   is	  par-­‐
ticularly	   clear	   in	   the	   specific	   case	   of	   traditional	  medical	   knowledge,	  where	   a	   range	   of	   factors	   is	  
contributing	  to	  the	  deterioration	  of	  the	  traditional	  framework.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  traditional	  medical	  
knowledge	   becomes	   fragile	   and	   new	  mechanisms	   are	   necessary	   to	   ensure	   its	   preservation,	   im-­‐
provement	  and	  distribution.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  problems	  of	  public	  good,	  ownership,	  and	  tyranny	  of	  
small	   decision	   externalities	   which	   were	   latent	   in	   the	   domain	   of	   traditional	   medical	   knowledge	  
when	  the	  traditional	  institutions	  worked	  effectively	  are	  exploding	  today	  when	  such	  knowledge	  is	  
subject	  to	  market	  dynamics.	  Market	  failures	  due	  to	  externalities	  affect	  firms	  operating	  in	  commer-­‐
cial	  markets	  for	  traditional	  medical	  products	  and	  services.	  	  
Traditional	   medical	   knowledge,	   as	   other	   forms	   of	   knowledge,	   has	   public	   good	   characteristics.	  
Moreover,	  to	  address	  public	  health	  needs,	  public	  health	  policy	  may	  treat	  medical	  products	  as	  pub-­‐
lic,	  or	  quasi-­‐public	  goods.	   In	  the	  community	  context	  where	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	   is	  his-­‐
torically	  practiced,	  the	  market	  may	  not	  exist	  or	  otherwise	  not	  be	  a	  central	  institution	  (in	  the	  sense	  
of	  organizing	   the	  production	  and	  exchange	  of	  private	  goods	  and	  existence	  of	   competition).	  Pre-­‐
ventive	  and	  curative	  medical	   services	  are	  meant	   to	  be	  available	   to	  all,	  and	   in	   this	  sense	  take	  on	  
public	  good	  characteristics,	  yet	  customary	  law	  regulates	  who	  can	  learn	  traditional	  medical	  knowl-­‐
edge,	  the	  process,	  and	  who	  can	  practice.	  Government	  regulation	  may	  be	  lacking.	  The	  system	  pro-­‐
vides	  incentives	  and	  pay-­‐offs	  to	  traditional	  knowledge	  practitioners	  that	  are	  not	  necessarily	  mone-­‐
tary,	  such	  as	  social	  status.	  Likewise,	  rights	  to	  the	  use	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  by	  community	  
members	  are	  also	  recognized	  through	  customary	  law.	  Local	  natural	  resources,	  such	  as	  forests	  from	  
where	  medicinal	  plants	  are	  sourced	  are	  also	  communally	  managed.	  In	  this	  sense,	  as	  advanced	  by	  
E.	  Ostrom	  (1990),	   local	  communities	  can	  be	  effectively	  self-­‐organized,	  much	  as	  a	  private	  associa-­‐
tion	   or	   private-­‐club	   to	  manage	   the	   production	   and	   dissemination	   of	   traditional	  medical	   knowl-­‐
edge,	   -­‐a	   local	   public	   good-­‐,	   and	   local	   forests	   -­‐a	   common-­‐pool	   resource.	  While	   regulating	  use	  of	  
medical	  knowledge	  within	  the	  community	  as	  a	  public	  good,	  whereby	  no	  one	  is	  excluded	  from	  en-­‐
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joying	  medical	  treatment,	  other	  communities	  or	  third	  parties	  can	  be	  excluded	  from	  enjoying	  those	  
benefits.	  	  
While	  the	  weakening	  of	  traditional	  institutions	  can	  lead	  to	  broader	  knowledge	  diffusion	  within	  the	  
community,	  it	  does	  not	  translate	  necessarily	  into	  preservation	  or	  increased	  practice.	  Some	  knowl-­‐
edge	  may	  not	  be	  readily	  replicable	  (because	  it	   is	  normally	  held	  and	  passed	  on	  orally	  and	  only	  by	  
traditional	  practitioners,	  the	  expert	  and	  personalized	  nature	  of	  the	  practice,	  and	  reliance	  on	  use	  of	  
local	   natural	   resources	   that	   may	   no	   longer	   be	   available).	   Moreover,	   some	   forms	   of	   traditional	  
medical	   knowledge,	   such	   as	   knowledge	   considered	   sacred	   or	   of	   special	   spiritual	   value,	   are	   not	  
available	  for	  all	  community	  members	  to	  learn	  or	  practice.	  In	  this	  case,	  there	  is	  a	  loss	  of	  the	  stew-­‐
ardship	  function	  that	  traditional	  practitioners	  play	  in	  preserving	  and	  regulating	  the	  use	  of	  knowl-­‐
edge	  based	  on	  customary	  law.	  Knowledge	  may	  also	  deteriorate,	  despite	  continued	  practice,	  due	  to	  
lack	  of	  institutions	  to	  ensure	  proper	  learning	  and	  passing	  on.	  	  
Institutional	  change,	  though	  slow,	  can	  take	  place	  within	  the	  community	  in	  adapting	  to	  the	  chang-­‐
ing	  context.	  However,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  is	  linked	  to	  meeting	  local	  
health	  needs,	  there	  may	  be	  good	  reason	  for	  public	  policy	  involvement	  in	  institutional	  building.	  In	  a	  
changing	  community	  context	  whereby	   traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  ceases	  being	  embedded	   in	  
and	  supported	  by	  traditional	  institutions,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  design	  of	  new	  institutions	  when	  tradi-­‐
tional	  institutions	  fail	  to	  play	  the	  previous	  role.	  This	  may	  involve	  either	  reconstructing	  traditional	  
institutions	  to	  the	  extent	  possible	  (i.e.	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  incentives	  for	  the	  preservation	  
of	   traditional	  medical	   knowledge	   through	   the	   role	   of	   traditional	   practitioners)	   or	   adopting	   new	  
institutions.	  	  
Government,	  or	  private	  firms	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  two,	  may	  replace	  the	  community	  role	  in	  the	  
management	  and	  use	  of	   traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  and	  natural	   resources.	  Some	   institutions	  
can	  be	  derived	  from	  those	  generally	  used	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  scientific	  knowledge.	  Codification	  is	  an	  
important	  mean	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  existing	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  and	  to	  facilitate	  the	  
learning	   and	   passing	   on	   process	   in	   light	   of	   the	   rupture	   of	   traditional	   social	   ties.	  	  
For	   private	   firms	   operating	   in	   commercial	  markets	   for	   T&CM	  products	   and	   services,	   knowledge	  
spillovers	  and	  free	  -­‐	  riding	  by	  competitors	  due	  to	  public	  good	  externalities	  is	  a	  key	  concern.	  Private	  
agents	  are	  likely	  to	  undersupply	  medical	  knowledge	  and	  produce	  innovations	  at	  the	  socially	  opti-­‐
mum	  level	  because	  of	   inability	  to	  privately	  appropriate	  benefits	  from	  knowledge	  production.	  Yet	  
for	  the	  development	  of	  private	  enterprise	  based	  on	  traditional	  medicine,	  the	  solutions	  identified	  
for	  the	  production	  of	  scientific	  knowledge,	  such	  as	  direct	  government	  production,	  subsidies,	  legal	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monopolies	   (intellectual	   property	   rights),	   have	   not	   been	   applied	  widely	   to	   stimulate	   traditional	  
knowledge	  production.	  	  
T&CM	  requires	  more	  support,	  notably	  through	  the	  allocation	  of	  financial	  resources	  for	  more	  codi-­‐
fication	  and	  research.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  plant-­‐based	  products,	  there	  are	  significant	  costs	  that	  T&CM	  
firms	  need	   to	  make	   to	  meet	   increasingly	   stringent	   regulatory	   standards,	  particularly	   in	   lucrative	  
markets	  (i.e.	  Europe,	  United	  States)	  prior	  to	  commercialization.	  Financial	  support	  by	  government	  
to	  T&CM	  currently	  is	  minimal	  as	  compared	  to	  financing	  for	  scientific-­‐based	  medicine.	  For	  example,	  
the	   US	  National	   Center	   for	   Complementary	   and	   Alternative	  Medicine	   had	   a	   budget	   of	   approxi-­‐
mately	  USD	  $124	  million,	  compared	  to	  the	  overall	  budget	  of	  the	  US	  National	  Institutes	  of	  Health	  of	  
approximately	  USD	  $25	  billion	  in	  2013.57	  The	  role	  of	  intellectual	  property	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  public	  
goods	  problem	  is	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  Section	  4.6.	  	  
As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  public	  good	  externalities,	  in	  the	  local	  community	  context	  traditional	  institutions	  
address	  the	  potential	  problem	  of	  ownership	  externalities.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  under	  market	  condi-­‐
tions,	   one	   can	   clearly	   see	   how	   ownership	   externalities	   apply	   to	   the	   case	   of	   traditional	  medical	  
knowledge.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  observe,	  measure	  and	  adequately	  assess	  its	  value	  for	  society,	  beyond	  
the	  rising	  market	  value	  for	  some	  T&CM	  products	  and	  services.	  Despite	  reported	  benefits	  of	  tradi-­‐
tional	  and	  complementary	  medicine,	  the	  endorsement	  of	  its	  use	  for	  public	  health	  is	  subject	  to	  sig-­‐
nificant	   scepticism	   from	  policy	  makers	   and	   the	   scientific	  medical	   community.	   This	   is	   due	   to	   the	  
limited	  evidence-­‐based	  scientific	  analysis	  of	  the	  quality,	  safety	  and	  efficacy	  of	  treatment	  and	  prac-­‐
tice.	  As	  compared	  to	  modern,	  science-­‐based	  medicine,	   it	   is	  only	  recently	  that	  formal	   institutions	  
are	  being	  created	  to	  evaluate	  and	  regulate	  the	  use	  of	  traditional	  medicine	  products,	  and	  to	  attest	  
and	  validate	  the	  know-­‐how	  and	  qualifications	  of	  self-­‐declared	  practitioners.	  	  	  
These	   are	   certainly	   legitimate	   concerns	   but	   they	   also	   reflect	   unfamiliarity	   and	  understanding	  of	  
traditional	   knowledge	   systems.	   For	  most	   conventional	  medical	   authorities	  and	  practitioners	   it	   is	  
difficult	   to	   evaluate	   the	   value	  of	   knowledge	  outside	   their	   own	   framework	   for	   evaluation	   that	   is	  
part	  of	   the	  science-­‐based	  knowledge	  system,	  and	   thus	   there	   is	  enormous	  scepticism	  among	   the	  
scientific	  community	  on	  the	  value	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge.	  	  
This	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  case	  with	  all	  experiential	  knowledge	  and	  a	  source	  of	  its	  fragility	  but	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  of	   its	  value;	   it	   is	  grounded	  on	  experience	  obtained	  through	   its	  continued	  use	  over	   long	  pe-­‐
riods	   of	   time.	   Given	   that	   the	   evidence	   and	   research-­‐base	   of	   traditional	   medical	   knowledge	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  See	  http://report.nih.gov/categorical_spending.aspx.	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largely	   observational	   rather	   than	   scientific,	   and	   that	   it	   is	   regulated	   through	   informal	   traditional	  
mechanisms,	   it	   is	  not	  considered	  reliable,	  pending	  evaluation,	  from	  the	  scientific-­‐approaches	  ap-­‐
plied	   in	   biomedicine.	   Consequently,	   increasingly	   science-­‐based	   approaches	   are	   being	   applied	   to	  
traditional	   medical	   products	   and	   practices	   for	   their	   examination	   and	   prior	   to	   authorizing	   their	  
formal	  use.	  	  However,	  the	  characteristics	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  pose	  unique	  problems	  
in	  this	   integration	  with	  modern	  science.	  The	  diversity	  of	  practices	  of	  traditional	  medicine	  among	  
countries	  or	  even	  among	  practitioners	  is	  a	  challenge	  for	  ensuring	  quality	  and	  efficacy	  and	  for	  es-­‐
tablishing	  harmonized	  standards	  of	  production	  and	  practices	  through	  regulation.	  	  
The	  personalized	  character	  of	  traditional	  medicine	  also	  poses	  particular	  challenges	  for	  the	  produc-­‐
tion	   of	  modern	   drugs	   based	   on	   such	   knowledge,	   for	   example	   for	   carrying	   out	   randomized	   con-­‐
trolled	  trials.	  Traditional	  medicine	  is	  thus	  a	  difficult	  subject	  for	  scientific,	  evidence-­‐base	  evaluation.	  
Nonetheless,	   this	   is	   the	   approach	   that	   countries	   are	   increasingly	   adopting	   where	   traditional	   or	  
complementary	  medicine	  is	  practiced,	  where	  there	  is	  an	  interest	  in	  promoting	  its	  export.	  It	  is	  also	  
the	  policy	  approach	  that	   is	  being	  advanced	  by	  the	  WHO.	  Efforts	  are	  being	  made	  to	  increase	  uni-­‐
formity	  in	  the	  processes	  of	  production,	  ingredients	  and	  final	  products	  to	  ensure	  more	  homogeny	  
in	  formulations.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  these	  efforts	  can	  also	  clash	  with	  the	  person-­‐
alized	  and	  holistic	   character	  of	   traditional	  medicine,	  putting	   stress	  on	  some	  of	   its	  key	  attributes	  
and	  appeal.	  
The	   public	   health	   challenge	   remains	   to	   increase	   research	   to	   improve	   the	   safety	   and	   efficacy	   of	  
treatments	  based	  on	  T&CM	  products	  and	  practices	  to	  meet	  health	  needs,	  both	  in	  the	  local	  context	  
where	  it	  is	  most	  frequently	  used	  as	  a	  source	  of	  health	  care	  and	  as	  part	  of	  national	  health	  systems,	  
while	   preserving	   the	   nature	   of	   traditional	  medical	   interventions.	   Supportive	   forms	   of	   evidence-­‐
based	  research	  include	  experiential	  research	  that	  is	  well	  -­‐	  suited	  for	  experiential	  knowledge.	  How-­‐
ever,	  science-­‐based	  approaches	  would	  serve	  to	  provide	  broader	  validity	  to	  T&CM.	  These	   include	  
comprehensive	  toxicity	  studies	  of	  traditional	  medicinal	  plants	  and	  clinical	  trials	  of	  single	  plants	  or	  
remedies	  containing	  mixtures	  of	  plants	  (Jäger	  2005).	  Efforts	  also	  need	  to	  be	  made	  to	  ensure	  the	  
qualifications	   of	   practitioners,	   such	   as	   through	   accreditation	   systems	   overseen	   by	   government	  
institutions	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   integrate	   traditional	   practitioners	   who	   hold	   tacit	   know-­‐how	   into	  
national	  health	  systems,	  rather	  than	  creating	  only	  new	  categories	  of	  professionals	  in	  the	  practice	  
of	  traditional	  medicine	  that	  breaks	  the	  link	  to	  the	  historic	   learning	  process	  of	  traditional	  medical	  
knowledge	  through	  inter-­‐generational	  passing	  on.	  	  
	  	   90	  
In	  the	  local	  community	  context,	  where	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  and	  local	  natural	  resources	  
is	  managed	   through	   customary	   law,	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   suboptimal	   effect	   of	   small	   decisions	   in	  
terms	  of	  size,	  scope	  and	  time	  perspective	  –	  the	  tyranny	  of	  small	  decisions-­‐	  is	  avoided.	  In	  the	  con-­‐
text	  of	  market	  dynamics	  for	  T&CM,	  however,	  the	  problem	  is	  evident.	  A	  clear	  example	  is	  the	  sus-­‐
tainability	  and	  proper	  use	  of	  plant-­‐based	  traditional	  medicinal	  products.	  Firms,	  T&CM	  practition-­‐
ers	  and	  consumers	  are	  increasingly	  using	  medicinal	  plants	  (as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  mar-­‐
ket)	  with	  little	  concern	  on	  the	  overall	  impact	  of	  their	  individual	  decisions	  on	  the	  long-­‐term	  sustain-­‐
ability	  of	  such	  use.	  Issues	  such	  as	  the	  generic	  erosion	  among	  wild	  plants	  and	  decreased	  quality	  of	  
raw	  materials	   are	   not	   internalized	   in	   such	   “small	   decisions”.	   For	   example,	   due	   to	   increased	  de-­‐
mand	  of	  plant-­‐based	  medicines,	  and	  the	   increasing	   lack	  of	  access	  by	  traditional	  practitioners	   (or	  
other	  sellers)	  to	  native	  plant	  resources	  as	  raw	  material,	  in	  certain	  contexts	  these	  are	  resorting	  to	  
substituting	  these	  in	  preparations	  with	  common	  plants	  (also	  passed	  off	  intentionally	  in	  the	  market	  
as	  native	  plant-­‐based	  medicines),	  posing	  health	  risks	  for	  users	  (Shanley	  and	  Luz	  2003).	  	  
Hence,	   higher-­‐level	   decision-­‐making	   may	   be	   necessary	   to	   address	   these	   and	   related	   	   “macro”	  
problems.	  Some	  of	  the	  higher-­‐level	  policy	  actions	  that	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  ensure	  supply	  and	  process-­‐
ing	  of	  raw	  materials	  of	  good	  quality	  in	  a	  sustainable	  manner	  are	  introducing	  sustainable	  practices	  
for	   the	   collection,	   cultivation	   and	   harvesting	   of	   medicinal	   plants;	   introduce	   quality	   controls	  
mechanisms	   for	   monitoring	   products	   sold	   in	   the	  market;	   design	   of	   a	   conservation	   strategy	   for	  
threatened	  species	  and	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge.	  	  
The	  technical	  guidelines	  relating	  to	  the	  quality	  control	  of	  medicinal	  plants	  developed	  by	  the	  WHO	  -­‐	  
Guidelines	  on	  Good	  Agricultural	  and	  collection	  practices	  (GACP)	  –	  are	  an	  example	  of	  higher-­‐level	  
decision	  making	  to	  address	  this	  type	  of	  externality.	  	  
	  4.7 Institution	  building	  to	  support	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  	  
	  
In	  this	  section	  we	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  institutions	  that	  underpin	  traditional	  medicine	  as	  com-­‐
pared	  to	  those	  of	  hybrid	  and	  science-­‐based	  medicine,	  and	  consider	  the	  extent	  to	  traditional	  insti-­‐
tutions	  are	  evolving	  in	  themselves	  in	  light	  of	  the	  changing	  local	  context	  and	  whether	  this	  process	  
sufficient,	  or	  otherwise	  what	  should	  be	  the	  new	  institutional	  design	  for	  what	  cannot	  be	  rebuilt	  of	  
the	  traditional	   institutional	   framework.	   In	  doing	  so,	  we	  consider	   to	  what	  extent	   institutions	   that	  
support	  scientific	  knowledge	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  accommodate	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge.	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Science-­‐based	  medicine	  has	  developed	  mechanisms	  to	  support	  the	  creation,	  codification	  and	  cir-­‐
culation	  of	  scientific	  know-­‐how	  that	  are	  largely	  absent	  for	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge.	  	  
Table	  8	  provides	  a	  comparison	  between	  selected	  institutions	  in	  traditional,	  hybrid	  and	  biomedical	  
medical	  systems.	  	  
It	  is	  now	  well	  established	  in	  economics	  and	  other	  social	  sciences	  that	  the	  analysis	  of	  institutions,	  in	  
our	  case	  those	  that	  backing	  different	  forms	  of	  medical	  knowledge	  and	  their	  practice,	  is	  as	  import-­‐
ant	  exercise.	  Institutions	  can	  be	  broadly	  defined	  as	  the	  prescriptions	  that	  humans	  use	  to	  organize	  
all	   forms	  of	   repetitive	   and	   structured	   interactions	   including	   those	  within	   communities,	  markets,	  
firms,	   and	   governments	   (Ostrom	  2005).	   They	   consist	   of	   both	   informal	   constraints	   such	   as	   sanc-­‐
tions,	   customs	  and	   codes	  of	   conduct,	   and	   formal	   rules,	   such	  as	   laws	  and	  property	   rights	   (North	  
1990).	  Underlying	   institutions	  are	  assumptions,	  values	  and	  preferences	  that	  drive	  human	  behav-­‐
iour	   and	   decision-­‐making.	   These	   help	   to	   understand	   how	   the	   formal	   institutions	   -­‐	   rules	   of	   the	  
game-­‐	  were	   formed,	   how	   they	   change	   and	  why	   they	  may	   or	  may	   not	   allow	   the	   outcomes	   that	  
were	  expected.	  Institutional	  choices	  also	  underscore	  the	  legitimacy	  that	  is	  given	  to	  the	  system.	  	  
Institutions	   historically	   underlying	   traditional	   medicine	   are	   undergoing	   significant	   change	   and	  
weakening	   to	   various	   extents	   in	   different	   settings.	   These	   remain	   stronger	   in	   settings	  where	   the	  
influence	  of	  biomedicine	  (or	  access	  to	  modern	  medical	  facilities)	  is	  less	  prevalent.	  	  
These	  include	  institutions	  that	  regulate	  the	  use,	  transfer	  and	  reproduction	  of	  knowledge,	  such	  as	  
community	  customary	  laws	  that	  provide	  a	  means	  for	  knowledge	  transmission	  based	  on	  kinship	  or	  
other	   defined	   criteria	   and	   differentiate	   legitimate	   practitioners	   from	   “quacks”.	   As	   previously	  
noted,	  we	  observe	  that	  a	  cause	  for	  the	  deterioration	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  (and	  in	  con-­‐
sequence	  the	  reliability	  of	  products	  and	  practices)	   is	  the	  weakening	  of	  the	  historically	  close	  con-­‐
nection	  between	   the	   traditional	  medical	   knowledge	  of	  practitioners	   and	   their	   knowledge	  of	   the	  
local	  context	  (i.e.	  the	  local	  people,	  lifestyles	  and	  culture,	  uses	  of	  local	  plant	  resources	  for	  medical	  
preparations).	  
The	  extensive	  experience	  of	  practitioners	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  specific	  context	  is	  what	  traditionally	  con-­‐
stitutes	   the	   evidence-­‐base	   that	   supports	   the	   practice	   of	   traditional	  medicine	   by	   such	   “experts”.	  
The	  knowledge	  is	  then	  passed	  on	  from	  generation	  to	  generation.	  Thus,	  the	  transfer	  and	  reproduc-­‐
tion	  of	  useful	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  cannot,	  without	  problems,	  be	  disconnected	  from	  the	  
knowledge	  and	  skill	  derived	  from	  long-­‐term	  experience	  gained	  in	  a	  specific,	  local	  context.	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Table	  8.	  Institutional	  diversity	  among	  medical	  knowledge	  systems	  
Knowledge	  	  
	  
Traditional	  Medicine	  	   Hydrid	  systems	   Biomedical	  science	  	  











































Inter-­‐generational	   passing	   on	  
by	  TM	  practitioners	   to	  eligible	  
apprentice	   (i.e.	   status	   within	  









Customary	   law.	   Un-­‐official.	  




Use	  of	  IPRs	  is	  uncommon.	  	  
	  
Measures	   to	   counter	   misap-­‐
propriation	   /	   erroneous	   grant	  
of	  IPRs	  over	  known	  TM	  uses	  of	  
plants	   and	   TM	   practices	   and	  
support	   compliance	   with	   na-­‐





Countries	  and/or	  TM	  practitio-­‐
ners	   may	   condition	   the	   ac-­‐
cess/use	   of	   plant	   resources	  
and	   associated	   TM	   knowledge	  
by	   third	   parties	   to	   prior	   in-­‐
formed	   consent	   and	   mutually	  
agreed	  terms	  for	  the	  sharing	  of	  
the	   benefits	   that	   may	   derive	  
from	   commercialization	   of	  
innovations	  based	  on	  these.	  




nisms	   for	   existing	   T&CM	  
practitioners	   (i.e.	   regis-­‐
ters,	  associations).	  	  
Formal	   training	   or	   edu-­‐
cation	   system,	   hybrid	  






Increasingly	   regulated	   at	  
national/regional	   level.	  	  
Variable	   among	   coun-­‐
tries.	  	  
	  
Efforts	   to	   adapt	   IPRs	   to	  
T&CM	   specificities	   and	  
use	  IPRs.	  	  
	  
Measures	   to	   counter	  
misappropriation	   /	   erro-­‐
neous	  grant	  of	   IPRs	  over	  
known	   T&CM	   uses	   of	  
plants	   and	   T&CM	   prac-­‐
tices	   and	   compliance	  
with	  national	  ABS	  laws.	  
	  






Formal	   education	   system,	  
universities.	   Formal	   re-­‐






Strong.	   Significant	   budget	  
to	   institutions	   to	   support	  







Use	   of	   IPRs	   to	   pro-­‐
tect/secure	   financial	   gain	  
from	  commercialization	  of	  
innovations	   involving	   use	  
of	   plant	   resources	   and	  







Compliance	   with	   national	  
ABS	   laws	   can	   be	   required	  
for	   access	   and/or	   use	   of	  
plant	   resources	   and	   asso-­‐
ciated	   TM	   knowledge	   and	  
for	   the	   commercialization	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Such	  disconnection	  may	  alter	   its	   relevance	  and	  even	  dangerously	   increase	   the	  potential	   risks	  of	  
the	  treatment.	  For	  example,	   it	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  certain	  traditional	  medicine	  treatments	  can	  
have	   interactions	  (i.e.	  side	  effects,	  toxicity)	  when	  used	   in	  conjunction	  with	  pharmaceutical	  drugs	  
(Peltzer	  et	  al.	  2008).	  	  
Another	  important	  source	  of	  weakening	  of	  traditional	  institutions	  is	  the	  increased	  reliance	  on	  and	  
preference	  for	  modern	  biomedicine,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  continued	  exclusion	  of	  traditional	  medi-­‐
cine	  from	  most	  national	  health	  systems.	  Thus,	  there	  has	  been	  lack	  of	  sufficient	  government	  sup-­‐
port	  for	  the	  strengthening	  of	   institutions	  to	  support	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge.	  Moreover,	   it	  
appears	   that	  while	   a	   growing	   number	   of	   firms	   and	   government	   policies	   aim	   to	   develop	   T&CM,	  
reaching	  new	  profitable	  global	  markets	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  main	  focus,	  with	   less	  emphasis	  on	  ad-­‐
dressing	   national	   health	   needs.	   The	   intensified	   search	   for	   validation	   of	   T&CM	  beyond	   the	   local	  
setting	  explains	  why	  biomedical	  thinking	  is	   increasingly	  dominant	  in	  T&CM	  medicine,	  particularly	  
in	  Western	  countries,	  along	  with	  efforts	  to	  standardize	  practices	  according	  to	  scientific	  methods.	  
Thus,	  much	  of	  current	  debate	  on	  the	  value	  of	  traditional,	  alternative	  or	  complementary	  medicine	  
rests	  on	  different	  perceptions	  on	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  underlying	  institutions,	  both	  formal	  and	  infor-­‐
mal.	  
The	   forms	  of	  evidence	  and	  means	   for	   the	   transmission	  of	  knowledge	  that	  are	  considered	  as	  ad-­‐
equate	   and	   reliable	   in	   biomedical	   science	   for	   ensuring	   safety	   and	   efficacy	   of	   the	   products	   and	  
practices	  are	  for	  the	  most	  part	  absent	  in	  traditional	  medicine	  systems,	  the	  latter	  relying	  on	  inter-­‐
generational	   relations	  and	   long	   term	  clinical	  practice.	  Conversely,	   in	   traditional	  medical	   systems	  
include	  measures	  of	  efficacy	  that	  may	  be	  relevant	  for	  health	  care	  and	  yet	   less	  prominent	   in	  bio-­‐
medicine,	  such	  as	  patient	  perceptions	  of	  health,	  change	   in	   lifestyle,	  and	  other	  non-­‐scientific	  evi-­‐
dence	  that	  the	  treatment	  is	  effective.	  Growing	  compliance	  with	  the	  norms	  of	  modern	  bioscience	  
in	  relation	  to	  use	  of	  traditional	  medicine	  is	  evidenced	  in	  countries	  such	  as	  Brazil,	  India	  and	  China	  
where	  traditional	  medicine	  has	   long	  been	  practiced	   (Menon	  et	  al.	  2010).	   It	   is	   less	  clear	  whether	  
such	  efforts	  are	  aimed	  at	  promoting	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  use	  to	  address	  domestic	  health	  
care	   priorities	   or	  mainly	   focused	   on	   promoting	   the	   use	   traditional	  medical	   knowledge	   for	   leads	  
into	  the	  development	  of	  new	  biomedical	  products.	  The	  WHO	  is	  leading	  efforts	  for	  regulating	  tradi-­‐
tional	  medicine,	  as	  part	  of	  an	  overall	  trend	  to	  develop	  regional/global	  regulatory	  mechanisms	  for	  
regulating	  herbal	  drugs.	  For	  example,	  the	  European	  Directive	  2004/24/EC	  introduced	  a	  simplified	  
registration	  procedure	   for	   traditional	  herbal	  medicinal	  products	   toward	  harmonizing	   the	  current	  
legislation	  framework	  for	  all	  herbal	  medicinal	  products	   in	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU).	  Fulfilling	  the	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requirements	   for	   the	   registration	   of	   non-­‐European	   traditional	   herbal	  medicinal	   products	   within	  
the	   EU	   remains	   a	   challenge	   for	   most	   firms,	   as	   requirements	   include	   demonstrating	   a	   15-­‐year	  
minimum	  medicinal	  use	  period	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  evidence	  of	  absence	  of	  health	  risk	  (Qu	  et	  al.	  2014).	  
Thus,	   understandably	  much	  of	   the	   efforts	   of	   firms	   seeking	  new	  markets	   abroad	   are	   focused	  on	  
meeting	  this	  type	  of	  regulatory	  requirements.	  	  
	  
The	  concerns	  on	  the	  quality,	  safety	  and	  efficacy	  of	  T&CM	  products	  and	  practices	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  
assessment	  of	  the	  knowledge	  and	  qualifications	  of	  traditional	  practitioners	  are	  often	  well	  founded.	  
This	   situation	   can	  dangerously	   undermine	   the	   integration	  of	   T&CM	   into	   formal	   health	   care	   sys-­‐
tems,	   in	  addition	   to	   impeding	   the	  entry	  of	   traditional	  medical	  products	   into	  global	  markets.	  Ac-­‐
cordingly,	  institutions	  do	  need	  to	  be	  re-­‐designed	  or	  established	  to	  address	  these	  concerns.	  	  In	  ad-­‐
dition,	  as	  we	  have	  advanced	  in	  this	  study,	  there	  is	  a	  notable	  gap	  in	  institutions	  to	  support	  the	  pro-­‐
duction	   and	   continued	   transmission	   of	   traditional	   medical	   knowledge	   given	  market	   failures,	   as	  
compared	  to	  biomedical	  knowledge.	  The	  challenge,	   then,	   is	   to	  design	  and	  sustain	   institutions	   to	  
support	   traditional	  medical	   knowledge	  with	   clearly	   defined	   policy	   objectives	   and	   understanding	  
that	  these	  will	  impact	  the	  outcomes	  differently	  depending	  on	  the	  setting.	  	  	  
For	  the	  most	  part,	  the	  institutions	  advanced	  to	  support	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  are	  an	  ex-­‐
tension	   of	   those	   of	   biomedicine,	   as	   promoted	   in	   the	  WHO	   Traditional	  Medicine	   Strategy	   2014-­‐
2023	  (World	  Health	  Organization	  2013).	  These	  include,	  in	  addition	  to	  uniform	  regulations	  for	  pro-­‐
ducts	   and	   practices,	   bodies	   for	   the	   accreditation/registration	   of	   existing	   practitioners	   (associa-­‐
tions),	  institutions	  for	  the	  uniform	  education/training	  of	  practitioners	  (training	  institutes,	  universi-­‐
ties),	  direct	  financing	  of	  knowledge	  production,	  application	  of	  science-­‐based	  tools	  such	  as	  qualita-­‐
tive	  research	  methods	  and	  data	  gathering	  and	  analysis	  and	  intellectual	  property	  rights.	  However,	  
not	  all	  institutions	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  can	  be	  readily	  extended	  to	  traditional	  medicine	  systems.	  
Some	  of	   the	   institutions	  developed	   to	  promote	   the	  production	  and	  diffusion	  of	   scientific	   know-­‐
ledge	  can	  be	  adapted	  and	  others	  may	  not	  be	  suitable.	  	  
Table	  8	  describes	  how	   institutions	  such	  as	   intellectual	  property	   (IP)	   laws	  and	  access	  and	  benefit	  
sharing	  (ABS)	  laws	  have	  different	  outcomes	  among	  various	  medical	  knowledge	  systems.	  In	  Section	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4.8 Intellectual	  property	  rights	  and	  access	  and	  benefit	  sharing	  
	  
IP	   law	   is	  a	  well-­‐established	   institution	  within	  science-­‐based	  knowledge	  systems.	   In	  contrast,	   it	   is	  
largely	  absent	   in	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  systems.	  The	  State-­‐grant	  of	   intellectual	  property	  
rights	  (IPRs)	  as	  legal	  rights	  to	  exclude	  others	  from	  use	  of	  knowledge	  goods	  is	  a	  policy	  tool	  that	  is	  
usually	  used	  in	  the	  context	  of	  promoting	  knowledge	  production.	  Patents,	  Trademarks,	  copyrights,	  
geographical	  indications	  and	  plant	  variety	  protection	  are	  some	  of	  the	  various	  forms	  of	  IPRs.	  They	  
are	  widely	  used	  by	   firms	  and	   individuals	   to	   appropriate	   returns	   from	   their	   innovations	  or	  other	  
creations	  and	  to	  deter	  imitation.	  Incentive	  mechanisms	  are	  also	  needed	  for	  the	  continued	  produc-­‐
tion	  and	  dissemination	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  relevant	  to	  examine	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  IPRs	  are	  a	  relevant	  institution.	  	  
The	  grant	  of	   IPRs	   involves	  an	   important	  knowledge	  trade-­‐off.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   the	  free	  sharing	  
and	  rapid	  dissemination	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  is	  socially	  beneficial	  to	  access	  the	  knowledge	  and	  
expand	  its	  use	  in	  the	  health	  system	  and	  towards	  the	  aim	  of	  universal	  health	  care.	  The	  ability	  of	  IPR	  
holders	   to	   legally	  exclude	  others	   from	  the	  use	  of	  protected	  products	  can	  be	  detrimental	   for	   the	  
dissemination	  and	  access	   to	   traditional	  medical	   knowledge	  and	  products	  by	  people	  who	  cannot	  
afford	  to	  pay	  high	  prices.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  private	  firms	  involved	  in	  producing	  traditional	  medi-­‐
cine	  products	  will	  seek	  mechanisms	  for	  the	  private	  capture	  of	  the	  benefits	  from	  the	  economic	  use	  
of	   the	   knowledge,	   given	   that	   spillovers	   can	   deter	   private	   investment.	   Hence,	   in	   managing	   the	  
knowledge	  trade-­‐off	  between	  access	  and	  incentives,	  a	  central	  policy	  question	  is	  how	  to	  ensure	  the	  
preservation	  of	   traditional	  medical	   knowledge	  and	  encourage	  production	  of	  new	  useful	  medical	  
products	  and	  practices	  based	  on	  such	  knowledge.	  The	  policy	  approach	  may	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  
defined	  priorities.	  As	  part	  of	  health	  care	  in	  poorer	  countries,	  ensuring	  access	  to	  treatments	  is	  a	  key	  
criterion.	  In	  this	  case,	  alternative	  incentive	  mechanisms	  may	  need	  to	  be	  crafted,	  such	  as	  increased	  
government	  financing	  to	  research	  and	  knowledge	  transfer	  institutions	  that	  incorporate	  traditional	  
practitioners,	  support	  for	  associations,	  and	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  and	  other	  mechanisms	  that	  
de-­‐link	  medical	   innovations	  from	  high	  prices,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2.	   	  Conversely,	   if	  priority	   is	  
given	  to	  the	  economic	  exploitation	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  and	  response	  to	  the	  growing	  
global	  demand	  for	  T&CM	  products	  and	  practices	   in	  profitable	  markets,	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  IPRs	  
to	  allow	  private	  capture	  of	  benefits	  from	  exploitation	  of	  knowledge	  may	  be	  relevant.	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A	  controversial	  aspect	  of	  IP	  law	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  allows	  for	  the	  privately	  appropriation	  of	  innova-­‐
tions	  that	  are	  based	  on	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge,	  without	  any	  compensation	  or	  benefits	  from	  
the	  innovation	  directly	  accruing	  to	  the	  traditional	  knowledge	  holders	  (such	  as	  a	  community	  of	  tra-­‐
ditional	  practitioners).	  	  
Traditional	  knowledge	  that	   is	  disclosed	   in	  written,	  oral,	  or	  any	  form	  is	  most	  often	  considered	  by	  
the	  IP	  system	  to	  be	  in	  the	  ‘public	  domain’,	  that	  is,	  free	  for	  anyone	  to	  use.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  patents,	  
proper	  examination	  of	  patent	  applications	  should	  reveal	  the	  traditional	  knowledge	  that	  has	  been	  
disclosed	   to	  society	   (in	   the	  public	  domain)	  as	  “prior	  art”	  –	  previously	  existing	  public	  knowledge,	  
and	  on	  this	  basis	  the	  patent	  should	  be	  rejected.	  When	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  and	  a	  patent	  is	  granted,	  
it	  may	  be	  very	  costly	  and	  difficult	  for	  traditional	  knowledge	  holders	  to	  challenge	  a	  granted	  patent.	  
For	  example,	  a	  large	  number	  of	  patents	  granted	  over	  plant	  biological	  resources	  for	  uses	  that	  have	  
long	  been	  known	  and	  practised	   in	  traditional	  medical	  systems,	   for	   instance	  Ayahuasca,	  Turmeric	  
and	   Neem.	   This	   is	   a	   situation	   often	   described	   as	   ‘biopiracy’	   or	   misappropriation	   of	   traditional	  
knowledge	  by	  the	  patent	  system.	  	  
Efforts	   to	   improve	  prior	   art	   searches	   for	   traditional	   knowledge	   in	   the	  public	   domain	   include	   in-­‐
creased	  codification	  of	  existing	  medical	  knowledge	  and	  making	  it	  more	  readily	  available	  to	  patent	  
offices	  in	  multiple	  languages	  to	  assist	  in	  their	  examination	  of	  patent	  applications.	  An	  example	  of	  a	  
database	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  is	  the	  Indian	  TK	  Digital	  Library.	  	  
Traditional	  knowledge	  that	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  disclosed	  (i.e.	  secret	  or	  held	  only	  by	  a	  practitioner	  
or	  community)	  can	  also	  in	  most	  situations	  be	  legally	   incorporated	  in	  an	  innovation	  for	  which	  IPR	  
protection	   is	   claimed,	  without	   consent	  or	   compensation	  of	   the	  original	  holder	  of	   the	   traditional	  
knowledge.	   In	   both	   instances,	   patents	   are	   granted	   in	   relation	   to	   disclosed	   or	   undisclosed	   tradi-­‐
tional	  knowledge	  create	  situations	  whereby	  the	  patented	  product	  or	  process	  may	  not	  be	  used	  and	  
exploited	  by	  others,	  including	  by	  the	  original	  traditional	  knowledge	  holders.	  	  
A	   second	   type	  of	   situations	   that	   raise	   concerns	   over	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   IP	   system	  on	   traditional	  
medical	   knowledge	   relates	   to	   the	   application	   of	   rules	   on	   access	   and	   benefit	   sharing	   (ABS)	  with	  
respect	  to	  traditional	  knowledge	  associated	  to	  plant	  and	  animal	  biological	  resources.58	  	  The	  condi-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Countries	  that	  are	  party	  to	  the	  Convention	  of	  Biological	  Diversity	  (CBD)	  and	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  are	  legally	  bound	  
to	  the	  defined	  rules	  on	  access	  and	  benefit	  sharing,	  whether	  they	  are	  users	  or	  providers	  of	  biological	  resources	  and/or	  
associated	   traditional	   knowledge,	   or	   both.	  Nonetheless,	   there	   is	   a	   high	  degree	  of	   variability	   among	   countries	   as	   to	  
whether	   and	   how	   they	   regulate	   access	   and	   use	   of	   biological	   resources	   and	   associated	   traditional	   knowledge.	   See	  
http://www.cbd.int/abs/default.shtml.	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tions	  for	  the	  grant	  of	  IPRs	  are	  normally	  determined	  solely	  by	  the	  IP	  laws.	  However,	  it	  may	  be	  the	  
case	   that	   countries	  which	   have	   adopted	   national	   ABS	   laws	   establish	   requirements	   for	   the	   legal	  
access	  and	  use	  of	  biological	  resources	  and	  associated	  traditional	  knowledge,	  such	  as	  requiring	  the	  
prior	   informed	  consent	   (PIC)	  of	   the	   traditional	  knowledge	  holder	   (i.e.	   traditional	  practitioner)	  or	  
designated	  government	  authority	  and/or	  the	  sharing	  of	  benefits	  (economic	  or	  some	  other	  form	  of	  
agreed	   compensation)	   from	   the	   innovations	   that	  may	  be	  derived	   from	   the	  use	  of	   the	  biological	  
product	   and	  associated	   traditional	   knowledge.	  National	  ABS	   laws	  may	  also	   require	   that	  prior	   to	  
the	  grant	  of	  an	  IPR	  the	  applicant	  shows	  compliance	  with	  the	  PIC	  and	  ABS	  requirements.	  
An	  additional	  source	  of	  tension	  in	  the	  application	  of	  IP	  laws	  over	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  is	  
the	   fact	   that	   in	   certain	   settings	   customary	   laws	   and	   practices	  may	   regulate	   traditional	  medical	  
knowledge	  production	  and	  use,	  yet	  the	  rights	  provided	  for	  under	  customary	   laws	  are	  not	  recog-­‐
nized	  in	  national	  legal	  systems	  (for	  example	  rules	  on	  practice	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  by	  only	  se-­‐
lect	  members	  of	  the	  community).	  Moreover,	  IP	  laws	  generally	  exclude	  traditional	  knowledge	  as	  a	  
potential	  subject	  matter	  of	  protection.	  	  
Significant	  policy	  debate	  and	  academic	  attention	  has	  been	  given	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  
use	  of	   IP	   tools	   should	  be	  promoted	   to	  protect	   innovations	  and	   creations	   that	   stem	   from	  within	  
traditional	   knowledge.	   In	   principle,	   traditional	   knowledge	   is	   a	   creation	  of	   the	  human	  mind,	   and	  
therefore	  can	  be	  protected	  by	  IPRs.	  However,	  it	  does	  not	  fit	  easily	  within	  the	  IP	  system.	  This	  is	  be-­‐
cause	  of	  the	  specific	  characteristics	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  (i.e.	  collectively	  held	  makes	  it	  difficult	  
to	  identify	  who	  the	  IPR	  can	  be	  attributed	  to,	  it	  is	  passed	  on	  from	  generation	  to	  generation	  rather	  
than	  novel).	  Moreover,	  prescriptions	  and	  concepts	  of	  the	  IP	  system	  can	  alien	  to	  traditional	  know-­‐
ledge	  systems	  and	  hence	  may	  be	  inappropriate	  or	  incompatible	  with	  their	  beliefs	  and	  practices.	  	  
Existing	  IP	  tools	  to	  some	  extent	  can	  be	  useful	  and	  are	  being	  used	  in	  practice	  to	  provide	  protection	  
to	  traditional	  knowledge	  and	  promote	  traditional	  knowledge-­‐based	  innovations.	  For	  example,	  pa-­‐
tents	  can	  be	  granted	  to	  traditional	  knowledge	  based	  innovations	  provided	  they	  meet	  the	  patent-­‐
ability	   requirements	  of	  novelty,	   inventiveness	  and	   industrial	   applicability.	   	   Trademarks,	   certifica-­‐
tion,	  and	  collective	  marks,	  and	  geographical	  indications	  can	  be	  used	  to	  market	  products	  issued	  out	  
of	  traditional	  knowledge	  based	  innovations	  and	  to	  protect	  the	  reputation	  and	  goodwill	  associated	  
with	  the	  traditional	  knowledge.	  	  The	  law	  of	  unfair	  competition,	  including	  passing	  off,	  can	  be	  used	  
to	  prevent	  various	  forms	  of	  misrepresentation	  as	  well	  as	  false	  endorsement	  claims.	  Finally,	  trade	  
secrets	  law	  can	  protect	  undisclosed	  information.	  In	  some	  instances,	  conventional	  IP	  laws	  have	  also	  
been	  adapted	  to	  provide	  some	  form	  of	  protection	  to	  traditional	  knowledge.	  However,	  it	  is	  difficult	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for	  traditional	  knowledge	  holders	  to	  use	  the	  IP	  system.	  Some	  of	  the	  difficulties	  they	  face	  in	  prac-­‐
tice	  include	  meeting	  the	  criteria	  for	  IP	  protection	  and	  costs	  of	  access	  to	  the	  system	  (fees,	  transac-­‐
tion	  costs).	  Moreover,	   in	  cases	  where	  IP	  protection	  is	  gained,	  traditional	  knowledge	  holders	  may	  
still	  face	  enormous	  difficulties	  in	  the	  commercialization	  of	  their	  innovations	  and	  their	  enforcement	  
against	   third	   parties.	   The	   shortcomings	   in	   existing	   and	   adapted	   IP	   laws	   have	   prompted	   some	  
countries	  and	  regions	  to	  set	  up	  sui	  generis	  systems	  (a	  system	  of	   its	  own)	  to	  cater	   to	  the	  unique	  
character	  of	   traditional	   knowledge.	  At	   the	   international	   level,	   negotiations	  are	  underway	  within	  
the	  World	  Intellectual	  Property	  Organization	  (WIPO).59	  
	  4.9 Conclusions	  
	  
Traditional	   medical	   knowledge	   is	   a	   form	   of	   experiential	   knowledge	   that	   is	   of	   value	   to	   address	  
health	  needs.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  traditional	  institutions	  that	  served	  to	  support	  traditional	  medical	  
knowledge	  reproduction	  and	  transmission,	  such	  knowledge	  becomes	  fragile	  and	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  
suffer	  from	  deterioration	  or	  even	  disappearance,	  as	  compared	  to	  scientific	  knowledge.	  The	  loss	  of	  
traditional	  medical	  knowledge	   leads	   to	  reduced	  capacity	   for	  effective	  action	   in	  certain	  socioeco-­‐
nomic	  contexts	  and	  circumstances	  in	  which	  such	  knowledge	  was	  previously	  useful.	  	  
	  
We	  discussed	  various	  types	  of	  externalities	  that	  cause	  market	  failure	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  produc-­‐
tion	  and	  management	  of	  knowledge.	  We	  find	  that	  these	  externalities	  are	  not	  well	  corrected	  for	  in	  
the	  specific	  case	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge,	  in	  contexts	  where	  the	  exchange	  of	  traditional	  
medicine	  products	  and	  services	  are	  organized	  through	  markets,	  as	  is	  increasingly	  the	  case,	  and	  on	  
a	  global	  scale	  to	  meet	  health	  needs	  beyond	  the	  local	  context	  and	  exploit	  for-­‐profit	  opportunities.	  	  
	  
In	   contrast,	  market	   failures	   do	   not	   arise	   in	   the	   local	   community	   context,	   when	   knowledge	   and	  
natural	  resources	  are	  effectively	  managed	  by	  the	  community	  and	  supported	  by	  traditional	  institu-­‐
tions.	  When	  the	  community	  system	  is	  in	  strain,	  there	  is	  increased	  risk	  of	  deterioration	  and	  loss	  of	  
traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  be	  put	  to	  use	  to	  meet	  local	  health	  needs.	  Thus,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Sui	  generis	  frameworks	  may	  be	  inspired	  in	  IP	  concepts	  that	  are	  extended	  to	  the	  particularities	  of	  TK	  innovations	  or	  
aim	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  holistic	  approach	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  TK,	  for	  example	  building	  upon	  customary	  law.	  Other	  ap-­‐
proaches	  have	  also	  been	  advanced,	  for	  example,	  to	  develop	  a	  compensatory	  liability	  regime	  that	  would	  give	  TK	  inno-­‐
vators	  compensation	  for	  a	  limited	  time	  period	  rather	  than	  exclusive	  rights	  as	  in	  the	  IP	  approach.	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preservation	  of	  local	  community	  contexts	  and	  traditional	  institutions	  should	  be	  supported	  by	  gov-­‐
ernment	  policy	  to	  the	  extent	  possible.	  	  	  
	  
Where	  this	  is	  no	  longer	  achievable,	  attention	  should	  be	  given	  to	  new	  institutional	  design	  and	  inte-­‐
gration	   with	   science-­‐based	   institutions	   that	   work	   effectively	   to	   support	   biomedical	   knowledge.	  
Science-­‐based	  medicine	  has	  developed	  institutions	  and	  incentive	  mechanisms	  to	  support	  the	  crea-­‐
tion,	   codification	  and	   circulation	  of	   scientific	   know-­‐how.	  These	  are	   largely	   absent	   for	   traditional	  
medical	  knowledge.	  However,	   institutions	  of	  biomedical	  knowledge	  cannot	  be	  readily	  copied	  for	  
traditional	  medicine	  and	  hybrid	  systems.	  
	  
Greater	  government	  support	  is	  needed	  towards	  institution	  building	  to	  preserve	  and	  promote	  tra-­‐
ditional	  medical	   knowledge.	  The	  challenge	   is	   to	  design	  and	   sustain	   institutions	   to	   support	   tradi-­‐
tional	  medical	  knowledge	  with	  clearly	  defined	  policy	  objectives	  and	  understanding	  that	  these	  will	  
impact	  the	  outcomes	  differently	  depending	  on	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  setting.	  	  
	  
Strengthening	  and	  building	  institutions	  to	  support	  the	  production	  and	  transmission	  of	  traditional	  
medical	  knowledge	  needs	  to	  increase	  attention	  to	  the	  local	  context	  linkage,	  as	  opposed	  to	  seeking	  
universal	   solutions.	   Moreover,	   institutions	   need	   to	   stimulate	   collaborative	   relationships	   among	  
traditional	  practitioners	  and	  health	  authorities	  and	  biomedical	  researchers,	  particularly	  in	  settings	  
where	  traditional	  medicine	  is	  already	  practiced	  widely	  and	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  further	  its	   integration	  in	  
the	  national	  health	  systems.	  The	  lack	  of	  proper	  incorporation	  of	  traditional	  practitioners	  into	  new	  
hybrid	  institutions	  increases	  the	  risk	  of	  deterioration	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  as	  well	  as	  of	  
misdiagnosis	  and	  improper	  medical	  treatment	  by	  any	  type	  of	  practitioner.	  	  
	  
It	   is	  also	  critical	   to	  build	  appropriate	   institutions	   to	  promote	  knowledge	  production	  and	  address	  
the	   problem	   of	   externalities,	   while	  managing	   the	   often	   complex	   interactions	   among	   traditional	  
medical	   knowledge	   holders	   and	   the	   diversity	   of	   users	   of	   traditional	  medical	   knowledge	   (i.e.	   re-­‐
searchers,	   firms)	   so	   as	   to	   reduce	   the	   uncertainties	   that	   surround	   knowledge	   sharing.	   There	   are	  
important	  tensions	  in	  the	  interaction	  of	  science-­‐based	  biomedical	  systems	  and	  traditional	  medical	  
knowledge	  systems	  that	  inhibit	  useful	  knowledge	  transfers	  from	  taking	  place	  in	  a	  manner	  consid-­‐
ered	   legitimate,	   as	   described	   in	   the	   relationship	   of	   IP	   laws	   and	  ABS	   laws.	  Governments	   are	   the	  
responsible	  agents	  for	  introducing	  institutions	  that	  can	  effectively	  manage	  these	  tensions.	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Conclusion	  
This	  study	  explored	  three	   interrelated	  themes	   from	  the	  perspective	  of	  economics	  of	   innovation.	  
The	  first	  is	  the	  phenomenom	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  form	  of	  institution	  –	  PDP	  –	  that	  aims	  to	  
facilitate	  and	  drive	  R&D	  and	   innovation	   in	   the	  area	  of	  neglected	  diseases.	   These	   self-­‐governing,	  
private	  non-­‐profit	  organizations	  are	  a	  very	  interesting	  example	  of	  institutional	  experimentation	  to	  
provide	  effective	  solutions	  to	  a	  challenging	  innovation	  problem.	  PDPs	  are	  undoubtedly	  contribut-­‐
ing	  to	  reducing	  the	  dearth	  of	  R&D	  and	  innovation	  in	  relation	  to	  neglected	  diseases	  by	  providing	  an	  
alternative	  mean	  to	  undertake	  medical	  product	  development.	   It	   is	  distinct	   from	  the	  classical	  ap-­‐
proach	  where	  private	  for-­‐profit	  firms	  are	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  R&D	  activities	  and	  in	  bringing	  about	  in-­‐
novations	  to	  market,	  supported	  by	  public	   incentive	  structures	   including	  public	   financing	  for	  R&D	  
and	  strong	  IPRs.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  neglected	  diseases,	  traditional	  incentive	  mechanisms	  do	  not	  work	  
well	  to	  drive	  private	  for-­‐profit	  investment.	  PDPs	  are	  helping	  to	  fill	  this	  gap,	  addressing	  some	  of	  the	  
major	  causes	  of	  market	  failure	  for	  R&D	  and	  innovation	  in	  neglected	  diseases.	  They	  mobilize	  public	  
and	   philanthropic	   financing,	   thereby	   allowing	   costs	   of	   R&D	   to	   be	   de-­‐linked	   from	   the	   prices	   of	  
medical	  products,	  and	  act	  as	  “system	  integrators”	  that	  leverage	  the	  resources	  and	  capabilities	  of	  a	  
diverse	  network	  of	  public,	  philanthropic	  and	  private	  sector	  partnerships.	  There	  is	  also	  evidence	  of	  
success	  of	  PDPs	  in	  bringing	  about	  new	  medical	  products,	  although	  the	  majority	  are	  improvements	  
or	  new	  uses	  for	  existing	  medical	  products.	  	  
The	  PDP	   institution	  however,	  also	  presents	   several	  drawbacks	   that	  would	  be	  worth	  exploring	   in	  
further	  detail	   in	  future	  research.	  	  In	  particular,	   it	  will	  be	  useful	  to	  observe	  how	  PDPs	  evolve	  with	  
respect	   to	   the	   limitations	   identified	   in	   this	   research	   given	   that	   the	   future	  of	   the	  PDP	   landscape	  
remains	  uncertain.	  Some	  of	  the	  limitations	  identified	  in	  this	  study	  that	  merit	  further	  analysis	  are	  
the	   challenges	   of	   ensuring	   sustainable	   long-­‐term	   financing	   due	   to	   reliance	   on	   donor	   and	   public	  
sector	  moneys,	  their	  policies	  on	  critical	  issues	  such	  as	  access	  and	  IPRs,	  coordination	  problems	  and	  
potential	  duplicative	  efforts	  and	  competition	  among	  PDPs	  due	  to	  limited	  sources	  of	  financing,	  as	  
well	  as	  insufficient	  transparency	  in	  PDP	  operations	  particularly	  in	  contractual	  terms	  with	  partners.	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Another	  aspect	   is	   to	   further	  explore	   the	  spillover	  effects	   that	  PDP	  activities	  appear	   to	  have	  cre-­‐
ated,	   such	   as	   fostering	   greater	   interest	   and	   openness	   in	   collaboration	   and	   information	   sharing	  
among	  various	  actors	  to	  advance	  R&D	  and	  innovation,	  particularly	  in	  the	  pre-­‐competitive	  stage	  of	  
discovery	  for	  new	  medicines.	  While	  in	  the	  area	  of	  neglected	  diseases	  this	  collaboration	  is	   largely	  
devoid	  of	  competitive	  market	  pressures,	  there	  are	  indications	  that	  there	  is	  interest	  to	  further	  such	  
collaborations	  in	  other	  more	  “lucrative”	  areas,	  such	  as	  for	  addressing	  market	  failures	  in	  the	  area	  of	  
anti-­‐microbial	   resistance.	   	  Finally,	   it	  would	  be	  useful	   to	  explore	   in	  more	  detail	  other	   institutional	  
experiments,	  in	  addition	  to	  PDPs,	  to	  develop	  medical	  products	  as	  public	  goods	  to	  ensure	  dissemi-­‐
nation	  and	  access	  to	  all	  populations	  models	  of	  innovation,	  that	  de-­‐link	  the	  costs	  of	  R&D	  and	  inno-­‐
vation	  from	  the	  prices	  of	  medical	  products	  in	  the	  area	  of	  neglected	  diseases	  and	  beyond,	  such	  as	  
the	  discussion	  in	  the	  WHO	  for	  an	  inter-­‐governmental	  or	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  agreement	  establishing	  
mechanisms	  to	  increase	  global	  coordination	  of	  priority-­‐setting	  for	  R&D	  and	  resource	  allocation	  for	  
innovation	  based	  on	  global	  public	  health	  needs.	  
A	   second	   interrelated	   theme	  explored	   in	   this	   study	  was	  how	  PDPs,	  as	  private	  non-­‐profit	   institu-­‐
tions,	  relate	  to	  the	  incentive	  mechanism	  of	  IPRs	  that	  firms	  in	  medical	  product	  development	  make	  
significant	  use	  of	  and	  consider	  highly	  valuable	  to	  their	  for-­‐profit	  objectives.	  This	  study	  contributed	  
to	  a	  broader	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  IPRs	  in	  non-­‐profit	  innovation,	  that	  is	  a	  subject	  that	  has	  
received	  very	  little	  attention	  in	  the	  field	  of	  economics	  more	  broadly	  and	  in	  particular	  in	  economics	  
of	  innovation.	  	  	  
The	  study	  finds	  that	   IPRs	  generally	  do	  not	  act	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  R&D	  and	  innovation	  in	  private,	  
non-­‐profit	  institutions,	  taking	  the	  example	  of	  PDPs,	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  as	  IPRs	  are	  expected	  to	  do	  
so	  for	  private,	  profit-­‐maximizing	  firms.	  This	  is	  because	  PDPs	  do	  not	  seek	  to	  re-­‐coup	  investments	  in	  
R&D	  and	  innovation	  from	  profit	  margins	  on	  sales	  of	  medical	  products.	  However,	  the	  management	  
of	   IPR	  more	  broadly	   is	   an	  activity	  of	   relative	   importance	   for	  PDPs,	   as	  potential	   “users”	  of	  back-­‐
ground	  IPRs	  held	  by	  third	  parties	  over	  technology,	  data	  or	  know-­‐how	  that	  the	  PDP	  seeks	  to	  access.	  	  
Contrary	  to	  the	  expected	  results,	  PDPs	  are	  also	  “producers”	  of	  IPRs,	  seeking	  to	  protect	  innovations	  
from	  unauthorized	  use	  by	  third	  parties.	  However,	  contrary	  to	  for-­‐profit	  firms,	  PDPs	  do	  so	  in	  order	  
to	  advance	  their	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  and	  access	  mandate,	  in	  particular	  in	  managing	  the	  number	  of	  col-­‐
laborations	  they	  undertake	  with	  partners	  in	  R&D	  projects.	  However,	  this	  study	  finds	  that	  there	  is	  
insufficient	  transparency	  of	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  agreements	  of	  PDPs	  with	  partners	  concerning	  the	  use	  
of	   IPRs.	  This	   limitation	   inhibits	  proper	  assessment	  of	   the	   IPR	  management	  strategies	  of	  PDPs,	   in	  
accordance	  to	  their	  non-­‐profit	  and	  access	  mandates.	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An	  important	  conclusion	  from	  this	  study	  is	  the	  need	  for	  a	  change	  in	  approach	  in	  the	  research	  on	  
the	   effects	   of	   IPRs	   in	   the	   field	   of	   economics.	   The	   economic	   analysis	   of	   IPRs	   tends	   to	   study	   the	  
social	  and	  economic	  effects	  of	  IPRs	  disconnected	  from	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  institution	  that	  produces	  
and	  manages	   them.	  However,	  as	  demonstrated	   in	   this	   study,	   the	  effect	  of	   IPRs	   is	  not	  static.	  Ra-­‐
ther,	   the	   impact	   of	   IPRs	   and	   their	   function	   can	   vary	   significantly	   depending	   on	   the	   institutional	  
context	  in	  which	  it	  is	  used	  and	  for	  what	  purpose.	  The	  effects	  of	  IPRs	  need	  to	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  an-­‐
alysis	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  institution	  managing	  them.	  	  
The	  third	  and	  final	  theme	  explored	  in	  this	  study	  was	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge,	  as	  a	  form	  of	  
experiential	  knowledge	  that	  is	  of	  value	  to	  address	  health	  needs.	  The	  study	  finds	  that	  as	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  other	  forms	  of	  knowledge,	  particularly	  scientific	  knowledge,	   institutions	  are	  necessary	  to	  sup-­‐
port	  the	  reproduction	  and	  transmission	  of	  knowledge.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  traditional	  institutions	  that	  served	  to	  support	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  re-­‐
production	   and	   transmission,	   such	   knowledge	  becomes	   fragile	   and	   is	  more	   likely	   to	   suffer	   from	  
deterioration	  or	  even	  disappearance,	  as	  compared	  to	  scientific	  knowledge.	  The	  loss	  of	  traditional	  
medical	   knowledge	   leads	   to	   reduced	   capacity	   for	   effective	   action	   in	   certain	   socioeconomic	   con-­‐
texts	  and	  circumstances	  in	  which	  such	  knowledge	  was	  previously	  useful.	  	  
	  
Various	  types	  of	  externalities	  cause	  market	  failure	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  production	  and	  manage-­‐
ment	   of	   any	   form	   of	   knowledge.	   The	   study	   identifies	   that	   with	   regards	   to	   traditional	   medical	  
knowledge,	  market	   failures	   do	   not	   arise	   in	   the	   local	   community	   context,	   when	   knowledge	   and	  
natural	  resources	  are	  effectively	  managed	  by	  the	  community	  and	  supported	  by	  traditional	  institu-­‐
tions.	  However,	  in	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge,	  when	  the	  community	  system	  
is	  in	  strain,	  the	  traditional	  institutions	  stop	  operating	  well	  enough	  to	  support	  continous	  knowledge	  
production	  and	  dissemination	  and	   to	  correct	  market	   failures.	   In	   this	  context,	   traditional	  medical	  
knowledge	  suffers	  deterioration	  and	  may	   lose	   its	   relevance	  towards	  meeting	   local	  health	  needs.	  
Thus,	  the	  study	  finds	  that	  an	  important	  mean	  to	  support	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  is	  through	  
the	  preservation	  of	  local	  community	  contexts	  and	  traditional	  institutions.	  	  	  
	  
When	  this	  is	  no	  longer	  achievable,	  attention	  should	  be	  given	  to	  new	  institutional	  design	  and	  inte-­‐
gration	   with	   science-­‐based	   institutions	   that	   work	   effectively	   to	   support	   biomedical	   knowledge.	  
These	   institutions	  are	   largely	  absent	   for	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge.	  However,	   the	  study	  cau-­‐
tions	  that	  institutions	  of	  biomedical	  knowledge	  cannot	  be	  readily	  copied	  for	  traditional	  medicine	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and	  hybrid	  systems.	  There	  are	   important	  tensions	   in	  the	  interaction	  of	  science-­‐based	  biomedical	  
systems	  and	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  systems	  that	   inhibit	  useful	  knowledge	  transfers	  from	  
taking	  place	  in	  a	  manner	  considered	  legitimate,	  as	  described	  in	  the	  relationship	  of	  IP	  laws	  and	  ABS	  
laws.	  Governments	  should	  work	  in	  close	  collaboration	  with	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge	  holders	  
to	  design	  institutions	  that	  can	  effectively	  manage	  these	  tensions	  in	  accordance	  to	  the	  local	  social	  
and	  economic	  context.	  Further	  research	  should	  be	  geared	  towards	   improving	  the	  understanding	  
of	  the	  potential	   for	   integrating	  scientific	  knowledge	  with	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  
extent	   to	  which	   institutions	   associated	   to	   scientific	   knowledge	   can	   be	   adapted	   or	   improved	   to-­‐
wards	  supporting	  traditional	  medical	  knowledge.	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Appendix	  	  
Chapter	  2	  	  











NECT	   	   -­‐	   Nifurtimox-­‐Eflornithine	   co-­‐
administration	  
	  
Reduces	  the	  number	  of	  eflornithine	  infusions	  
needed,	  has	   a	  higher	   cure	   rate	   than	  eflorni-­‐
thine	  alone	  and	  fewer	  severe	  adverse	  events.	  
Cost	  of	  treatment	  is	  lower,	  simpler	  to	  admin-­‐
ister	   and	   more	   adapted	   to	   field	   conditions	  
where	  it	  is	  used.	  	  
HAT	   Africa	   2009	   Médecins	  Sans	  Frontières	   (MSF);	   Swiss	  
Tropical	   and	   Public	   Health	   Institute	  
(Swiss	   TPH);	   National	   Trypanosomiasis	  
Control	  Programmes	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  
Congo	  and	   the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  
the	   Congo	   (DRC)	   (WHO),	   with	   drugs	  





SSG&PM	  co-­‐administration	  	  
	  
Combination	  of	  sodium	  stibugluconate	  (SSG)	  
and	   PM.	   As	   efficacious	   as	   single-­‐dose	   SSG,	  
with	   the	  advantage	  of	  being	   shorter	   course,	  
therefore	   lessening	   the	   burden	   on	   health	  
systems,	  and	  more	  cost-­‐effective.	  
VL	   East	  
Africa	  
2010	  	   Kenya	   Medical	   Research	   Institute	  
(KEMRI),	   Kenya;	   Institute	   of	   Endemic	  
Diseases	  (IED),	  University	  of	  Khartoum,	  
Sudan;	   Addis	   Ababa	   University,	   Ethi-­‐
opia;	   University	   of	  Makerere,	   Uganda;	  
Ministries	   of	   Health	   of	   Sudan,	   Kenya,	  
and	  Uganda;	  Médecins	  Sans	  Frontières	  
(MSF);	  i+	  solutions,	  IDA	  Foundation	  The	  
Netherlands;	   GLAND	   Pharma	   and	  
OneWorld	   Health	   (OWH),	   USA;	   LEAP	  
(Leishmaniasis	   East	   Africa	   Platform)	  
The	   London	   School	   of	   Hygiene	   and	  
Tropical	  Medicine	  (LSHTM).	  




New	  VL	  Treatments	  
	  
Single	   dose	   AmBisome®	   10mg/kg	   and	   three	  
drug	   combination	   therapies	  based	  on	  AmBi-­‐




Currently	   effectiveness	   studies	   	   are	   being	  
carried	   out	   in	   South	   Asia	   to	   demonstrate	  
feasibility	   in	   implementing	   the	   new	   treat-­‐
ment	   modalities	   recommended	   by	   WHO	  
(miltefosine-­‐paromomycin,	   AmBisome®-­‐
miltefosine,	   AmBisome®-­‐paromomycin,	  
AmBisome®	   10mg/kg)	   in	   primary	   healthcare	  
settings	   in	   India	   with	   a	   view	   to	   extending	  
their	  use	  in	  the	  region.	  
VL	  	   South	  
Asia	  
2011	   INDIA:	   National	   Vector	   Borne	   Disease	  
Control	   Programme	   (NVBDCP),	   Indian	  
Medical	   Research	   Council	   (ICMR),	  
Delhi;	   Rajendra	   Memorial	   Research	  
Institute	   of	   Medical	   Sciences	  
(RMRIMSI),	   Patna,	   Bihar	   State	   Health	  
Society	   (BSHS);	   Médecins	   Sans	   Fron-­‐
tières	  (MSF),	  Spain.	  
BANGLADESH:	   Ministry	   of	   Health,	  
International	   Centre	   for	   Diarrhoeal	  
Disease	   Research	   (ICDDR,	   B),	   Dhaka;	  
Shaheed	   Suhrawardy	   Medical	   College	  
and	   Hospital	   (ShSMC),	   Dhaka;	   Com-­‐
munity	  Based	  Medical	  College	   (CBMC),	  
Mymensingh.	  	  
USA:	   One	   World	   Health	   (OWH),	   San	  
Francisco.	  	  
University	   of	   Tokyo,	   Japan;	   Institute	  
Tropical	   Medicine-­‐Antwerp,	   Belgium;	  
LSHTM,	   UK;	   WHO	   Special	   Programme	  




Paediatric	  dosage	  form	  of	  Benznidazole	  
	  
New	   paediatric	   dosage	   formulation	   and	  





2011	   Laboratório	  Farmacêutico	  do	  Estado	  de	  
Pernambuco	   (LAFEPE),	   Brazil;	   Hospital	  
de	  Niños	  Ricardo	  Gutierrez,	  Argentina;	  
Instituto	   Nacional	   de	   Parasitología,	   Dr	  
M	   Fatala	   Chabén,	   Argentina;	   Hospital	  
de	   Niños	   de	   Jujuy,	   Argentina;	  
Ministério	  de	  Salud,	  Província	  de	  Jujuy,	  
Argentina;	   Hospital	   Público	   Materno	  
Infantil	   –	   Salta,	   Argentina;	   Centro	   de	  
Chagas	   y	   Patologia	   Regional,	   Hopital	  
Independencia,	   Santiago	   del	   Estero,	  
Argentina:	   Centro	   de	   Chagas	   y	  
Patologia	   Regional,	   Argentina;	  
CONICET/INGEBI,	   Argentina;	   Centro	  
Nacional	  de	  Diagnóstico	  e	  Investigación	  
de	   Endemo-­‐epidemias	   (CeNDIE),	  
Ministry	   of	   Health,	   Argentina;	  
University	   of	   Liverpool,	   UK;	   NUDFAC,	  
Brazil	  




ASAQ	  –	  Fixed-­‐Dose	  Artesunate/Amodiaquine	  
	  
fixed-­‐dose	   combination	   (FDC)	   of	   artesunate	  
(AS)	  and	  amodiaquine	  (AQ)	  
	  
Easy	  dosaging,	  based	  on	  four,	  optimized	  age-­‐
specific	   regimens.	   Less	   expensive	   than	   all	  
other	   fixed-­‐dose	   combinations	   containing	  








Sanofi,	   France;	   MMV,	   Switzerland;	  
AEDES,	   Belgium;	   Zenufa,	   Tanzania;	  
National	   Centre	   for	   Research	   and	   De-­‐
velopment	   on	   Malaria,	   Burkina	   Faso;	  
Universiti	   Sains	  Malaysia;	  University	  of	  
Oxford,	   UK;	   Institute	   of	   Research	   for	  
Development	  (IRD),	  Senegal;	  Université	  
de	   Bordeaux,	   Faculté	   de	   Pharmacie,	  
France;	  	   Mahidol	   University,	   Thailand;	  
Bertin	   Pharma,	   France;	  Médecins	   Sans	  
Frontières/Doctors	   without	   Borders	  
(MSF);	   Epicentre,	   France;	   WHO-­‐TDR;	  
Kenya	   Medical	   Research	   Institute	  
(KEMRI),	   Kenya	   ;	   Indian	   Council	   of	  
Medical	   Research	   (ICMR),	   India;	  
National	   Malaria	   Control	   Programme,	  
Ministry	  of	  Health,	  Sierra	  Leone;	  Komfo	  





ASMQ	  –	  Fixed-­‐Dose	  Artesunate/Mefloquine	  
	  
Used	   in	  the	  field	  for	  many	  years,	   the	  combi-­‐
nation	   of	   artesunate	   (AS)	   and	   mefloquine	  
(MQ)	   is	   one	   of	   the	   five	   ACTs	   recommended	  
by	  WHO	  for	  the	  treatment	  of	  uncomplicated	  
P.	   falciparum	   malaria,	   preferably	   as	   a	   fixed	  
dose	  combination.	  
Easy-­‐to-­‐use	   treatment	   regimen	   with	   one	  
single	  daily	  dose	  of	  one	  or	  two	  tablets	  to	  be	  
taken	   over	   three	   days.	   3	   presentations	   of	  
ASMQ	  are	   available	   for	   children;	   tablets	   are	  
small	  and	  easily	  crushable.	  








2008	   Industrial	   partners:	   Farmanguinhos,	  
Brazil;	   Cipla,	   India.	   Other	   partners:	  
Shoklo	   Malaria	   Research	   Unit,	   Thai-­‐
land;	  Universiti	  Sains	  Malaysia;	  Univer-­‐
sity	  of	  Oxford,	  UK;	  TDR;	   Indian	  Council	  
of	   Medical	   Research	   (ICMR),	   India;	  
Epicentre,	  France;	  National	   Institute	  of	  
Medical	   Research,	   Tanzania;	   Centre	  
Hospitalier	   Universitaire	   Vaudois	  
(CHUV),	   Switzerland;	   Kenya	   Medical	  
Research	   Institute	   (KEMRI),	   Kenya;	  
Centre	   National	   de	   Recherche	   et	   de	  
Formation	   sur	   le	   Paludisme	   (CNRFP),	  
Burkina	   Faso;	   Medicines	   for	   Malaria	  




Coartem®	   Dispersible	   (artemether-­‐
lumefantrine)	  (Approved	  by	  regulatory	  auth-­‐
ority	  (Swissmedic)	  and	  WHO	  Prequalified)	  
The	   first	   high-­‐quality	   artemisinin	   combina-­‐
tion	   therapy	   (ACT)	   formulated	   especially	   for	  
children.	   Coartem®	   Dispersible	   contains	   a	  
fixed-­‐dose	   combination	   of	   artemether	  
(20mg)	   and	   lumefantrine	   (120mg)	   for	   the	  







2009	   Novartis	  Pharma,	  Switzerland	  





Artesunate	  	  injection	  (WHO	  prequalified)	  
	  
Superiority	   of	   artesunate	   injection	   over	  
quinine	   injection	   as	   first-­‐line	   treatment	   for	  











DHA/PQP)	  (Approved	  by	  regulatory	  authority	  
(EMA))	  
	  
A	  fixed-­‐dose	  combination	  of	  dihydroartemis-­‐
inin-­‐piperaquine	   (DHA/PQP)	   for	   the	   treat-­‐








2011	   Sigma-­‐Tau	   Industrie	   Farmaceutiche	  
Riunite,	  Italy	  





artesunate(Approved	  by	  regulatory	  authority	  
(EMA)	  
	  
A	   fixed-­‐dose	   combination	   of	   pyronaridine	  










2012	   University	  of	  Iowa,	  IA,	  USA;	  Shin	  Poong	  




Sulfadoxine-­‐pyrimethamine	   +	   amodiaquine	  
(SP+AQ)	   (Working	   towards	   WHO	   Prequalifi-­‐
cation)	  
	  
Sulfadoxine-­‐pyrimethamine	   and	  
amodiaquine	   (SP+AQ)	   once	   a	   month	   for	   4	  
months	   for	   children	   during	   the	   malaria	  






2012	   Guilin	  Pharmaceutical	  Co.	  Ltd.,	  China	  
FIND	   Diagnostic	   SD	  BIOLINE	  HAT	  
First	  rapid	  test	  to	  screen	  for	  sleeping	  sickness	  
This	   cheap	   and	   very	   simple-­‐to-­‐use	   test	   can	  
be	   performed	   by	   health	   workers	   with	   mini-­‐
mal	  training,	  using	  fresh	  blood	  from	  a	  finger	  
prick,	  and	  the	  results	  are	  obtained	  after	  only	  
15	  minutes.	  
HAT	   Angola,	  
the	   DRC	  




2012	   FIND	   and	   the	   Institute	   of	   Tropical	  
Medicine	   (Belgium),	   MicroCoat	   Bio-­‐
technologie	   GmbH	   (Germany),	   the	  
International	   Livestock	   Research	   Insti-­‐
tute	   (Kenya),	   the	   Institute	   of	   Tropical	  
Neurology	   (France),	   Médecins	   sans	  
Frontières	   (Spain),	   the	   National	   HAT	  
Control	   Programme	   of	   the	   DRC	  
(PNLTHA,	   Democratic	   Republic	   of	   the	  
Congo),	   the	   Centrafrican	   Institute	   of	  
Agronomical	   Research	   (Central	   African	  
Republic),	   the	  World	   Health	   Organiza-­‐
tion	   and	   Standard	   Diagnostics,	   Inc.	  
(Republic	  of	  Korea).	  
FIND	   Diagnostic	   Liquid	  culture	  and	  drug	  susceptibility	  testing	  	  
Mycobacterium	   Growth	   Indicator	   Tube	  
(MGIT)	  and	  drug	  susceptibility	  testing	  (DST)	  
A	   Mycobacterium	   Growth	   Indicator	   Tube	  
(MGIT)	  and	  drug	  susceptibility	  testing	  (DST).	  	  
TB	   Endemic	  
count-­‐
ries	  
2007	   Becton,	   Dickinson	   and	   Company	   (BD),	  
United	  States	  
FIND	   Diagnostic	   Rapid	  Speciation	  for	  MDR	  /	  TB	  
Capilia	  TB	  test	  
A	   Capilia	   TB	   test.	   Simple,	   fast	   (15	   minute)	  
detection	  of	  TB.	  	  
TB	   Endemic	  
count-­‐
ries	  
2007	   Tauns	  Co.	  Ltd,	  Japan	  
FIND	   Diagnostic	   GenoType	   MTBDRplus®/	   Line	   Probe	   Assay	  
(1st	  line	  drugs)	  
	  
A	   DNA	   strip	   test.	   Allows	   simultaneous	   mo-­‐
lecular	   identification	  of	   tuberculosis	   and	   the	  
most	   common	   genetic	   mutations	   causing	  
resistance	  to	  rifampicin	  and	  isoniazid.	  
TB	   Endemic	  
count-­‐
ries	  
2008	   Hain	  Lifescience,	  Germany	  
FIND	   Diagnostic	   Primo	  Star	  iLED	  
	  
Light-­‐emitting	   diode	   (LED)	   fluorescence	  
microscopy.	   Improved	   TB	   case	   detection,	  
durable,	  affordable,	  energy-­‐efficient.	  
TB	   Endemic	  
count-­‐
ries	  
2009	   Carl	   Zeiss	   MicroImaging	   GmbH,	   Ger-­‐
many	  
FIND	   Diagnostic	   Xpert®	   MTB/RIF/	   Automated	   nucleic	   acid	  
amplification	  test	  (NAAT)	  
	  
Self-­‐contained	   and	   cartridge-­‐based	   techno-­‐
logical	   platform	   that	   integrates	   sputum	  
processing,	   DNA	   extraction	   and	   amplifica-­‐
tion,	  TB	  and	  MDR-­‐TB	  diagnosis.	  
TB	   Endemic	  
count-­‐
ries	  
2010	   Cepheid,	  USA	  
IDRI	   Diagnostic	   KalazarDetect	  
	  
An	   in	   vitro	   diagnostic	   medical	   device	   de-­‐
signed	   for	   the	   qualitative	   detection	   of	   anti-­‐








2009	   InBios,	  International,	  USA	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human	  serum.	  
iOWH	   Ingredient	   Semisynthetic	   Artemisinin	   prequalified	   by	  
the	  World	  Health	  Organization	  (WHO),	  
	  







2012	   Sanofi-­‐Aventis,	  USA	  
University	  of	  California,	  Berkeley	  (UCB),	  
USA	  
Amyris	  Inc.,	  USA	  
iOWH	   Formula-­‐
tion	  
antibiotic	   Paromomycin	   Intramuscular	   Injec-­‐
tion	  (PMIM)	  	  
Alife-­‐saving	   medicine	   for	   the	   treatment	   of	  
visceral	   leishmaniasis.	   OWH	   resurrected	  
PMIM,	  a	  drug	  abandoned	  by	  for-­‐profit	  phar-­‐
maceutical	  companies,	  and	  developed	  it	  into	  
a	   safe,	   effective	   and	   low-­‐cost	   treatment	   for	  
Kala-­‐Azar.	  







2011	   Gland	  Pharma,	  India	  
IVI	   Vaccine	   Killed	  whole-­‐cell	  oral	  cholera	  vaccine	  
mORC-­‐Vax™	  (Vietnam),	  Shanchol™	  (India)	  
	  
Reformulated	   a	   bivalent,	   killed	   whole-­‐cell	  
oral	   cholera	   vaccine,	   by	   replacing	   a	   high	  
toxin-­‐producing	   strain	   with	   a	   low	   toxin-­‐
producing	   strain	   and	   changing	   the	   antigen	  





2011	   Vabiotec,	  Vietnam	  
Shantha	  Biotechnics,	  India	  
Eubiologics,	  Korea	  
MVP	   Vaccine	   MenAfriVac™	  	  
Adapted	   existing	   Meningitis	   vaccines	   to	  







2010	   (PATH	  and	  WHO	  Partnership)	  	  
Syncs	  Bio/Netherlands	  -­‐Serum	  Institute	  
of	  India	  	  
Center	   for	   Biologics	   Evaluation	   and	  
Research	  of	  the	  U.S	  FDA	  	  
Serum	  Institute	  of	  India	  (SILL)	  Ltd,	  	  
Pune,	  India	  	  
UK	   National	   Institute	   for	   Biological	  
Standards	  (NIBSC)	  







Safe,	   comfortable,	   and	  easy	   to	  use,	   expand-­‐
ing	   non-­‐hormonal	   contraceptive	   options	   for	  
women	  
Launched	   in	   6	   European	   countries	   in	   June,	  
2013.	   	  Next	   step	   is	   regulatory	   submission	   to	  
the	  United	  States	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administra-­‐
tion	  for	  market	  approval	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  
PATH	  and	  research	  partners	  in	  Uganda,	  India,	  
and	  South	  Africa	  also	  aim	  to	   introduce	  SILCS	  






Europe	  	   2013	   Collaboration	  between	  PATH,	  a	  Seattle,	  
Washington-­‐based	   global	   health	   non-­‐
profit;	   CONRAD,	   a	   reproductive	   health	  
product	   development	   organization	  
operated	   through	   the	   Eastern	   Virginia	  
Medical	  School	  in	  Norfolk,	  Virginia;	  the	  
United	   States	   Agency	   for	   International	  
Development	   (USAID);	   and	   other	   part-­‐
ners.	   In	  2010,	  PATH	   licensed	   the	  SILCS	  
design	  to	  Kessel	  Marketing	  &	  Vertriebs	  
GmbH	   (Kessel),	   a	   private-­‐sector	   com-­‐
pany	  in	  Frankfurt,	  Germany.	  











Table	  10.	  	  Disease	  Coverage	  by	  PDP	  
	  
	  	  	  




Table	  11.	  Survey	  questionnaire	  
	  
1.	  	  Indicate	  the	  name	  of	  the	  PDP	  
! Text	  Response	  
! Drugs	  for	  Neglected	  Diseases	  Initiative	  (DNDi)	  
! TBVI	  Tuberculosis	  Vaccine	  Initiative	  (TBVI)	  
! Dengue	  Vaccine	  Initiative	  (DVI)	  
! Global	  Alliance	  for	  TB	  Drug	  Development	  (TB	  Alliance)	  
! IVCC	  
! International	  Vaccine	  Institute	  (IVI)	  
! PATH	  Malaria	  Vaccine	  Initiative	  (MVI)	  
! Foundation	  for	  Innovative	  New	  Diagnostics	  (FIND)	  
! Sabin	  Vaccine	  Institute	  PDP	  
! International	  Partnership	  for	  Microbicides	  (IPM)	  
! Medicines	  for	  Malaria	  Venture	  (MMV)	  
! PATH/WHO	  Meningitis	  Vaccine	  Project	  (MVP)	  
! AERAS	  
! CONRAD	  
! European	  Vaccine	  Initiative	  (EVI)	  
! Microbicides	  Development	  Programme	  (MDP)	  
	  
2.	  	  Indicate	  the	  name	  of	  the	  survey	  respondent	  and	  whether	  you	  authorize	  us	  to	  disclose	  the	  name	  in	  our	  research	  report.	  	  	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Name	   	   	  
! 	   ! 15	   ! 94%	  
! 2	  
! I	   authorize	   disclos-­‐
ure	   of	   my	   name	   in	  
any	  EPFL	  research	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 6	   ! 38%	  
! 3	  
! I	   do	   not	   authorize	  
disclosure	   of	   my	  
name	   in	   any	   EPFL	  
research	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 9	   ! 56%	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3.	  	  How	  important	  is	  IP	  management	  for	  the	  PDP?	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! low	   	  	  
! 	   ! 0	   ! 0%	  
! 2	   ! medium	   	   	  
! 	   ! 5	   ! 33%	  
! 3	   ! high	   	   	  
! 	   ! 10	   ! 67%	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 15	   ! 100%	  
	  
4.	  	  Does	  the	  PDP	  have	  a	  defined	  IP	  management	  policy?	  	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! yes	   	   	  
! 	   ! 13	   ! 87%	  
! 2	   ! No	   	   	  
! 	   ! 2	   ! 13%	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 15	   ! 100%	  
	  
5.	  	  Is	  the	  IP	  management	  policy	  publicly	  available	  and/or	  published?	  	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Yes	   	   	  
! 	   ! 5	   ! 38%	  
! 2	   ! No	   	   	  
! 	   ! 8	   ! 62%	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 13	   ! 100%	  
	  
	  
6.	  	  What	  are	  the	  benefits	  of	  having	  a	  defined	  IP	  management	  policy?	  
! Text	  Response	  
! Clear	  guidelines	  internally	  and	  externally.	  Reference	  to	  the	  policy	  during	  negotiations	  
! Clear	  view	  on	  the	  position	  of	  the	  PDP	  
! There	  are	  many	  as	  have	  been	  laid	  out	   in	  the	  IP	  Handbook.	   	   In	  particular,	  DVI	  needs	  to	  assure	   its	  private	  sector	  partners	  
that	  is	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  IP	  situation	  and	  will	  respect	  and	  promote	  IP	  protection	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  companies	  and	  for	  the	  
benefit	  of	  the	  public	  sector.	  
! To	  ensure	  that	  our	  management	  team,	  our	  board,	  donors	  and	  key	  strategic	  partners	  have	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  what	  
our	  IP	  policy	  is.	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! Clarity	  and	  standardisation	  between	  partners	  
! While	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  consider	  each	  case	  on	  its	  own	  merits,	  a	  policy	  establishes	  the	  guidelines	  enabling	  rapid	  and	  consis-­‐
tent	  decision-­‐making.	  By	  the	  way,	  I	  assume	  that	  you	  refer	  to	  patent	  filing	  policy	  when	  you	  talk	  about	  "IP	  management	  pol-­‐
icy".	  
! Sets	  scope	  of	  what	  is	  permitted	  and	  not,	  clear	  to	  partners	  how	  we	  operate	  
! To	  ensure	  we	  can	  advance	  the	  PDP	  Programs	  without	  any	  potential	  or	  perceived	  barriers	  
! MMV	   needs	   to	   address	   IP	  management	   in	   all	   of	   its	   research	   programmes	   as	   all	   programmes	   generate	   Foreground	   IP.	  	  
Decisions	  need	  to	  be	  made	  on	  ownership	  of	  IP,	  protection	  of	  IP,	  rights	  to	  the	  IP,	  etc.	  
! Policy	   is	  available	  upon	  request.	  A	  defined	  policy	  provides	  clarity	   for	  employees	  and	  guides	  our	  negotiations	  with	  other	  
organizations	  with	  whom	  Aeras	  has	  collaborative	  relationships.	  
! clear	  guidelines	  to	  execute	  third	  party	  agreements,	  eg,	  contracts,	  MTAs,	  sublicenses,	  etc.,	  and	  business	  plans	  
! To	  ensure	  that	  products	  will	  be	  made	  available	  to	  the	  target	  populations	  in	  low	  income	  settings	  at	  affordable	  prices	  
! Sets	  out	  the	  agreed	  position	  as	  to	  how	  IP	  generated	  under	  the	  MDP	  programme	  will	  be	  managed.	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 13	  
	  
7.	  	  What	  are	  the	  benefits	  of	  not	  having	  a	  defined	  IP	  management	  policy?	  
! Text	  Response	  
! Flexibility	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 1	  
	  
8.	  	  Do	  any	  of	  the	  following	  characteristics	  of	  the	  PDP	  influence	  the	  PDP	  approach	  to	  IP	  management?	  	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Non-­‐profit	   na-­‐
ture	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 13	   ! 81%	  
! 2	  
! Work	   to	   large	  




	   	  
! 	   ! 12	   ! 75%	  
! 3	   ! R&D	   plus	   access	  
mission	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 14	   ! 88%	  
! 4	   ! Any	  other	   	   	  
! 	   ! 2	   ! 13%	  
	  
! Any	  other	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! Our	  product	  will	  not	  command	  a	  dual	  market	  (at	  least	  not	  to	  a	  significant	  level).	  If	  it	  did,	  we	  would	  probably	  be	  diligent	  in	  
attempting	  to	  establish	  and	  own	  a	  patent	  portfolio	  around	  it	   in	  order	  to	  use	  potential	  royalties	  from	  sales	   industrialized	  
countries	  to	  achieve	  our	  Global	  Access	  objectives.	  
! Advancing	  products	  that	  have	  no	  commercial	  return	  
	  
9.	  	  Is	  there	  any	  staff	  in	  the	  PDP	  explicitly	  dedicated	  to	  IP	  management?	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Yes	   	   	  
! 	   ! 7	   ! 44%	  
! 2	   ! No	   	   	  
! 	   ! 9	   ! 56%	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 16	   ! 100%	  
	  
10.	  	  What	  is	  the	  internal	  governance	  structure	  in	  the	  PDP	  for	  decision-­‐making	  on	  IP	  management?	  	  
! Text	  Response	  
! Responsibility	  of	  the	  Director	  of	  BD	  and	  Legal,	  some	  issues	  brought	  to	  the	  Executive	  committee	  when	  necessary	  
! Legal	  counsel	  
! Any	  IP	  agreement	  has	  to	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  Director	  General.	  There	  are	  no	  other	  committees	  or	  review	  bodies.	  
! We	  have	  established	  an	  IP	  committee	  to	  oversee	  key	  IP	  decisions	  and	  to	  recommend	  any	  changes	  to	  our	  IP	  strategy	  
! Portfolio	  manager	  recommends	  to	  the	  management	  team	  
! We	  use	  a	  Consulting	  firm	  for	  IP.	  The	  Dir	  Portfolio	  Management	  is	  the	  point	  of	  contact.	  Decision	  are	  taken	  by	  Dir	  Portfolio	  
and	  CSO,	  submitted	  to	  Director	  general	  for	  approval.	  
! Any	  decision	  needed	  will	  be	  made	  by	  MVI's	  Portfolio	  Management	  Committee.	  
! Contract	  management	  function,	  clear	  donor	  guidelines	  
! Decisions	  are	  managed	  by	  and	  through	  an	  Executive	  Board	  Committee	  
! 	  
! Executive	  Team	  
! Head	  of	  Legal	  is	  responsible	  for	  IP	  management	  
! When	  an	  invention	  disclosure	  made	  by	  an	  employee	  it	  is	  reviewed	  by	  Head	  of	  R&D	  (including	  other	  relevant	  research	  team	  
members),	  CEO	  and	  General	  Counsel	  and	  a	  decision	  is	  made	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  file	  a	  patent	  
! Initial	  decision	  by	  contracts	  and	  program	  teams.	  Final	  decision	  by	  Executive	  Director	  
! IP	  issues	  are	  regulated	  in	  the	  contracts	  signed	  with	  organisations	  that	  are	  supported	  by	  EVI	  
! Publication/dissemination	  of	  data	  and	  results	  was	  managed	  by	  the	  Programme	  Liaison	  Group	  (specified	  membership,	  set	  
quorum	  &	  set	  majority),	  Responsible	  for	  overall	  management	  of	  MDP	  (including	  monitoring	  achievement	  of	  programme	  
objectives)	  was	  the	  Programme	  Management	  Board	  (all	  partners,	  set	  quorum	  &	  set	  majority)	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
	  	   114	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 15	  
	  
	  
11.	  	  What	  are	  the	  main	  activities	  undertaken	  in	  the	  PDP	  in	  relation	  to	  IP	  management?	  	  
! Text	  Response	  
! Insuring	  access	  provisions	  and	  freedom	  to	  operate	  within	  all	  contracts	  and	  partnerships	  
! In	  principle	  no	  IP	  is	  owned	  by	  the	  PDP	  
! Mainly	  DVI	  monitors	  the	  situation.	  	  All	  the	  developers	  have	  their	  own	  IP	  and	  FTO.	  	  We	  do	  not	  feel	  the	  field	  is	  impeded	  by	  
competing	  or	  overlapping	  IP	  claims.	  
! Filing	  patents,	  protecting	  inventions,	  trade	  secrets	  and	  trademarks	  and	  licensing	  IP	  
! Ensuring	  access	  through	  licensing	  if	  necessary.	  
! Follow	  up	  of	  our	  patents,	  search	  for	  patentability	  by	  consulting	  firm.	  
! Very	  few	  -­‐	  we	  typically	  do	  not	  support	  patent	  filing	  and	  prosecution	  costs	  incurred	  by	  our	  partners.	  
! We	  do	  not	  hold	  any	  IPR,	  its	  covered	  under	  our	  agreements	  with	  our	  partners	  
! Patent	  protection,	  publications	  
! Licensing	  agreements,	  patents	  
! Protection	  of	  IP,	  in	  and	  out-­‐licensing	  of	  IP	  
! Review	  of	  projects,	  manuscripts	  for	  publications	  and	  other	  disclosure	  to	  ensure	  timely	  filing	  of	  patent	  applications.	  
! Establishment	   and	   implementation	  of	   policy	   through	   contracts	   and	   agreements	  with	  partners.	   Protecting	   inventions	  by	  
filing	  patents.	  Licensing	  drugs	  from	  othwer	  organizations.	  
! Ensure	  via	  contractual	  clauses	  that	  products	  will	  be	  made	  available	  at	  affordable	  prices	  
! Granting	  of	  licences/rights	  in	  respect	  of	  IP	  brought	  into/tested	  as	  part	  of	  MDP.	  	  Patentable	  results	  were	  not	  expected	  to	  be	  
generated	  in	  the	  course	  of	  MDP	  activities.	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 15	  
	  
12.	   	   Is	   your	   PDP	   a	   user	   of	   IP	   (has	   gained	   rights	   or	   obtained	   a	   license	   to	   use	   third	   party	   IP-­‐protected	   pro-­‐
ducts/processes/services)?	  	  	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Yes	   	   	  
! 	   ! 12	   ! 75%	  
! 2	   ! No	   	   	  
! 	   ! 4	   ! 25%	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 16	   ! 100%	  
	  
	  




13.	  	  Does	  the	  PDP	  use	  this	  form	  of	  IP?	  	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Patents	   	   	  
! 	   ! 13	   ! 87%	  
! 2	   ! Trademarks	   	   	  
! 	   ! 5	   ! 33%	  
! 3	   ! Copyright	   	   	  
! 	   ! 6	   ! 40%	  
! 4	   ! Trade	  secrets	   	   	  
! 	   ! 6	   ! 40%	  
! 5	   ! Other	   	   	  
! 	   ! 3	   ! 20%	  
	  
! Other	  
! Technology,	  as	  in	  requiring	  agreement	  to	  technology	  transfer	  if	  partner	  is	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  fulfill	  its	  oblgations.	  
! Data	  
! we	  only	  reserve	  IP	  rights	  in	  case	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  contractual	  obligations	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 15	  
	  
14.	  	  What	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  use	  of	  patents?	  	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	  
! To	   obtain	  
access	   to	   a	  
technology	   or	  
knowledge	  
that	   is	   pro-­‐
tected	   by	   a	  
patent	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 7	   ! 54%	  
! 2	  
! To	   ensure	  




tents	   held	   by	  
third	  parties)	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 7	   ! 54%	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! 3	  
! To	   transfer	  
technology	   to	  
third	  parties	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 8	   ! 62%	  
! 4	   ! Any	  other	   	   	  
! 	   ! 3	   ! 23%	  
	  
! Any	  other	  
! all	  of	  the	  above!	  
! All	  of	  the	  above	  
! Comment:	  access	  to	  a	  patent	  never	  ensures	  freedom	  to	  operate.	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 13	  
	  
15.	  	  How	  important	  is	  it	  for	  the	  PDP	  to	  access	  related	  know-­‐how	  or	  capabilities	  of	  the	  patent	  holder,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  right	  of	  
use	  or	  license?	  	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! low	   	  	  
! 	   ! 0	   ! 0%	  
! 2	   ! medium	   	   	  
! 	   ! 3	   ! 20%	  
! 3	   ! high	   	   	  
! 	   ! 12	   ! 80%	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 15	   ! 100%	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 15	  
	  
16.	  	  How	  often	  does	  the	  PDP	  obtain	  a	  patent	  license	  that	  is	  exclusive	  as	  opposed	  to	  non-­‐exclusive?	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Never	   	   	  
! 	   ! 6	   ! 38%	  
! 2	   ! Rarely	   	   	  
! 	   ! 6	   ! 38%	  
! 3	   ! Sometimes	   	   	  
! 	   ! 2	   ! 13%	  
! 4	   ! Often	   	   	  
! 	   ! 2	   ! 13%	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! 5	   ! All	  of	  the	  time	   	  	  
! 	   ! 0	   ! 0%	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 16	   ! 100%	  
	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 16	  
	  
17.	  	  How	  often	  does	  the	  PDP	  obtain	  a	  patent	  license	  that	  is	  royalty-­‐free	  as	  opposed	  to	  royalty-­‐bearing?	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Never	   	   	  
! 	   ! 4	   ! 25%	  
! 2	   ! Rarely	   	   	  
! 	   ! 1	   ! 6%	  
! 3	   ! Sometimes	   	   	  
! 	   ! 3	   ! 19%	  
! 4	   ! Often	   	   	  
! 	   ! 4	   ! 25%	  
! 5	   ! All	  of	  the	  time	   	   	  
! 	   ! 4	   ! 25%	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 16	   ! 100%	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 16	  
	  
18.	  	  Does	  the	  patent	  status	  of	  a	  technology	  influence	  the	  PDP	  selection	  of	  that	  technology	  for	  an	  R&D	  project?	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	  
! Yes,	   if	   there	   is	  
alternative	  
technology	  
available	   the	  
PDP	  will	  choose	  
alternative	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 4	   ! 27%	  
! 2	  
! No,	   if	   good	  
terms	   can	   be	  
reached	   for	   the	  
use	   of	   the	   pat-­‐
ent	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 1	   ! 7%	  
! 3	  
! No,	   if	   the	   tech-­‐
nology	   is	   con-­‐
sidered	   the	  
best	   choice	   for	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 7	   ! 47%	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the	  project	  
! 4	   ! Other	   	   	  
! 	   ! 3	   ! 20%	  




! Obviously,	  we	  want	  to	  avoid	  royalty	  obligations	  whenever	  possible.	  As	  stated	  above,	  existence	  of	  a	  patent	  around	  a	  part-­‐
nered	  technology	  is	  otherwise	  a	  minor	  factor	  contributing	  to	  our	  decision-­‐making.	  
! we	  only	  ensure	  that	  IP	  situation	  will	  allow	  making	  products	  available	  at	  affordable	  prices	  in	  developing	  countries	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 15	  
	  
19.	  	  Is	  it	  useful	  for	  third	  parties	  to	  share	  patents	  with	  the	  PDP	  (allowing	  the	  PDP	  uncompensated	  use	  of	  a	  patent)?	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Yes	   	   	  
! 	   ! 13	   ! 87%	  
! 2	   ! No	   	   	  
! 	   ! 2	   ! 13%	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 15	   ! 100%	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 15	  
	  
20.	  	  Is	  there	  a	  particular	  R&D	  stage	  in	  which	  sharing	  of	  patents	  is	  more	  useful?	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Yes	   	   	  
! 	   ! 4	   ! 36%	  
! 2	   ! No,	   all	   are	  
equally	  useful	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 7	   ! 64%	  




! Early	  in	  development	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! R&D	  and	  Process	  development	  
! Early	  development	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 11	  
	  
21.	  	  Is	  the	  PDP	  a	  producer	  of	  IP	  (claim	  ownership	  of	  any	  form	  of	  IP)?	  	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Yes	   	   	  
! 	   ! 11	   ! 69%	  
! 2	   ! No	   	   	  
! 	   ! 5	   ! 31%	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 16	   ! 100%	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 16	  
	  
22.	  	  Does	  the	  PDP	  produce	  this	  form	  of	  IP?	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Patents	   	   	  
! 	   ! 5	   ! 42%	  
! 2	   ! Trademarks	   	  	  
! 	   ! 0	   ! 0%	  
! 3	   ! Copyright	   	   	  
! 	   ! 3	   ! 25%	  
! 4	   ! Trade	  Secrets	   	  	  
! 	   ! 0	   ! 0%	  
! 5	   ! Any	  other	   	   	  
! 	   ! 4	   ! 33%	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 12	   ! 100%	  
	  
! Any	  other	  
! n/a	  
! All	  of	  the	  above	  except	  copyright	  
! We	  rarely	  prosecute	  our	  "own"	  patents,	  but	  we	  do	  refer	   to	  MVI's	  Background	  Technology	   in	  our	  agreements	   (in	  effect,	  
that	  would	  be	  mostly	  know-­‐how	  and	  trade	  secret-­‐type	  of	  IP).	  
! data	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! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 12	  
	  
23.	  	  Does	  the	  PDP	  have	  a	  policy	  on	  who	  may	  seek	  patents	  on	  the	  results	  of	  R&D	  projects	  in	  the	  PDP	  portfolio	  (i.e.	  whether	  by	  the	  
PDP,	  individual	  PDP	  staff,	  the	  PDP	  with	  partners,	  or	  partners	  alone)?	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Yes	   	   	  
! 	   ! 9	   ! 60%	  
! 2	   ! No	   	   	  
! 	   ! 6	   ! 40%	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 15	   ! 100%	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 15	  
	  
24.	  	  What	  is	  the	  policy	  on	  who	  may	  seek	  patents	  on	  the	  results	  of	  R&D	  projects	  in	  the	  PDP	  portfolio?	  	  
! Text	  Response	  
! We	  do	  no	  seek	  ownership	  of	  patents,	  we	  let	  the	  partner	  file	  if	  interested	  against	  full	  non-­‐exclusive	  licence	  rights	  to	  use	  the	  
patent	  inour	  activities.	  
! The	  inventor	  applies	  for	  the	  patent	  but	  assigns	  it	  to	  IVI.	  
! All	  patents	  are	  assigned	  to	  TB	  Alliance	  
! Partners	  seek	  patents	  
! Institution	  and	  joined	  inventors	  
! Either	  the	  partner	  decides	  on	  its	  own	  (pharma	  company)	  or	  MMV	  and	  partners	  decide	  together.	  MMV	  may	  decide	  on	  its	  
own	  if	  all	  the	  IP	  rights	  were	  assigned	  to	  MMV.	  
! By	  PDP	  If	  solely	  developed	  by	  PDP	  employees;	   Jointly	  with	  collaborators	   if	   jointly	  developed;	  By	  collaborator	   if	   it	   is	  only	  
developed	  by	  collaborator	  
! owner(s)	  of	  the	  patentable	  results	  may	  seek	  the	  patents	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 8	  
	  
25.	  	  For	  the	  PDP,	  what	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  producing	  patents?	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! To	   generate	  
income	   via	  
	   	   ! 2	   ! 13%	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! As	   a	   defensive	  
strategy	   to	  
avoid	   third	   par-­‐
ties	   from	   un-­‐
authorized	   use	  
of	   the	   technol-­‐
ogy	   or	   claiming	  
ownership	   of	  
patents	   over	  
the	  technology	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 7	   ! 44%	  
! 3	  
! To	   license	   pa-­‐
tents	   to	   in-­‐
dustry	   to	   raise	  
their	   interest	   in	  
partnering	   in	  
manufacturing	   -­‐	  
distribution	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 8	   ! 50%	  
! 4	   ! Any	  other	   	   	  
! 	   ! 8	   ! 50%	  
	  
! Any	  other	  
! None	  
! n/a	  
! Control	  the	  development	  and	  manufacturing	  of	  a	  compound	  to	  ensure	  proper	  use,	  quality	  and	  access	  
! As	  stated,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  major	  driver	  in	  our	  strategy,	  as	  our	  product	  is	  not	  a	  typical	  dual	  market	  product.	  
! NA	  
! For	  cross	  licensing	  so	  that	  Aeras	  can	  access	  technology	  owned	  by	  others	  
! To	  ensure	  access	  to	  products	  at	  affordable	  prices	  in	  the	  target	  populations	  
! to	  fulfil	  pre-­‐existing	  obligations	  to	  commercial	  partner	  &	  funders	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Min	  Value	   ! 1	  
! Max	  Value	   ! 4	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 16	  
	  
26.	  	  Which	  of	  these	  situations	  apply	  to	  the	  results	  of	  R&D	  projects	  in	  the	  PDP	  portfolio?	  (in	  relation	  to	  who	  can	  be	  an	  assignee	  of	  
the	  patent,	  not	  inventor)	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! The	   PDP	   can	  
hold	  a	  patent	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 9	   ! 60%	  
! 2	   ! The	   PDP	   and	   	   	   ! 9	   ! 60%	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partner(s)	   can	  




! PDP	   staff	   or	  
member(s)	   can	  
can	   hold	   a	   pat-­‐
ent	  in	  their	  own	  
name	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 1	   ! 7%	  
! 4	  
! A	   partner	   can	  
hold	   a	   patent,	  
with	  pre-­‐agreed	  
licensing	   terms	  
to	  the	  PDP	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 10	   ! 67%	  
! 5	   ! Any	  other	   	   	  
! 	   ! 2	   ! 13%	  
	  
! Any	  other	  
! n/a	  
! A	  partner	  can	  hold	  a	  patent	  under	  the	  condition	  to	  make	  the	  products	  available	  at	  affordable	  prices	  in	  target	  populations	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 15	  
	  
27.	  	  To	  what	  extent	  does	  the	  PDP	  share	  patents	  or	  is	  considering	  sharing	  patents	  (allow	  a	  third	  party	  uncompensated	  use)?	  
! Text	  Response	  
! If	  applicable,	  unlimited	  use	  without	  compensation	  of	  IP	  for	  non-­‐profit	  goals	  
! N/A	  
! Not	  at	  all	  because	  it	  has	  no	  patents.	  
! We	  are	  comfortable	  licensing	  our	  patents	  on	  an	  exclusive	  basis	  in	  the	  developed	  world	  and	  on	  a	  non-­‐exclusive	  basis	  in	  the	  
least	  developed	  countries	  
! Not	  
! Not	  sharing	  
! We	  will	  consider	  sharing	  whenever	  it	  furthers	  achievement	  of	  our	  Global	  Access	  objectives.	  
! N/A	  
! with	  academic	  partners	  
! it	  may	  happen	  (hasn't	  happened	  yet)	  
! Have	  cross-­‐licensed	  or	  shared	  our	  patents	  in	  return	  for	  global	  access	  to	  the	  final	  product.	  
! Frequently	  
! All	  partners	  have	  right	  to	  use	  for	  non-­‐commercial	  activities	  
	  
	  	   123	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 13	  
	  
28.	  	  For	  the	  PDP,	  is	  open	  R&D	  collaboration	  useful	  (no	  patent	  claims	  for	  results	  of	  the	  R&D	  collaboration)?	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Yes	   	   	  
! 	   ! 10	   ! 67%	  
! 2	   ! No	   	   	  
! 	   ! 3	   ! 20%	  
! 3	   ! In	   a	   particular	  
research	  stage	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 2	   ! 13%	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 15	   ! 100%	  
	  
! In	  a	  particular	  research	  stage	  
! Yes,	  when	  encouraging	  companies	  to	  work	  with	  us	  in	  identifying	  optimal	  combination	  drug	  regimens	  
! Discovery	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 15	  
	  
29.	  	  Which	  of	  the	  following	  factors	  influence	  patent	  licensing	  agreements	  or	  R&D	  agreements	  between	  the	  PDP	  and	  partners?	  	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! R&D	  stage	   	   	  
! 	   ! 12	   ! 80%	  
! 2	  
! Target	  profile	  of	  the	  
product	   to	   be	   de-­‐
veloped	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 11	   ! 73%	  
! 3	   ! Target	   price	   of	  
medical	  product	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 8	   ! 53%	  
! 4	   ! Type	  of	  partner	   	   	  
! 	   ! 9	   ! 60%	  
! 5	  
! Choice	  of	  sources	  to	  
obtain	   the	   technol-­‐
ogy/knowledge/res
ources	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 7	   ! 47%	  
! 6	   ! Specific	  disease	  that	  
is	  targeted	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 10	   ! 67%	  
! 7	   ! Regions	   /	   countries	   	   	   ! 9	   ! 60%	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that	  are	  targeted	   ! 	  
! 8	  
! Markets	   that	   are	  
targeted	   (private,	  
public,	   purchasing	  
entities)	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 7	   ! 47%	  
! 9	  
! Source	   of	   funds	   of	  
the	   PDP	   (public,	  
philanthropic,	   in-­‐
dustry)	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 6	   ! 40%	  
! 10	   ! Estimated	   cost	   of	  
production	  
	   	  
! 	   ! 6	   ! 40%	  
! 11	   ! Any	  other	   	   	  
! 	   ! 2	   ! 13%	  
	  
! Any	  other	  
! n/a	  
! Commitment	  to	  providing	  access	  to	  the	  product	  to	  those	  most	  in	  need	  in	  developing	  countries.	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 15	  
	  
30.	  	  Are	  pre-­‐existing	  patents	  held	  by	  partners	  ever	  an	  obstacle	  for	  the	  successful	  conclusion	  of	  partnerships	  at	  any	  R&D	  stage?	  	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Never	   	   	  
! 	   ! 3	   ! 21%	  
! 2	   ! Rarely	   	   	  
! 	   ! 5	   ! 36%	  
! 3	   ! Sometimes	   	   	  
! 	   ! 6	   ! 43%	  
! 4	   ! Often	   	  	  
! 	   ! 0	   ! 0%	  
! 5	   ! All	  of	  the	  time	   	  	  
! 	   ! 0	   ! 0%	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 14	   ! 100%	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 14	  
	  
31.	  	  Are	  pre-­‐existing	  patents	  held	  by	  the	  PDP	  ever	  an	  obstacle	  for	  the	  successful	  conclusion	  of	  partnerships	  at	  any	  R&D	  stage?	  	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	   ! Response	   ! %	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! 	  
! 1	   ! Never	   	   	  
! 	   ! 11	   ! 79%	  
! 2	   ! Rarely	   	   	  
! 	   ! 3	   ! 21%	  
! 3	   ! Sometimes	   	  	  
! 	   ! 0	   ! 0%	  
! 4	   ! Often	   	  	  
! 	   ! 0	   ! 0%	  
! 5	   ! All	  of	  the	  Time	   	  	  
! 	   ! 0	   ! 0%	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 14	   ! 100%	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 14	  
	  
32.	  	  Are	  negotiations	  on	  terms	  for	  ownership	  of	  future	  patents	  ever	  an	  obstacle	  for	  the	  successful	  conclusion	  of	  partnerships	  at	  
any	  R&D	  stage?	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Never	   	   	  
! 	   ! 1	   ! 7%	  
! 2	   ! Rarely	   	   	  
! 	   ! 6	   ! 40%	  
! 3	   ! Sometimes	   	   	  
! 	   ! 7	   ! 47%	  
! 4	   ! Often	   	   	  
! 	   ! 1	   ! 7%	  
! 5	   ! All	  of	  the	  Time	   	  	  
! 	   ! 0	   ! 0%	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 15	   ! 100%	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 15	  
	  
33.	  	  Has	  the	  PDPs	  done	  any	  opposition/invalidity	  of	  any	  IP	  held	  by	  third	  party?	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Yes	   	  	  
! 	   ! 0	   ! 0%	  
! 2	   ! No	   	   	   ! 16	   ! 100%	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! 	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 16	   ! 100%	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 16	  
	  
34.	  	  Can	  you	  describe	  a	  case/cases?	  	  
! Text	  Response	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 0	  
	  
35.	  	  Has	  the	  PDP	  had	  any	  case	  of	  patent	  litigation/infringement	  to	  deal	  with?	  	  
! #	   ! Answer	   	  	  
! 	   ! Response	   ! %	  
! 1	   ! Yes	   	   	  
! 	   ! 3	   ! 19%	  
! 2	   ! No	   	   	  
! 	   ! 13	   ! 81%	  
! 	   ! Total	   ! 	   ! 16	   ! 100%	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 16	  
	  
36.	  	  Can	  you	  describe	  a	  case/cases?	  	  
! Text	  Response	  
! Never	  any	  litigation/nfringement	  issues	  
! We	  have	  been	  cautious	  about	  proceeding	  with	  a	  particular	  compound	  held	  by	  a	  biotech	  company	  because	  of	  the	  patents	  
surrounding	  that	  compound	  and	  our	  inability	  to	  obtain	  a	  license	  to	  that	  compound	  




! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 4	  
	  
37.	  	  Can	  you	  share	  any	  case	  studies,	  best	  practice	  or	  examples	  of	  IP	  management	  /	  licensing	  deals	  by	  the	  PDP?	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! Text	  Response	  
! We	  are	  currently	  in	  discussions	  regarding	  the	  licensing	  of	  a	  Phase	  3-­‐ready	  regimen	  to	  a	  global	  partner	  where	  we	  are	  offer-­‐
ing	  a	  non-­‐exclusive	  	  license	  to	  all	  countries	  of	  the	  world	  except	  the	  High	  Income	  Countries	  where	  we	  are	  offering	  an	  exclu-­‐
sive	  license.	  Our	  partner	  will	  pay	  us	  royalties	  on	  sales	  where	  they	  have	  an	  exclusive	  license.	  
! Licensing	  deals:	  it	  is	  good	  to	  "stage"	  your	  agreements	  according	  to	  the	  stage	  of	  the	  project.	  E.g.,	  if	  you	  fund	  an	  early-­‐stage	  
feasibility	  study	  where	  you	  are	  mostly	   interested	  in	  the	  resulting	  data,	   it	  doesn't	  make	  any	  sense	  to	  negotiate	  complete	  
terms	  relating	  to,	  say,	  the	  commercialization	  of	  a	  product	  resulting	  from	  the	  use	  of	  the	  technology	  applied	  in	  the	  study.	  
! IPM	  has	  several	  non-­‐exclusive	  licenses	  for	  ARV	  technologies	  
! n/a	  
	  
! Statistic	   ! Value	  
! Total	  Responses	   ! 4	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